

missing factor 'gachchhatâm' is admitted as forming part of the first mantra, it is found to be incapable of being taken along with the second, because of the plural number of the noun 'aṅgâni' (which would take the verb 'gachchhantâm' and not 'gachchhatâm'); and thus the factor in question not being equally construable with all the mantras in question it cannot be taken along with the third mantra, through the nominative in this, 'yajña-patiḥ,' is in the singular; and as such quite compatible with the singular of 'gachchhatâm.' It is on account of the intervention of the unconnected second mantra, between (1) and (3), that this verb 'gachchatâm' is not taken with (3).

And thus the missing factor of (2) and (3) not being found in the Veda, we are forced to admit one out of ordinary parlance; hence in both of these we supply the necessary word from without. And though the word 'gachchhantâm' (in the second mantra) and 'gachchhatâm' (in the third) are not actually pronounced, yet their existence must be admitted as otherwise the signification of the sentence would remain incomplete for want of a verb.

Thus then in the case in question there is no Anuṣaṅga.

The use of this discussion lies in the fact that, if certain words formed an 'Anuṣaṅga,' they would form a mantra; and as such, any mistake in the pronunciation of these would have to be accompanied by expiatory rites; whereas if the words supplied are out of ordinary sentences, they do not constitute a mantra and hence any mistakes in pronunciation, etc., are not so serious as to entail an expiatory rite.

To this end it has been declared that, (1) that which is directly mentioned in the Veda, and (2) that which is brought in by means of an Anuṣaṅga, are counted as having the character of a mantra, whereas all-sentences of ordinary parlance, being similar to assumed sentences, can never be recognised to have the character of mantras.

This is the end of the first Pâda of Adhyâya II.

SECOND ADHYÂYA.

SECOND PADA.

Adhikaraṇa I.—Difference in the Apûrva of subsidiary sacrifices. Difference of Actions based upon the difference of words signifying the action.

SÛTRA II. ii. 1.

शब्दान्तरे कर्मभेदः कृतानुबन्धत्वात् ॥ १ ॥

शब्दान्तरे Śabdântare, the word being different. कर्मभेदः Karmabhedah, difference of action. कृतानुबन्धत्वात् Kṛitânubandhatvât, because of its being specially qualified.

1. When there is a different word there is a different action because it is specially qualified.—1.

COMMENTARY.

In the foregoing introductory chapter we have dwelt with all matters connected, directly and indirectly, with the subject under consideration ; and now we are going to take up the subject-matter of the Adhyâya in the shape of the difference among actions on the ground of the difference among words, etc.

And first of all we take up the differences caused by the difference of expressions, because it is this difference that points out most clearly the difference among actions. In connection with this we should have cited the examples of all verbal forms connected with one or many verbal affixes such as *yajati*, *dadati*, *juhoti*, *nirvapati*, etc. The Bhâṣya has cited only three—‘*yajati*, *dadati* and *juhoti*,’ because, inasmuch as all these denote the *giving away* of something, their significations are all akin, and as such they naturally appear to have identical meaning.

And on this point, inasmuch as there are *three* kinds of *Pûrvapakṣa* introduced in the Bhâṣya, it seems as if the doubt on the point in question should also have been expressed in three ways.

These are :—(1) Do the three Bhâvanâs denoted by the three words (*yajati*, etc.)—bring about a single *Apûrva*, or three distinct *Apûrvas* ? (2) Do the three denotations of the three roots qualify a single *Bhâvanâ*, or three distinct *Bhâvanâs* ? (3) Do the three roots denote a single object or three distinct objects.

As a matter of fact, however, there is only *one doubt* in connection with this subject. In the case of the three verbs, is there only one *Bhâvanâ* as qualified by the denotations of the three roots, or is there a distinct *Bhâvanâ* for the denotation of each root? What the word '*karma*' (in the sûtra) denotes is the *Bhâvanâ* as qualified by the denotation of the root. And it is the *Bhâvanâ* that would be differentiated by means of different words, etc. As for the *Apûrva*, inasmuch as it is not directly expressed by the words in question, and as it follows in the wake of the action itself, it cannot form a subject of separate treatment. Though the "unity of three root meanings" spoken of in the *Bhâṣya* is not possible in the case of all root-endings, yet it might be mentioned, somehow or other in connection with the roots '*yajati*,' etc., in question, but in the case of these, though it may be possible yet much stress should not be laid upon this unity. Thus then the root-meanings being really different, there seems to be yet another ground for doubt in the mind of the *Pûrvapakṣi*, viz., is the *Bhâvanâ* mentioned as subservient to the root-meaning, and as such does it end with each root-meaning? or are root-meanings subserving to the *Bhâvanâ*, and as such they conjointly serve to qualify it?

On this we have the following

Pûrvapakṣa (A).

"It is *conjointly* that the root-meaning qualifies the *Bhâvanâ*. Inasmuch as the *Bhâṣya* often uses the word '*Samudâya*' (combination)—as in the sentence *Samudâya—Schhikîrhitah*, '*Samudâyâdikâmapûrvam*,' *nachâśabdah samudâyah*, etc.—and as it speaks of the *Apûrva* as one only, it seems clear that the idea desired to be conveyed was that *a single Apûrva follows from all the three Bhâvanâs*. And in support of this idea the *Bhâṣya* brings forward the following arguments: In the first instance, that which is not seen is concluded to be *non est*; and also so long as (in the absence of the unseen factor) there appears no incompatibility in what is actually seen (with what is spoken of), it is concluded that the unseen does not exist; it is only when there is a contradiction between the *seen* and the *spoken*, that we can rightly assume the existence of the *unseen*; and hence, when the contradiction is removed by the assumption of only one such unseen factor, there need be no assumption of many such factors. It is with a view to this that it has been declared: 'When there is a contradiction, then alone can an unseen factor be assumed, whereby the *seen* or the *heard* would become supported.' And under the circumstances if there were no difference—on the ground of simplicity—

between the assumption of one and that of many factors, then we might go on assuming many factors; but, as a matter of fact, we do perceive such a difference, hence it must be admitted that a single unseen '*Apūrva*' follows from the combination of the three *Bhāvanās*." [Thus is *Pūrvapakṣa* A.]

This statement of the *Pūrvapakṣa* however, is open to the following objection: 'What is that word that has laid down the combination of *Bhāvanās*, wherefrom the single *Apūrva* would follow?' And in view of this objection the *Bhāṣya* states the *Pūrvapakṣa* somewhat differently as follows:—

Pūrvapakṣa (B).

The Action laid down by the three sentences is one only, but variously coloured, like the rainbow, by the denotations of the three roots; and in support of this the following arguments have been brought forward: If we accept this conclusion then it is necessary to make but a slight assumption of the unseen factor. If the actions are held to be different, then it would be necessary to assume many unseen factors, for which there could not be the least justification. For these reasons 'a single composite is meant to be expressed,'—by which it is meant that there are many parts of a single action. Therefore we must conclude that in the word '*yajati*' the first part '*yaji*' signifies the sacrifice and the second part signifies the *Bhāvanā* and so forth. Some people seem to think that the expression '*Athavā*' in the *Bhāṣya* is a mistaken reading. But it could be very well explained in the following manner: The *Bhāṣya* has brought forward two sets of arguments in favour of the *Pūrvapakṣa*; having explained the first of these, in the sense of the advantage of assuming less of the unseen than what is necessary in the other theory, it is only right that it should introduce the second by *Athavā* (or *secondly*). That is to say, the sense of the *Bhāṣya* comes to be this: It is not necessary for us to point out the disadvantage, in the other theory, of having to assume much more of the unseen element, as it is by means of the words themselves that we shall prove the *Bhāvanā* to be one only. And it proceeds to do this by showing that though the first parts of the verbs differ from one another, yet inasmuch as all of them have the same affix, their denotations are identical. This is what is meant by the sentence (in the *Bhāṣya*): '*tathā dadatitipurvo dātatyartham uttarastameva bhāvayediti.*' The latter portion of this seems at first sight to mean that the second party shows that the object of the *Bhāvanā* is the root-meaning; but this is not what is meant; because it has been shown that in all cases that which is denoted by the root can never be the object of the *Bhāvanā*; and also

because any such assertion could never be of any use to the *Pûrvapakṣi*. In the same manner it cannot be said that the root-meaning is *described* by the second part of the verb. Therefore we must construe the sentence as follows: On the word '*dadati*' the first part (the root *dâ*) signifies *to give*; and the second part (the affix) serves to describe that *Bhâvanâ* which has been previously denoted by the affix in '*yajeta*'—the only purpose of this descriptive reiterations by '*dadati*' of the previously denoted *Bhâvanâ* being the connecting of the said *Bhâvanâ* with the denotation of a root other than the former (*yaji*). The same may be said with regard to the word '*juhoti*' also. That such is the sense of the *Bhâṣya* is also shown by the fact that in connection with the word '*yajeta*' the '*Bhâṣya*' does not make use of the word '*anuvadati*' (describes) the only reason whereof being that in this case there is no *Bhâvanâ*, previously expressed, that could be described (by the affix in '*yajeta*'). If the *Bhâṣya* had meant the denotation of the root to be the object of the *Bhâvanâ* then this would apply to the first verb, as well as to the other two (and thus there could be no difference in the way of explaining the signification of the three verbs); and the *Bhâṣya* could not have left off the first verb ('*yajeta*') and made the declaration (of the root denotation being the object of the *Bhâvanâ*) with regard to the last two only. Consequently we must take the *Bhâṣya* only as pointing to the singleness of the *Bhâvanâ*. Thus then, there is a single *Bhâvanâ*, and a single *Action*, in the case in question.

In answer to the above we have the following *Siddhânta* :—

Whenever there is a difference in the denotations of the roots, we must conclude that the *Bhâvanâ* also is distinct in each case. And when a *Bhâvanâ* has once appeared as qualified by the denotation of one root, it is not possible for the same *Bhâvanâ* to be subsequently qualified by others as well.

That is to say, though the word denoting the *Bhâvanâ* is on only and its denotation—the *Bhâvanâ*—forms the predominant factor, yet whenever there is a difference in the qualifying root-denotation, the *Bhâvanâ* must be admitted to be distinct also. Nor, is it possible for three root-denotations to fall in within a single *Bhâvanâ*. Nor can they form a single composite whole, because all of them equally have the same purpose of expressing the instrumental factor (of the *Bhâvanâ*); and also because each of them is expressed by a different word, quite independently of another. Nor is it possible for a single root-denotation to include within itself three root-denotations; and it is not possible for three roots, independent of one another, to be laid down in a single word, for

the sake of any affix ; because in the matter of the adapting of affixes Pāṇini uses the word 'dhātoḥ' (III-i-91), where great significance attaches to the singular number (and this shows that in one word one root can be adapted to only one affix). Nor is it possible for the three verbs to form a single sentence ; as they do not serve the same purpose, they do not appear incomplete on being separated (and as such they do not fulfil the conditions of syntactical unity) ; and it is not possible to make a single sentence out of them, by assuming a single *Apūrva* (as following from them) ; because such an assumption has been negatived under *Sūtra* II-i-47, and also because the difference or non-difference among Actions is not dependent upon a difference or non-difference among *Apūrvas* ; as a matter of fact it is quite the contrary (*i.e.*, the difference or non-difference of *Apūrvas* depending upon that of Actions).

For these reasons the actions expressed by the three verbs must be held to be different. In support of this we have the following : when a piece of rock-crystal has been spoken of as *red*, the mention of *black* could not but be taken as referring to another piece of crystal ; in the same manner, when one word has spoken of the *Bhāvanā* as connected with one root-denotation, the mention of other roots could not but be taken as referring to other *Bhāvanās*.

Adhikaraṇa II.—Difference of Actions based upon Repetition of the same word : as in the case of the Samits and other sacrifices.

SŪTRA II. II. 2.

एकस्यैवं पुनःश्रुतिरविशेषादनर्थकं हि स्यात् ॥ २ ॥

एकस्य Ekasya, of one word. एवं Evam, also. पुनःश्रुतिः Punahśrutih, repetition. अविशेषात् Avišeṣāt, if there were no distinction. अनर्थकं Anarthakam, useless. हि Hi, as. स्यात् Syât, would be.

2. The repetition of the same word also (is a means of differentiation) ; as because the word does not lay down any specific particulars the repetition would be useless.—2.

COMMENTARY.

We meet with such sentences in the Veda as :—“ samidhoyajati, vidoyajati tanunpatamyajati, varhiryajati, swâhâkâram yajati ” ;—here we find each sentence mentioning the Action by means of the same word ‘yajati.’ The question then arises—does the word ‘yajati’ repeated five times lay down one Action and one *Apūrva* or five Actions and five *Apūrvas* ?

The Pûrvapakṣa used is thus stated in the Tantravârtika :—

They indicate only *one* Apûrva ; because as shown in the previous *Adhikaraṇa*, though the signification of the affix be the same, yet a difference in the roots serves to differentiate the Actions ; when, however, the root also is the same, what would be there to point out the Actions to be different ?

Further, on the utterance of the first sentence—*samidhoyajati*—an idea of the Action ‘*yâga*’ presents itself to the mind ; and hence when the same verb is pronounced again, the Action denoted by this is at once recognised as the same that had previously come to the mind ; and as such the repetition does not point out any difference in the Action.

The Siddhânta is that the given words denote five distinct Actions and Apûrvas. And this on the following grounds :—

The sentences in question occur in connection with the Prayaja sacrifices performed in course of the Darśa Pûrṇamâsa ; the verb ‘*yajati*’ in these sentences cannot be taken as enjoining an original sacrifice, as this sacrifice is already laid down by the text laying down the original Darśa Pûrṇamâsa. Each repetition of the word ‘*yajati*’ therefore, must be taken as *referring* to that original sacrifice ;—on this account the words ‘*samidhaḥ*,’ ‘*tanunputam*’ and the rest can be taken as laying down either the materials to be offered or the deities to whom the offering is to be made ;—as a matter of fact, however, we know that both these accessories of the original sacrifice are laid down in another sentence, directly connected with the primary injunction of the original sacrifice—*agneyoṣ-takapalobhavati*, where Agni is mentioned as the deity and the cake baked on eight pans as the material ;—if then the words ‘*samidhaḥ*’ etc., must be taken as injunctions of accessories and *not* in connection with that same sacrifice (and not in connection with five other sacrifices) each of them must be taken as mentioning a distinct deity which would mean that the actual action of *Sacrificing* or offering is to be repeated as many times as there are deities mentioned ;—so that each ‘*yajati*’ stands for a distinct act of offering leading to a distinct Apûrva.

In the above reasoning the Siddhânta has proceeded after admitting for the sake of argument that the sentences lay down accessories. As a matter of fact, however, this is not possible : the word ‘*Samidhaḥ*,’ etc., ending as they do with accusative cannot be taken as denoting materials to be offered as has been shown under Sûtra II-i-11, 12. Nor again can they be taken as mentioning the deity as will be shown later on under Sûtra IX-i-9. Thus in any case the sentence must be taken as laying down five distinct Actions and five distinct Apûrvas.

Adhikaraṇa III.—Treating of the relation of subserviency between the Agharas and the Agneya, etc.

SŪTRAS. II. ii. 3 to 8.

प्रकर्णन्तु पौर्णमास्यां रूपावचनात् ॥ ३ ॥

प्रकर्णं Prakarṇam, the context. तु Tu, verily. पौर्णमास्यां Paurṇamāsyām, to the Paurṇmāsī. रूपावचनात् Rûpāvachnât, none of the details being mentioned.

3. The context certainly refers to the Paurṇamāsī (as the principle); specially (with regard to the other sacrifices the details are not mentioned).—3.

COMMENTARY.

The present Adhikaraṇa has been introduced as dealing with the exceptions to the conclusion arrived at in the foregoing Adhikaraṇa. There are two texts—

We have the text—‘*yadâgneyaṣṭak’opalô’ mâvaryâyâm paurṇamāsyam châchyuto bhavati*’: and then come the six sentences—(1) ‘*upâmsuyajau,*’—(2) ‘*âghâramâghârayati,*’—(3) ‘*âjyabhâganyajati,*’—(4) ‘*sviṣṭakrite samavadyati,*’—(5) ‘*patnisamyâjan yajati,*’—(6) ‘*samiṣṭayajurjuhoti*’; and lastly, all these are followed by the text ‘*ya evamvidvân paurṇamāsīm yajati ya evamvidvân amâvâsyâm yajati, &c.*’

Now the question arises,—do the two verbs in the two last sentences lay down two entirely independent actions or do they only refer to the six actions that have been laid down by the preceding sentences which go to constitute the Dârśa Pûrṇamāsa sacrifices. As regards the six actions the Agneya and the rest themselves that they are distinct from one another is shown by their difference in their accessories.

On this point the Pûrvapakṣa view is as follows :—

Inasmuch as all the sacrifices in question are mentioned by *different words* and also by *repetitions of words*, they must be all of equal importance. Though these two reasons—Difference of words and Repetition—are not connected directly with the fact of ‘Equal Importance,’ yet they are taken along with this, through the difference in actions (that these would indicate), which is also implied in the assertion of ‘Equal Importance’ (as shown above). That is to say, the sacrifices denoted by the two ‘*yajetas*’ are shown to be different from those of the Actions (mentioned along with the Dârśa-Pûrṇamāsa) that are not yâga (but Homa, etc.) by the *difference in words*; while they are shown to be different from the *yâgas*, by the repetition of the word ‘*yajeta*’; and hence they must all be

taken as of equal importance. (That is to say, when each 'yajeta' mentions a distinct sacrifice, all the sacrifices mentioned in the passages quoted become independent of one another, and as such all equally are *primary* sacrifices.)

Nor could any special purpose be served by taking the two 'yajati's in question as mere references to the previously enjoined sacrifices (because the only purpose that is found to be served by such references is the pointing out of fresh accessories); and as a matter of fact we do not find any accessories in the shape of materials, etc., mentioned in the two sentences in question; and as such we cannot make the injunctive potency of these 'yajetas' give up the function of laying down the actions themselves. And thus also even when the sacrifices enjoined by the two *yajatis* in question are distinct from the *Agneyâ*, etc., they are found to have distinct forms of their own; and hence they must be admitted to be distinct actions; and as such, there being nothing to show that the results follow from the six primaries *Agneyâ* and the rest only, (because the only sentence that had been accepted as showing this was 'ya evam,' etc., which however has been shown to be the injunction of a distinct sacrifice altogether), the character of the primary belongs equally to all the sacrifices mentioned in the various sentences quoted (i.e., to the *Prayâja*, etc., the *Âghâra*, etc., as well as to the *Âgneya*, etc).

The *Pûrvapakṣa* to this *Adhikaraṇa* has also been stated in the following somewhat different form :—

We admit that the sacrifices are distinct; but we cannot admit of the fact of the character of the Primary belonging equally to all. Because the names '*Amâvasyâ*' or '*Darśa*' and '*Paurṇamâsî*' would apply only to some of the sacrifices, and not to all; and the result is spoken of as following from these that are qualified by these names; and as such there can be no equality in the character of all the sacrifices. That is to say, the words '*Darśa*' and '*Paurṇamâsa*' denote sacrifices with a qualification (that of being named by these words); and as from the sentence—'*Darśa paurṇamâsâbhyâm svargakârmō yajeta*'—it is clear that it is only from such qualified sacrifices that the particular result could follow, we must take these alone as the primary sacrifices; and all other sacrifices mentioned along with them (and without any distinct results of their own) must be accepted as the subsidiaries of these two. It may be noted that this second *Pûrvapakṣa* is at variance with the *Siddhânta* only as regards the difference of the sacrifices mentioned by the two 'yajetas' from the primary sacrifices of the *Darśa Paurṇamâsa*. The final form of *Pûrvapakṣa* is

simply that inasmuch as the application of the names Darśa and Paurṇamāsa depends upon the signification of the root 'yajī' all the sacrifices in question must be held to be equally primary.

In answer to the above we have the following Siddhânta :—

The words 'yajeta' in these sentences, or the words 'Amāvasyā' and 'Paurṇamāsa' do not denote *sacrifice in general*; nor do you (we hold the sentences to lay down two independent sacrifices) admit of these words pointing to all the sacrifices in question. Then all that you can do is to make them lay down two independent sacrifices. But in that case, inasmuch as the details (material deity, etc.) of these sacrifices are not mentioned, no one would be found to perform them; and hence the sentence would become wholly futile. If, however, they are taken as referring to the sacrifices mentioned in the text, then the materials and the deities of all these sacrifices, as also the particular points of time at which they have to be performed, being found to be duly mentioned, the full form of the sacrifices becomes known; and as such the sentence becomes utilised in pointing out the time at which they should be performed.

It has been argued above that the material and the Deity of the four sacrifices are also clearly cognisable. But though it is true that the common material, *Dhruva*, might be taken as the material employed, yet inasmuch as there is no mention of a Deity, the sacrifice remains as indistinct as ever.

Nor it is possible for the Deity to be indicated by the words of the *mantras* employed; because the *mantras* in question are distinctly pointed out, by the *order* in which they occur, to belong to the *Ājyayabhāgas*.

For these reasons there can be no Injunction of the Deity, through the sentences brought forward; because these have been shown to have no connection with the matter. And hence the sacrifice held to be enjoined by the sentence 'Ya evām, etc.,' not having its details of material and Deity clearly mentioned, it cannot be taken as one different from those previously laid down. The result being found to follow from only those sacrifices that go to form the *composite whole*, all the sacrifices other than these must be taken as subsidiary to them (the former ones the Agneya and the rest, being taken as the *Primary Sacrifices*, and as such they are not all of 'equal importance.'

विशेषदर्शनाच्च सर्वेषां समेषु ह्यप्रवृत्तिः स्यात् ॥४॥

विशेषदर्शनाच्च Viśeṣa Darśanât Cha, also because we find peculiar quantity. सर्वेषां Sarvesâm, of all. समेषु Sameṣu, if equal. हि Hi because. अप्रवृत्तिः Apravṛttiḥ, they could not appear in them. स्यात् Syât, would be.

4. Also because we find a peculiarity (in the shape of the appearance of the subsidiary Prayâja in the modifications of the Primaries) (we cannot hold all to be equally Primaries) because they (the Prayâjas) could not appear in them (the modifications) if all were equal—4.

COMMENTARY.

If the sacrifices mentioned by the sentences ‘*ya evam etc.*’ were distinct from all others, then the Aghāra and the other subsidiaries would all equally be Primaries ; and, hence, in accordance with the *Sûtra* VIII-i-20 the subsidiary *Prayâjas*, etc., also, like the Agneya and the other Primaries, would enter into the instrumental factor (in the bringing about of the principal result) ; and as such they would no longer be able to supply the want of the method in the Bhâvanâ (bringing about) of the modifications of the Primary, which has its *Instrument* or *means* already laid down ; and as such these modifications would no longer take into themselves these *Prayâjas*, etc.; they are actually found to be taken up by these modifications ; as otherwise we could not have a text enjoining ‘*Kṛṣṇala*’ as the material to be used at the *Prayâja*, when performed in connection with the modifications.

Consequently in order to establish the fact of the *Prayâja*, etc., being subsidiary to the *Agnêya* and the rest, we must take the two sentences in question as referring to the previously mentioned sacrifices.

गुणस्तु श्रुतिसंयोगात् ॥ ५ ॥

गुणस्तु *Guṇastu*, accessories. श्रुतिसंयोगात् *Śruti saṁyogât*, because of direct mention.

5. Objection : “The sentences (*Yadâgneya*, etc.) lay down accessories, because of the direct mention (of the root ‘*yaji*’ in the other sentences).”—5.

COMMENTARY.

If we accept distinct sacrifices to be laid down by the sentences ‘*ya evam, etc.*’ then we have the following advantages : (1) The singular number in the word ‘*paurṇamâsîm*’ because quite explicable with reference to the noun itself, without having recourse to any indirect indication, by the word, of the composite of sacrifices. (2) If we accept these sentences as Injunctions, we have a further advantage, *viz.* : the root ‘*yaji*’ is found to be directly mentioned, and it is not necessary to infer it from the mention of the Deity (as you have got to do in the case of holding the

Injunction to lie in the sentence 'yadāgneya,' etc.). (3) In your case the sacrifices enjoined by these inferred 'yajis' being more than one, their *Apūrvas* would also be more than one and thus in comparison with the process of taking the sentences as referring to the beforementioned sacrifices, that of taking them as independent Injunctions is far more advantageous. As for the appearing of the *Prayājas* in the modifications (urged in the preceding *Sūtra*) it can be explained, either by qualifying the injunction of *Kṛṣṇala* in the performance of the *Prayājas* in the modifications, by adding the condition 'in such cases when there are sentences that must be taken as *Anuvāda*, or by taking it as laying down a material for the *Prayāja* occurring in the primary itself.

चोदना वा गुणानां युगपच्छास्त्रात् चोदिते हि तदर्थत्वात्
तस्य तस्योपादिशीयत् ॥ ६ ॥

चोदना Chodanā, injunction. वा Vā, but. गुणानां Guṇānām, of accessories. युगपत् Yugapat, simultaneously. शास्त्रात् Śāstrāt, by the scripture. चोदिते Chodite, being declared. हि Hi, because. तदर्थत्वात् Tadarthatwāt, for the sake of accessories. तस्य तस्य Tasya tasya, with each. उपादिशीयत् Upādiśīyat, would be enjoined.

6. Reply : But they are Injunctions ; as otherwise many accessories would be declared simultaneously by the scripture, because if they appeared after the sacrifices had been enjoined then their such appearance could be only for the sake of the accessories and as such we would have to admit of an injunctive word with each accessory.—6.

COMMENTARY.

The sentences 'yadāgneya,' etc., cannot be taken as laying down the accessories of the sacrifices enjoined by the sentences 'ya evām, etc.' Because it is a well recognised rule that when the Action is one that has been already enjoined (by a previous sentence) we cannot lay down more than one accessory with regard to it ; as it is only when the Action has not been otherwise enjoined that even a number of accessories could be laid down by a single effort (of that Injunction).

That is to say, in all original Injunctions of Actions, the Injunctive Affix proceeds to enjoin only the *Bhāvanā* because it is only this factor that is not got at by other means. And so long as this *Bhāvanā* is not fully equipped with all its factors, by means of the Denotation of the Root and the other factors in the sentence (denoting the various auxiliaries of the sacrifice), it cannot be brought to action ; and hence until all this

has been fully laid down, the Injunction is not complete. And it so happens that by the apparent inconsistency of the generic character of the auxiliaries that are recognised as constituting the factors of the *Bhāvanā*—this inconsistency leads us to look for a specification of the said auxiliaries,—then it is that the *Bhāvanā* comes to be specified by those specifications which are implied by the Instrumental case-endings found in the same sentence, and which also are on the look out for the *Bhāvanā* (as the object to be specified). And in the case of each word, the *Class*, *Gender* and *Number*, that belong to an object,—all these come to be recognised, by means of the direct signification of the particular case-ending, as auxiliaries to the *Bhāvanā* because all these (class, etc.) on account of being expressed by the same word, have among themselves the relation of the qualification and the qualified, and are not recognised as belonging to, or depending, upon one another (and as such must be concluded to form part of something else; and that is the *Bhāvanā*). And thus it is that all words near the *Bhāvanā* or removed from it, fall in with the *Bhāvanā*, notwithstanding their remoteness or proximity—in the way that we have explained under the *Adhikaraṇa* or *Anuṣṅga* in the foregoing *Pāda* of this *Adhyāya*. And it is only then that, having got hold of a *Bhāvanā* fully endowed with all its qualifications, the Injunction becomes complete.

And as in all such cases the Injunction lays down the qualified *Bhāvanā* by a single effort, it does not entail any such anomaly as the assumption of various potencies in the Injunction. Because it is only when the direct functionings of words are multiplied that it becomes very complicated; and when the words end in expressing a single fact then there is nothing incompatible in the *indirect implication* of many things. That is to say, the direct Injunction having been once utilised in the laying down of the qualified *Bhāvanā*—if it were taken again to *directly* function towards the laying down of something else, then it would be necessary to repeat the Injunctive word over again, and this being incompatible with the Veda, would not be warrantable; when, however, the Injunctive word has ceased its functioning with having laid down the *Bhāvanā*, then, on account of the apparent inconsistency of its own signification it would give birth to (*i.e.*, indirectly imply) other Injunctive words expressive of such qualifications (as would be necessary for removing the said inconsistency); and in this the original injunctive word would not have to give up its one form as appearing in the Vedic text; although it would serve all the purposes that would be served by various repetition of itself.

And though in this manner the Injunction of the qualification would appear *after* the original Injunction of the *Bhāvanā* itself, yet in accordance with the law laid down under the *Adhikaraṇa* on 'Ākṛiti' (in the first *pāda* of the first *Adhyāya*), the qualifications themselves will have appeared before that. That is to say, though, as a matter of fact, the Apparent Inconsistency due to the fact of the *Bhāvanā* being qualified, appearing subsequently leads to an idea of the Injunction of the qualification, long after that of the original Injunction (of the *Bhāvanā*), yet, in accordance with the rule arrived at in the *Adhikaraṇa* on 'Ākṛiti' as it is impossible for the *Bhāvanā* to be *qualified*, in the absence of the qualifications themselves, it must be admitted that these must have been full fledged entities from before ; as it is through these alone that any idea of the *Bhāvanā* being *qualified* could be brought about.

All these injunctions (of qualification), pointed out by the apparent inconsistency of a perceptible fact, operate either simultaneously or one after the other. And thus we find that if we admit a sentence to be the Injunction of a fresh *Bhāvanā*, then it becomes an easy matter to get at the Injunctions of its accessories by the help of the original Injunction of the *qualified Bhāvanā*, which is capable of giving birth to various Injunctions.

On the other hand, however, (if the sentence be taken as only referring to a *Bhāvanā* previously enjoined by another sentence), this is not possible. Because as a rule, it is only when Primary is carried to a place, that it draws with itself all its accessories ; while if it is one of the accessories that is carried, it does not carry with itself another accessory, because these two are not so intimately connected. That is to say, when the *Bhāvanā* is such as has been got at from another sentence, then the *Injunctive* word in the sentence in question cannot enjoin that *Bhāvanā* over again—as a repeated Injunction of the *Bhāvanā* would be as useless as the powdering of that which has already been powdered ; and then not performing its injunctive function, it does not become the means of giving birth to various Injunctions with regard to things connected with that *Bhāvanā* ; as it is only when the Injunctive word *enjoins* the qualified *Bhāvanā* that it makes possible assumption of such Injunctions ; and this is not possible in the case in question ; hence the Injunctive Affix is found to be such as has its direct expressive potency quite inoperative (towards the injunction of the *Bhāvanā*) and, hence, in accordance with the rule laid down under the Sūtra *ānarthaky at tadangeṣu*, that Injunctive Affix comes down from the *Bhāvanā* and directs itself towards the auxiliaries connected with it. And then those qualifications of Class, Gender and

Number, which qualify the auxiliary expressed by a single word, serve to point out that auxiliary,—exactly in the way that we have explained in the case of the Injunction of a qualified *Bhāvanā* : and as such these qualifications are all enjoined, and hence in the case of a single word, even though the *Bhāvanā* has been enjoined by another sentence, it is possible to have the Injunction of many things (in connection with it). When however there is a combination of many auxiliaries mentioned by many words (as in the case of the sentences ‘*Agneyoṣṭākāpālāh*, etc.’) then in that case, there being no sort of relationship among these auxiliaries themselves, the words expressing them also remain unconnected (with one another) ; and hence when the Injunction betakes itself to one of them, it has nothing to do with any other ; and when it would betake to this latter, it could not have anything to do with another, and so on ; because all of them being wholly unconnected with one another. For these reasons it is not possible, in this case, to have the one implied by the other, as we had in the case of the Injunction applying to the *Bhāvanā*.

Thus then in this case, the original Injunction not giving birth to other Injunctions, the former being one only, would be wholly taken up in the laying down of one auxiliary ; and then the declaration that it lays down another also, would not be possible, unless we meant to repeat the original Injunction ; this would entail the anomaly of all these repeated Injunctions being of human origin (and as such having no authority). This is what is meant by the second half of the *Sūtra*, which means that if the sentence were taken as laying down an action that has been already previously enjoined, as such laying down could only be for the purpose of mentioning the accessory, the Injunctive word would have to be repeated for the sake of the Injunction of each one of the accessories.

Thus then in the sentence ‘*Āgneya*, etc.’ we must have the injunction of the connection of a material and a Deity ; but this connection is not possible with regard to any sacrifice that may have been previously enjoined by other sentences ; and hence, in accordance with the *Sūtra* ‘*Guṇāchchapūrva Sambandhah*’ we must admit a distinct sacrifice to be actually enjoined by this sentence (*yadāgneyah*, etc.) ; and then we have the same rūpavachana (non-mention of the form) ‘that was urged in the third *Sūtra* ; and as such the sentence ‘*ya evam*,’ etc., must be taken as only referring to the sacrifices enjoined by the sentence ‘*yadāgneyah*, etc.’ And by this we are forced to have recourse to indirect indication, etc. for the purpose of explaining the singular ending (in *Paurṇamāsūm*).

व्यपदेशश्च तदवत् ॥ ७ ॥

व्यपदेशः Vyapadeśa, the mention. च Cha, also. तदवत् Tadavat, is like that.

7. The mention of these also is like that.—7.

COMMENTARY.

If the Amāvasyā were a single sacrifice, then the two materials—the *Sānnāyga* (Curd and Butter) and the *Oṣadhi* (Herbs) would be optional alternative, and then why should there be any mention of the preparation of one of these before the other, (as it would be necessary to employ and prepare only one of the two alternative materials)?

When there are various sacrifices, then the *Sānnāyga* and *Oṣadhi* come to be taken as both, forming the materials to be offered in various sacrifices, and as such all the various materials having to be prepared for the *Amāvasyā* sacrifices, it becomes quite relevant to speak of the preparation of one of these before the other,—which would be entirely irrelevant in any other case.

And, further, in accordance with the *Pūrvapakṣi* over and above the three sacrifices there would be a fourth (in the shape of that enjoined by the sentence ‘*ya evam,*’ etc.); and as such the passage quoted in the *Bhāṣya* would refer to them as *uttarani* (in the plural) and not as *utrari* (in the Dual) which refers to the two composite sacrifices, the *Darsa* and the *Paurṇamāsa*).

लिङ्गदर्शनाच्च ॥ ८ ॥

लिङ्ग Linga. दर्शनात् Darśanāt. च Cha, and.

8. Also because we find (in the Veda) indicative words.—8.

COMMENTARY.

If the sentences ‘*ya evam,*’ etc.’ enjoined two distinct sacrifices, then the number of sacrifices would be more, and if they enjoined accessories, the number would be less than ‘thirteen’ and ‘fourteen’ which are the numbers that are mentioned in connection with the libations in the *Darśa* and the *Paurṇamāsa*. Because these numbers could be possible only if in the *Paurṇamāsa* there were three, and in the *Darśa* two primary libations (and this would not be the case if the sentences ‘*ya evam,*’ etc.’ are taken either as the Injunctions of independent sacrifices, or as the Injunctions of Accessories).

For these reasons we conclude that the sentences ‘*ya evam, etc.*,’ merely refer to the two previously maintained composite sacrifices. To this effect, we have the following declaration :

“(1) Because the enjoined sacrifice has no form (material, etc.), (2) because the words of the sentence directly denote the sacrifices mentioned in the context, and (3) because it is only in these latter sacrifices that we find distinct forms and details,—we must admit the sentences, ‘*ya evam, etc.*,’ to be mere references to the two composite sacrifices laid down in the preceding sentences.”

Adhikarana IV.—Exception to the foregoing Adhikarana.

SŪTRAS II. ii. 9 to 12.

“पौर्णमासीवत् उपांशुयाजः स्यात्” ॥ ६ ॥

पौर्णमासीवत् Paurṇamâsivat, like the Paurṇamâsî. उपांशुयाजः Upâṃśuyâjah, the Upâṃśu sacrifice. स्यात् Syât, should be.

9. “The case of the Upâṃśu sacrifice should be exactly like the Paurṇamâsî.”—9.

COMMENTARY.

The next three Adhikaranas deal with the exceptions to Adhikarana III.

There is one sentence :—Jâmi vâ etadyajñasya kṛiyate yadanvanchau purodâṣau, upâṃśuyâjamantara yajati; and then we have a set of sentences—Viṣṇurupâṃśu, yaṣṭavyo jâmitvâya, prajāpatirupâṃśu, yaṣṭavyo jâmitvaya, agniṣomâupâṃśu yaṣṭâvyâvajâmitâvâya; and on these three arises the following question : does the expression ‘upâṃśuyâjam,’ in the first sentence, only serve to speak of (refer to) the whole batch of sacrifices mentioned in the latter set of sentences? or does it serve to lay down an independent sacrifice by itself? And on this question, we have the *Pârvapakṣa* embodied in the *Sûtra*; and in support thereof we have the following arguments.

To the sentence ‘*Upâṃśuyajam,*’ &c., apply all the conclusions arrived at in the foregoing *Adhikarana*.

“Because inasmuch as the sacrifices laid down in the latter set of sentences have their accessories in the shape of the respective deities duly mentioned, while that which is mentioned in the first sentence has no such accessory mentioned, we cannot but conclude that this latter sacrifice depends upon the former sacrifices.

“That is to say, in the three sentences we have the affix *tavya* with the verb ; and as such they have the character of absolute Injunction, and, hence, if we were to assume these sentences to enjoin independent sacrifices, then we would render ourselves open to all the aforesaid objections of the details of these being unknown, and also of the necessity of having to assume many unseen factors.”

“And, further, we find each of the latter three sentences mentioning the removal of the evil effects of the *jami* (a technical flaw in the performance of a sacrifice, explained below); and it is with regard to this flaw of the *jami* that the first sentence mentioned the *Upâṁśu* sacrifices. That is to say, looking at the whole section, from the first sentence to the last, we find that the mention of *jami* (in the first sentence) and the *removal of jami* (mentioned in the last three) form one subject; and from this it is clear that it is the last three sentences that contain the real Injunctions, whereas in the first sentence we do not find any distinct *Arthavâda* or Injunction (by which it could be taken as containing the Injunction of a sacrifice). Then again, the special purpose served by the first sentence *referring* to the whole set of the three sacrifices (laid down in the latter sentences), is that it is only thus that any one of the three sacrifices (laid down by the three sentences) can be taken as a sacrifice independent of the other two; it is only by making the first sentence (which mentions a definite point of time; in the shape of the interim between the offering of two *cakes*, supplementary to the last three sentences, that all the three sacrifices becoming connected with that particular time,—each of them comes to be taken as an independent primary sacrifice.

चोदना वा अप्रकृतत्वात् ॥ १० ॥

चोदना Chodanâ, injunction. वा Vâ, certainly. अप्रकृतत्वात् Aprakṛitatwât, not being mentioned in the context.

10. But it must be an injunction as there is no other sacrifice mentioned in the context.—10.

COMMENTARY.

The sentence ‘*Upânenyâjan yajati*’ is the Injunction of an independent sacrifice, and it is not a mere reference to the set of three sacrifices mentioned in the three sentences: (1) Because there being no other sacrifices mentioned in the context, the sentence cannot be taken as a mere *reference*, and (2) because no sacrifice is actually enjoined by the sentences *Viṣṇu, etc.*

In the case of the sentence mentioning the *Vaisvânara* sacrifice, we find that from beginning to end the text treats of 'twelve cakes,' and hence the mention of the numbers 'eight' and the rest come to be taken as forming part of the twelve; and as such the sentences mentioning these small numbers are not taken as separate Injunctions of those numbers. In the same manner in the case in question, we find that the Injunction is introduced by the words '*jami va etat*' which describe a certain flaw in the sacrifice; and it is clear that such mention of the flaw must have some bearing on, and be needed by a certain enjoined, sacrifice; consequently it appears that the sentences '*Vişnu, etc.*,' speaking of the removal of the flaw serve the purpose of eulogising that enjoined sacrifice. When it so happens that between the offering of two cakes there is no other action to be performed, then we have what is called the flaw of '*jami*' and hence the mention of the 'removal of *jami*' must be taken as eulogising that action which would be laid down as to be performed between the two offerings; and from this it follows that in the case in question, what has to be eulogised in the sacrifice *Upâmśu*, which is distinctly laid down as to be performed '*in the interim*'; while in the sentences '*Vişnu, etc.*' we find described the 'removing of the *jami*,' which is the eulogy required by the aforesaid *Upâmśu* sacrifice; and consequently we disregard the injunctive character of these sentences, because their injunctiveness is nowhere found to be required, and hence all of them come to be taken as mere eulogistic sentences. Specially as we do not find the "interim" mentioned as to the time, in the sentences, '*Vişnu, etc.*'; and as such the '*jami*' with a mention of which the context was introduced, not having any direct connection with these sentences, these cannot be taken as embodying the Injunctions of any action for that '*jami*'; and hence too the 'removing of *jami*' mentioned in these sentences cannot be taken as eulogising these latter Injunctions. On the other hand, that action, which is mentioned directly in connection with the time '*interim*' is distinctly found to be the object of Injunction by the sentence that begins with the mention of '*jami*'; and then on this ground the other sentences come to have their use in eulogising that action; under the circumstances, it is scarcely right to accept an Injunction that we entail the assumption of many imperceptible elements.

And further, in the case of the sentences '*Vişnu, etc.*,' these being taken as connecting the sacrifices with the *Vişnu, etc.*, the 'sacrifice' would be *indirectly* implied as subordinate to that connection; and so long as a directly expressed sacrifice is available (in the sentence *Upâmśum, etc.*) it is not right to accept an indirectly implied sacrifice to be enjoined.

That is to say, the affix '*tavya*' in the '*yaṣṭavyaḥ*' is in the passive and as such the predominant factor in the sentence is '*Viṣṇu*' to whom the 'sacrifice' is subordinate (sentence meaning etymologically that *Viṣṇu is the objective of the sacrifice*); and the performability of the sacrifice could be only inferred indirectly from the sentence,—the factor of the 'sacrifice' being extracted out of the word '*yaṣṭavyaḥ*' and this would be scarcely proper; because we have a direct Injunction of the sacrifice in the sentence '*antara yajati.*' Even though it were possible for the sentence '*Viṣṇu*' to be taken apart from the sentence '*antara yajati*' yet all that they could do would be to lay down the Deities for that sacrifice which is laid down as to be performed in the 'interim' (in the sentence *antara*, etc.); and they could not lay down distinct Actions.

As a matter of fact, it is not possible even for the Deity to be laid down by such sentences. Because the word '*yaṣṭavyaḥ*' in these does not signify either the Deity or *that to which something is given*; because all that they actually signify is a *material* subordinate (belonging) to the sacrifice; consequently what we have to do is to take the potency of the *objective* as the predominant element; and as such what the word would signify would be what is signified by the Accusative case-ending; and certainly that does not establish the Character of the Deity. Because the root '*yaji*' meaning 'to give away' its actual objective is *that which is given away*, and hence the only possible explanation would be that the deity approached by the object given away, comes subsequently to be indirectly connected with the sacrifice. But in this way, the words come to have two objectives; and, hence in accordance with the Sūtra *sampatih śabdārthaḥ* [II. iv. 23] what happens is that the objective, in the shape of the thing given away, is set aside, and another, in the shape of the Deity worshipped, becomes manifested; and the verb thereby coming to be recognised to have only one objective (in the shape of the Deity worshipped); it is only after its Dative potency has been wholly suppressed, that the Deity could be spoken of as the objective, as in the sentence '*Viṣṇum yajati*' (in the Active Voice) or *Viṣṇuryaṣṭavyaḥ* (in the Passive Voice). And certainly in this we do not find any denotation of the Deity; all that we find in the character of Deity (of *Viṣṇu*) is indirectly indicated by the apparent inconsistency of its objective character. And consequently, in taking this sentence as an independent Injunction, we would have to get at the requisite *Bhāvanā* only by undertaking all the trouble of assuming a Deity. And certainly in comparison with all these assumptions, it is more reasonable by far to take the sentence as a mere Arthavāda (of the sacrifice laid down in '*antara yajati*').

गुणोपबन्धात् ॥ ११ ॥

गुण Guna, property. उपबन्धात् Upavandhât, on account of mention.

11. Because the property is mentioned.—11.

COMMENTARY.

That action (is enjoined by the sentence 'antara etc.') in connection with which we find the property of *Upam̐su* mentioned in the sentence 'Upam̐su paur̐namâsyâm yojan,' which serve the purpose of laying down the time (*Paur̐namâsî*) for the sacrifice. But this sentence is not the original injunction of the said property; because the sentence not embodying an injunction of a sacrifice, the said injunction of the property would involve the injunction of many things (which is highly objectionable). And for this reason we must take the sentence upam̐su 'paur̐namâsyam, etc., as only describing that which has been enjoined by the sentence *antara*, etc.

प्राये वचनाच्च ॥ १२ ॥

प्राये Prâye, as if it were. वचनात् Vachanât, on account of mention. च Cha, also.

12. Also because the sacrifice in question is mentioned in Vedic texts as if it were a primary sacrifice.—12.

COMMENTARY.

We find the sentence *Hridayamupam̐suyajah* which eulogises the Upam̐su sacrifice as if it were (Prâya) the principal limb (heart) of the sacrificial person; and thus clearly shows that it is a primary (and not secondary) sacrifice.

Adhikarana V.—The Aghâra, etc., are independent actions.

SÛTRAS II. ii. 13 to 16.

“आधाराग्निहोत्रमरूपत्वात्” ॥ १३ ॥

आधाराग्निहोत्र Aghâragnihotram, the Aghâra and the agnihotra. अरूपत्वात् Arûpa-twât, because they have no forms.

13. “The Aghâra and the Agnihotra (merely refer to other sacrifices) because we do not find mentioned in the Veda the forms (the accessory details) of these sacrifices.”—13.

COMMENTARY.

[This *adhikarana* is based upon two sets of passages: (1) We have the sentences 'Urdhvamâgharayati,' 'Santatâmâgharâyati' and 'rjum

âgharayati' followed by *agharam agharayati*; and (2) we have the sentences '*dadhnâ juhōti*,' and '*payasâ juhōti*,' etc., followed by '*agnihotram juhōti*.' And the question is as to whether the two sentences '*agharamagharayati*' and '*agnihotram juhōti*' lay down actions totally distinct from those mentioned in the preceding sentences, or they only refer to those same actions? And the position taken up by the *Pŭrvapakṣa* is that the sentence '*agharamagharayati*' only refers collectively to the set of actions mentioned by the sentences '*ûrdhavam*, etc.,' and so also with the sentence '*agnihotram juhōti*.' Nor can this *Adhikaraṇa* be said to have been included in the foregoing one; because]. The *Aghara* and the *Homa* that present themselves to the mind on the utterance of the sentence '*Urdhva-magharayati*' and '*payasâ juhōti*' are exactly as they are pointed out by these sentences; nor in this case is there a suppression of the *Bhāvanā*s of the *yāja* and the *homa* by the supervening character of the material; as we have in the case of the sentence '*Viṣṇurupâṃśu yaṣṭavyaḥ*,' and further, in the case in question the various sentences cannot be taken together as forming a single sentence (as in the previous *Adhikaraṇa*); nor does any of the two parties admit of the sentences being mere eulogistic ones; and hence the Injunction would be an absolute one, of the Action, just as (in the previous case) you hold it to be that of the Accessory.

That is to say, we do not, as in the case of the sentences '*upâṃśu*, etc., admit the fact of all the sentences in question forming a single sentence; nor do they serve the purposes of glorification; and hence according to both parties the sentences come to be accepted as Injunctions and the only question that arises is as to whether the Injunction is one of the Accessory only, or that of the Action accompanied by that Accessory? And on this we have the following

PŪRVAPAKṢA.

"The Injunction is one of the Action. Because the Injunctiveness being mentioned by the Affix, can never belong to the Noun. It may be urged that the Injunction of the Noun would follow from the *Bhāvanā*, but in that case, it would be the *Bhāvanā* that would be enjoined first.

That is to say, the Injunctive character does not rest with the words '*dadhi*' and the rest; and being expressed by the Affix, that character could not be related to the *curd*, etc., except by means of the *Bhāvanā* and the *Root-meaning*. For we have no such sentence as *dadhnâ-yut* (the *yut* being the injunctive affix only, apart from the Verbal Root); the sentence that we have is (*dadhnâ kuryât* where the relationship of the *dadhi* with the affix is through the root '*kr.*' Thus then the performability of the

dadhi etc., being due solely to the *Bhâvanâ* and the *Root-meaning*—how is it that these letters are denied to be the objects of the Injunction? For, certainly, without the Injunction of these we can never point out any Injunction of the Accessory. Because no sooner do we proceed to show such an Injunction than the Injunction of the *Bhâvanâ* and the *Root-meaning* presents itself forcibly. Consequently we must admit that what is enjoined is either the *Homa* or the *Bhâvanâ* as qualified by the *dadhi*.

And, then each of the *Bhâvanâs*, being duly recognised as having distinct accessory details of its own, the very fact of their following one after the other, points to the fact of their forming a single collective whole; and it follows that it is this collective whole that is meant by the sentence '*agnihotram juhoti*.' And the use of this reference lies in the unification of the Injunctions of the *means* and the *result* of these sacrifices. And thus *dadhi* and the other materials, each belonging to a distinct Action by itself, we are saved the undue necessity of taking them as optional alternatives.

In the same manner, in the case of the sentences '*Ūrdhvamagharayati*, etc., etc., though we do not find the material or the Deity of these mentioned, yet in accordance with the rule laid down in connection with *upâṁśu* qualifications of *ūrdhva* etc. may be taken as specifying differentias; and through these those Actions being taken as having their accessories mentioned, it is only the action mentioned by the sentence *agharam agharayati* that remains without a mention of its accessory details; and as such being wholly incapable of attracting men towards itself, it has to be taken as a mere reference to the previously mentioned sacrifices. And in that case, too, the use of such reference lies in the unification (of the three sacrifices) which is necessary for the purpose of the employing in them of the *mantra ida urdhas adhvara* etc., and the connection of the single Deity mentioned in the sentences (*tasyagharamagharya*, etc.)

“संज्ञोपबन्धात्” ॥ १४ ॥

संज्ञा Samjñâ, names. उपबन्धात् Upavandhât, presence.

14. “Because distinct names are given.”—14.

COMMENTARY.

“And further, names are employed only with a view to pointing out a certain definite peculiarity; and in the case in question we do not perceive what these peculiarities are (that are pointed out by the names '*aghara*' and '*agnihotra*' unless we take them as referring to the foregoing sacrifices). If the name '*agnihotra*' were taken only as pointing to *Homa* in

general, then, as much as this is already known, it would not be any new Action (mentioned by the word). —And as already known, there is nothing in it that has to be known and as such no injunction of that would be possible.

“अप्रकृतत्वात्” ॥ १५ ॥

अप्रकृतत्वात् Aprakṛitatvât, ?

15. Because it is not related to the context.—15.

COMMENTARY.

Under Sûtra 2.2.5, it has been held that an Action can obtain its accessories from other sentences ; so that in the case in question the sentence ‘*agnihotram juhoti*’ might be taken as the original injunction of an action having its accessories laid down by such sentences as ‘*tanḍulai juhoti*,’ ‘*dadhna juhoti*.’

This however is not possible as in the originaive sentences (*agnihotram juhoti*) we do not find any *Prakarana* of Actions, because it is only after the action has been connected with a particular result, that there arises a *Prakarana* (or desire) of knowing how that Result is to be brought about by means of that Action, and as such the *Prakarana* could only proceed from the assumed sentence that would sum up all the three factors of the *Bhâvana* in connection with the Action in question.

चोदना वा शब्दार्थस्य प्रयोगभूतत्वात्, तत्संनिधेर्युणार्थेन
पुनः श्रुतिः ॥ १६ ॥

चोदना Chodanâ, injunctions. वा Vâ, really. शब्दार्थस्य Śabdârthasya, what is expressed by the words. प्रयोगभूतत्वात् Prayogabhûtatvât, simply to be performed. तत्संनिधेः Tatsannidheh, of the same words. युणार्थेन, Guṇârthena, for the purpose of laying down accessory details. पुनः श्रुतिः Punahśrutih, repetition.

16. They are really Injunctions of independent Action because the words distinctly express something to be performed and the repetition of the same words is for the purpose of laying down accessory details.—16.

COMMENTARY.

It is clearly perceived that the words ‘*agharayati*’ (in ‘*agharama-gharayati*’) and *juhoti* (in ‘*agnihotram juhoti*’) not having their Injunctive potency taken up by any other word, cannot but distinctly express the injunction of definite actions. Nor can it be urged that the actions of ‘*Aghara*’ and ‘*Homa*’ are already enjoined by the sentences ‘*îrdhvan, etc.*,’

and 'dadhnâ, etc.,' because the Injunctive potency of these sentences is taken up by laying down of the accessories in the shape of 'ûrdhva' and 'dadhi,' which are not laid down by any other sentence ; and as such we cannot very well discard the idea of these sentences merely referring (by the words 'agharyati' and 'juhoti') to the actions of *Aghara* and *Homa* (enjoined by the two former sentences).

Whenever we come across the Injunction of a qualified Action what we have to consider in the first sentence, is what factor of the object of Injunction is such as has been laid down elsewhere and what is not so ; and when this has been duly discriminated, the Injunction comes to be taken as pertaining wholly to that factor which has not been laid down elsewhere ; in the case of the sentence 'dadhnâ juhوتي,' as the object of injunction is the action of 'Homa as qualified by dadhi,' when we find that the *Homa* has already been laid down by the sentence 'agnihotram juhوتي,' we conclude the Injunction in question to pertain to the *dadhi* only, and the *Bhâvanâ* and the *Root-meaning* (denoted in 'dadhnâ juhوتي') are said to be mere references to those enjoined elsewhere ; and it is never said that from the very beginning the sentence 'dadhnâ juhوتي' enjoins only the accessory with reference to the previously enjoined *Bhâvanâ* and *Root-meaning*.

The arguments of the *Pûrvapakṣa* are thus disposed of in the *Tantra Vârtika*.

(1) As for the names 'Agnihotra' and 'Aghara' they can be explained as serving the purpose of pointing out the peculiarity indicated by the verbs 'juhوتي' and 'agharayati' and in the present instance, they serve to distinguish the two actions in question from all other actions (of *Homa* and *Aghara*) ; on the ground of these two being enjoined.

(2) As for the absence of the accessory details (as urged under *Sûtra* 15), we find that the material and the Deity are distinctly pointed out by the context. Nor can it be urged that there being no *method* mentioned in the injunctive sentence (that there would be no context) ; because no such *method* would be looked for until the relationship with the Result had been established.

(3) Nor it is possible for us to have the Injunction of the Result with regard to an Action of which the Material and the Deity have not been laid down. Because the Result might very well be laid down with regard to the *Homa* only, of which the material and the Deity might be mentioned later on ; and there would be no incongruity in this.

(4) As a matter of fact, in similar cases, we do admit of reference to previously enjoined actions. But the acceptance of this reference always depends upon the fact of the action referred to being one that

has been already enjoined (or mentioned) ; and as such it always stands in need of recognising the Actions as the same as that which has been previously enjoined.

(5) The mere fact of the *Aghara* being mentioned in another *Prakarana* does not do away with all the intervening *Prakaranas* of the *Aghara*. Because even in the case of the *Aghara* (as laid down by the sentence 'agharamagharayati') the conjugational affix always raises in us a desire to know the *Object*, the *Instrument* and the *Method* of the action ; and hence it is quite possible for the material and the Deity to be indicated by the *Prakarana* (as the said desire could be fulfilled only by an indication of these).

Then again, your theory would necessitate the assumption of many unseen factors. Because you make each of the sentences 'dadhnâ juhōti' etc. and 'urdhvamagharayati,' etc., lay down an independent Action, and we do not find any deity laid down either for the *Homa* of *dadhi* or for the *urdhva aghara*, etc., and in the case of the sentence 'urdhvamagharayati,' the material too is not mentioned, and inasmuch as you hold each of them to be the injunction of an independent action, they could not be taken as laying down the *materials*, etc., for one another.

For these reasons it must be said as we have put it.

(6) It has been argued above that in the sentence 'agnihotram juhōti,' if the first word were to express an action, then, inasmuch as an Action could never be the objective, the accusative ending (in 'agnihotram') would be wholly inexplicable. In reply to this we urge that an action can be the objective of such verbs as *Saṅkalpa* (determination) and the like ; and as such the accusative ending in 'agnihotram' could be explained as with reference to the determination implied by the word 'juhōti' and as such there is nothing incongruous in the accusative ending in 'agnihotram.'

Adhikarana VI.—The Paśuyâga and the Somayâga are independent actions.

SŪTRAS 17 to 20.

द्रव्यसंयोगात् चोदना पशुसोमयोः प्रकरणे ह्यनर्थको द्रव्य-
संयोगो नहि तस्य गुणार्थेन ॥ १७ ॥

द्रव्यसंयोगात् Dravyasamyogât, on account of connection with certain materials. चोदना Chodanâ, injunction, पशुसोमयोः Paśusomyoh of the Paśuyâga and the Somayâga. प्रकरणे Prakarane, in the context. हि Hi, as. अनर्थको Anarthako, would be

useless. द्रव्यसंयोगो Dravyasamyogo, mention of the material. नहि Nahi, because they do not. तस्य Tasya, of them. गुणार्थेन Guṇārthena, the purpose of laying down accessory materials.

17. Because of the connection with certain materials the words, 'Paśu, etc.' and 'Soma, etc.' contain injunctions; as in the context the mention of the mere material would be useless—specially because the words do not serve the purpose of laying down accessory materials.—17.

COMMENTARY.

(1) We have a sentence '*Paśumālubhetā*' and in continuation of this we have the sentences '*hṛidayasyâgre vadyati, atha jihvâya athavakṣasâḥ*'. (2) Then again we have the sentence '*Somena yajati*' and in its continuation, the sentences '*Aindravâyavan grihṇāti, maitravaruṇam grihṇāti*,' etc. And the question that arises is this: Is *Ālabheta* a mere reference to the actions laid down by '*avadyati*' and is '*yajeta*' a mere reference to those laid down by '*grihṇāti*' or do they lay down independent actions by themselves? The question is ultimately stated in the following form: Is the word '*Paśu*' a mere reference to the *hṛidaya*, etc., and the word '*yaji*' to the sacrifices implied by the word '*avadyati*' or do they lay down an independent '*yâga*' and '*Paśu*' (as its material), the other sentences only serving to point out their accessory details? In the same manner, the question with reference to the other set of sentences is this: Is the word '*yajeta*,' a mere reference to the sacrifice implied by the relationship of the material and the Deity, as mentioned in the sentences '*âindravâyavam*, etc.'; and the word '*Soma*' to the juice used at those sacrifices or the sentences '*Somena yajeta*' lays down an independent action together with the material to be used in it?

On this question the *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows :—

The words in question are mere references to a number of actions taken collectively.

Because as in the case of the sentences '*Yadâgneyoṣṭakapâlḥ*' etc., the real end of the sentence is not served until the 'sacrifice' has been inferred (because the cake cannot be spoken of as '*Âgneya*' until it has been offered in sacrifice to the Deity *Agni*)—So also in the case of the sentences '*Aindravâyavam*,' etc., their full signification would not be accomplished until they implied a sacrifice (at which the *Soma* would be offered to *Indravâyu*, when alone it could be spoken of as *Aindravâyavam*). That is to say, the relationship of the Deity and the material mentioned in the

word 'Aindravayâvam' cannot be complete until a sacrifice has been implied, and so long as the sentence itself is not complete, it cannot stand in need of any other sentence (in the shape of 'Somena yajeta,' for which according to the Siddhânta it would lay down as accessory detail); and as such the sacrifice mentioned by the sentence 'Somenâ yajeta' could not yet come in as the sacrifice sought after; nor, on the other hand, would it be possible for the sentences 'Aindravâyavâm,' etc., to lay down the Deities for the sacrifice laid down by the sentence 'Somena yajeta'; which having no Deity mentioned, is wanting in an accessory detail of another sacrifice, we are forced to admit that that spoken of in the sentence 'Somena yajeta' is a mere reference to those sacrifices that have been laid down in the context (by the sentences 'Aindravâyavam grihñâti,' etc.)

In answer to the above the Siddhânta, as put forward by the Bhâṣya, is as follows :—

It is only when the sacrifice mentioned in a sentence is actually recognised to be the same as those mentioned before, that we take it to be a mere reference to these; in the case in question, however, we do not find this to be the case.

That is to say, if in the case in question we recognised the sacrifice to be exactly the same in all its details as those mentioned before,—as we do in the case of the *Purnamâsa* sacrifice, then we could take the sentence as a mere reference. If again, the sentence were held to be a reference to the root 'yaji' alone, then we could conclude it to be a reference bereft of the qualifications. In the cases in question, however, we find the sacrifices mentioned before are—(1) those that have the 'Hṛidaya, etc.,' and (2) those having the juice, for the material to be offered; while the sacrifices mentioned by the sentences in question have, for their materials, the *Paśu* and the *Soma*, respectively; and thus these letters not being recognised to be the same as the former ones, we cannot take these sentences to be mere references to the former sacrifices.

The Vârtika is not satisfied with the above presentment of the Adhikaraṇa. Against the above statement of the Siddhânta it quotes the following argument of the opponent :—

In the case of the *Aṣṭakapâla* cake, etc., though we find that these cakes are directly laid down as the materials, yet we accept the corn (*Vṛihî*) as the material, though this is pointed out only by syntactical connection; and in the same manner we could accept the 'Soma' as the enjoined material. It is only when there is a contradiction between two things that the stronger sets aside the weaker; and this is not the case when two things are quite compatible with one another. In the case in

question we find that the 'Soma' is quite compatible with the *juice* because this latter stands in need of something from which it could be extracted and the *Soma-plant* comes in as fulfilling this requirement. For instance, in the case of the sentence 'Âgneyo'stakapâlah,' etc., though we find that the 'Aṣṭakapâla' is directly laid down by the sentence, yet when the *Vrihi* and the *Yava* come to be laid down as the materials, there is no contradiction ; for these corns are actually required as the material out of which the *Aṣṭakapâla* cake would be made ; and certainly in taking up the *Vrihi* one does not give up the making of the *Aṣṭakapâla* ; and hence in this case the action with reference to which *Vrihi* is laid down as the material is not recognised as any other than that for which the 'Aṣṭakapâla' has been laid down. Exactly in the same manner, in the case in question, in taking up the *Somaplant*, one does not give up the *juice*, and hence there being no incompatibility between the two, inasmuch as the *Soma* mentioned in the sentence in question can very well be taken as the material for the sacrifices laid down by the other sentences, the sentence in question cannot be taken as laying down a distinct Action, merely on the ground of a difference in the materials mentioned. And further, the argument applies equally to the *Siddhânta* also ; because the *Siddhânta* also does not hold that the *unpounded soma plant* is to be offered at the sacrifice ; and hence just as for you the *plant* would only be the source of the *juice*, so also would it be for *Pûrvapakṣin*. As a matter of fact, it is your own theory that would be the more incongruous of the two. For in your case, if the *Plant*, as mentioned in the originative Injunction, were to be the sole means of accomplishing the sacrifice, then it would never do to turn it into *juice*, in accordance with other sentences. In our case, inasmuch as the *juice* would not be possible without its origin (in the shape of the *Plant*), our sentence be always on the look-out for the mention of this source ; and hence even if such source happens to be mentioned by another sentence, there is nothing incongruous in our having recourse to it. In your case, on the other hand, inasmuch as the original *Plant* itself is quite capable of being offered bodily by itself, it does not stand in the need of any mention of its modifications ; and as such any connection of these would be wholly incompatible, consequently we could not accept any such connection as laid down by other sentences.

In view of these arguments, based as they are on the firm ground of such examples as the aforesaid injunction of *Vrihi*, etc., which completely shut out our mouth, it is best for us not to start the question of the Injunction of Materials, and to confine ourselves solely to the refutation of the view of the sentences in question being mere references to previously

mentioned sacrifices. In the case of the *Paśu*, however, as the animal as a whole is not capable of being bodily offered at a sacrifice, the above arguments of the opponent would not apply; and hence for this case alone the argument of the Injunction of different materials would be a good one for the *Siddhānta*. But in the case of '*Soma*' it becomes necessary for us to refute the opponent's arguments based upon the Injunction of the *Vṛihi*; and for this purpose we have the next *Sūtra*.

Or, we may take it thus—that having refuted the former *Siddhānta* arguments (by means of the arguments based upon the Injunction of *Vṛihi*) the true conclusion is arrived at by means of the arguments embodied in the following *Sūtra*.

Or, lastly, we can take the present *Sūtra* as embodying the *Pūrvapakṣa* and the next *Sūtra*,—in which the '*cha*' may be taken in the sence of '*tu*' (which is a sign of the '*Siddhānta-Sūtra*') as putting forth the *Siddhānta*.

It may be asked how the present *Sūtra* can be taken as expressing the *Pūrvapakṣa*. This we proceed to explain as follows:—

The question being,—do the sentences '*hṛidayasya*, etc.,' and '*Aindravāyavam*, etc.,' serve the purpose of laying down accessory details, like the *Dadhi*, etc., and the subsequent sentences (*Paśum* etc., and *Somena*, etc.) are the originative Injunctions of the sacrifices concerned?—or do the former sentences themselves serve as the Injunctions of Sacrifices? We have the following

PŪRVAPAKṢA.

The sentence '*Hṛidayasya*, etc.,' or '*Aindravāyavam*, etc.,' do not serve the purpose of laying down accessory details, like the sentences '*Dadhñā juhōti*' and the rest; in fact these themselves are original Injunctions. Why? Because of the mention of materials, i.e., because of the mention of such materials as '*Hṛidaya*, etc.,' these sentences are the Injunctions of the *Paśu* and the *Soma*, as otherwise, through the context the connection of '*Hṛidaya*, etc.,' would become subsidiary to the sacrifice while as a matter of fact, it is not possible for this connection to serve as its accessory, because that would be contrary to the *Paśu* and the *Soma-plant* laid down in the original Injunctive sentences. Or in accordance with a previous law, the *Paśu* and the *Soma* having been obtained from other sentences, the mention of the connection of materials, in the present context, would in your theory be wholly useless. In my theory, on the other hand, the word *Soma* (in '*Somena yajeta*') is the name of the sacrifice, and the sentence '*Agniṣṭomīyam paśum*' serves the purpose of laying down the Deity '*Agni-Soma*'; and thus none of these two sentences making mention of

any material, the mention of materials in the other sentences is not at all superfluous. Consequently we conclude that the real Injunctions of the sacrifice are contained in the sentences 'Hṛidayasya, etc.,' and 'Aindravāyavam etc.,' (and the sentences *Agniṣṭomīyam, paśum, etc.,* and 'Somena yajeta' are mere references to these sacrifices taken collectively,—the former serving the purpose of pointing out the Deity for the offerings of the pieces, and the latter supplying the name of the sacrifices taken collectively.)

The Vārtika takes the next Sūtra as embodying the Siddhānta of the Adhikarāṇa while the Bhāṣya takes it as meeting certain Pūrvapakṣa arguments.

अचोदकाश्च संस्काराः ॥ १८ ॥

अचोदकाः Achodakâḥ, cannot be injunctive. च Cha, further. संस्काराः Saṃskârâḥ, laying down purificatory rites.

18. But as (laying down) purificatory rites they cannot be injunctive (of independent Actions).—18.

COMMENTARY.

The sentences in question cannot be taken as mere references to previous sacrifices, *because of these latter not being the sacrifices treated of by the context*,—an argument that has already been explained on a previous occasion in Sūtra II. ii. 10.

Question : "But how is it that these are not the sacrifices treated of by the context?"

Answer : Because the words 'avadyati' and 'grihṇāti' are not injunctive of sacrifices; as what they do is only to lay down certain purificatory or preparatory rites; because they are actually found to end with them: as when a sentence is actually found to have its sole ending in the pointing out of such rites, there is no ground for assuming a sacrifice to be indirectly indicated.

Thus, then, the actions (mentioned in the sentences 'Aindravāyavam, etc.,') having the character of mere Preparatory Actions, they stand in need of the mention of a 'sacrifice' somewhere else: and as such there would be nothing incongruous in the fact of such a sacrifice being laid down by another sentence (*Somena yajeta*), etc.

And our way of taking the sentences has the following advantage. (1) The singular number in 'Jyotiṣṭomena' becomes capable of being taken directly (and not figuratively as necessitated by the *Pūrvapakṣa*, which makes it refer to many sacrifices), (2) we are saved the useless trouble

of accepting the word 'Soma' (in 'Somena yajeta') as a second name for the 'Jyotiṣṭoma,' (3) nor is it necessary for us to accept the apparently useless fact of the sentence in question being a reference to all the other sentences, as in the case of the Pūrvapakṣa in connection with 'Aghārāgnihotra.'

For these reasons we conclude that the sentences in question are injunctions of the *Animal* and the *Soma* sacrifices.

तद्भेदात् कर्मणोऽभ्यासो द्रव्यपृथक्त्वादनर्थकं हि स्यात्
भेदो द्रव्यगुणीभावात् ॥ १६ ॥

तद्भेदात् Tadbhedât, because of difference. कर्मणः Karmanah, of the action. अभ्यासः Abhyâsah, repetition. द्रव्यपृथक्त्वात् Dravyapṛithaktvât, as the substances are distinct. अनर्थकं Anarthakam, useless. हि Hi, because. स्यात् Syât, it would be. भेदः Bhedah, difference. द्रव्यगुणी भावात् Dravyagunîbhâvât, as it is subservient to the substance.

19. Because of difference, there is a repetition of the Action, as the substances are distinct, it would be useless (to mention another connection); hence there is a difference (in the *Grahaṇa*); specially as it is subservient to the substance.—19.

COMMENTARY.

On account of the connection of the deity being different in each case,—there must be a repetition of the action of *grahana*; because on account of the distinctness of the substance that is to be prepared or purified by means of the *grahana* in connection with the said deities, if any other connection were mentioned, it would be wholly useless as it would not be performed; and hence, there is a difference of the *grahana*, because it is subservient to the substance to be purified (by that *grahana*).

The Vârtika has suggested another interpretation of the Sûtra also, it is as follows:—'tadbhedât'—i.e., because of the diversity of the prepared 'Soma'—there is a repetition of the action of sacrifice; 'because of the separateness of the material accepted';—if all of them were not offered up, the whole 'would be useless'; and hence even though in the original Injunction, the sacrifice has been mentioned but once yet 'there is a diversity' of its performance, because of the fact of the originally enjoined 'substance being subservient to the various conditions mentioned in other sentences.

The substance, too, must be offered in the same way as it has been held in the various cups as, if the whole thing were to be mixed up again,

the previous holding into separate cups would become wholly useless ; and the deities, to whom the cupfuls have been previously dedicated, would not become connected with (possessed of) their specified shares ; nor is it possible for all the deities to be referred to at the time of the (single) offering, hence it is not possible for people, afraid of repetition, to mix up all the juice and make a single offering of it ; specially as even if this were done, it would lead to a confusion of the shares (previously specified). And when the shares have been once separately specified, it becomes necessary for the other party to clear up the said confusion, unless of course he has a scriptural text distinctly laying down such confusion. Thus then, it being necessary to make the offering as previously determined, it is only when all the deities (and the *grahanas* as taken collectively, that the following sentence—*daśaitânadhvaryuh prâtaḥsavane grihṇâti, âświno daśamo grihṇâti tam tritîyam juhoti* etc., etc., (laying down the definite order and the summing up of the various 'grahanas' becomes explicable.)

Thus then we conclude that the whole forms a single action (of the *Jyotiṣṭoma*).

The use of the present *Adhikarana* lies in the fact that, according to the *pûrvapakṣa*, among the sacrifices subsidiary to the same sacrifice (the *Jyotiṣṭoma*), we would have the performance of the details with regard to one cup, and that, too, only once ; whereas, according to the *Siddhânta*, the whole thing has to be done exactly as in the Primary Sacrifice (the *Jyotiṣṭoma*).

संस्कारस्तु न भिद्येत, परार्थत्वात् द्रव्यस्य गुणभूतत्वात् ॥ २० ॥

संस्कारः Sanskârah, the purificatory action. तु Tu, however. न भिद्येत Na Bhidyeta, would not differ. परार्थत्वात् Parârthatvât, on account of being for the sake of something else. द्रव्यस्य Darvyasya, of the substance. गुणभूतत्वात् Gunabhutatvât, because it has a subordinate position.

20. The purificatory action would not differ because the substance being for the sake of something else has a subordinate position.—20.

COMMENTARY.

In the *Pûrvapakṣa* it has been argued that in the case of the tying of the animal there are a number of texts laying down the tethering post to be of Khadira, Palâśa, etc., and this tying being a purificatory act the various trees mentioned have been regarded as optional alternatives. In the same manner it has been urged in the case of the many deities mentioned also Indra, Vâyu, etc., these should be regarded as optional alternatives.

In answer to this argument the Sûtra points out that the analogy put forward does not hold good. In the case of the tethering post the several kinds of wood are laid down clearly for the purpose of accomplishing a purification. Hence there could be no necessity for the using of all the words, for which reason they are taken as optional alternatives. In the case of the deities on the other hand the passages under consideration do not mention them as accomplishing the sacrifice. Consequently not being subservient to anything they must be regarded as equally independent and hence every one of them has to be adopted.

It may be noted that this Sûtra has been omitted by Kumârila in his Vârtika.

Adhikaraṇa VII.—Actions differentiated by means of number.

SÛTRA II. ii. 21.

पृथक्त्वनिवेशात् संख्यया कर्मभेदः स्यात् ॥ २१ ॥

पृथक्त्वनिवेशात् Prithaktvanivesât, because of its separateness. संख्यया Saṅkhyayâ, by means of number. कर्मभेदः Karmabhedah, differentiation of actions. स्यात् Syât, would be.

21. Because of the fact of its inhering in separateness, number would serve to differentiate the Actions.—21.

The treatment of the three exceptions to the law relating to the Reception of words has been finished, and we now proceed to show how Actions are differentiated (or distinguished) means by of number.

In this connection we should cite such sentences as 'tisra âhutir-yuhoti,' 'dvâdaśa dvâdaśâni juhoti' which are laid down as co-extensive with the actions enjoined by previous originaive injunctions, and which are accompanied by definite numbers.

And on this, we have the following :—

Pûrvapakṣa (A).—Inasmuch as the word 'juhoti' is mentioned but once, the action laid down is one only ; and as for the Number (three, etc.) it could be made up by frequent repetition of the same Action.

Siddhanta (A).

To the above we make the following reply :—

Siddhanta (A).—In the case in question the number is mentioned in connection with the *Homa*, while it is being enjoined, and not *after* it has been enjoined as in the case of the sentence 'Ekadaśaprayajan,' and without an idea of 'separateness' the number does not attain its true character.

Nor can the number be said to be made up by a repetition of the same Action; because it is only when there is no other way of explaining the number that it is held to be made up by *Repetitions* as in the case of the *Prayajas*, the *Upasadas* and the like, which have had their own limits previously specified. In the case in question, however, inasmuch as no other number of the Action has been previously specified the number (*three*) must be taken as pointing out the separate character of the Actions themselves. And hence as the number is found to inhere in the Separateness of the actions themselves, we can not accept it as referring to the Separateness due to the mere repetition of the same action; as we shall show later on, under the Sûtra 'Âgamâdvâ' *bhyâsasyâśentatwât*—(X. V. 16).

The above is the presentation of the Adhikarana according to Kumâ-rila. He has taken for his basic text a passage in which the differentiating number refers to the action. The Bhâṣya, however, has taken for its basic text the sentence 'Saplâdaśa prayâpatyân paśûn âlabhet' while the numbers pertain not to the action but to the animals. The Vârtika points out that the Bhâṣya has chosen this text because it is more difficult to prove that the number pertaining to an accessory detail differentiates actions than to prove the same with regard to the number pertaining to the action itself.

Adhikarana VIII.—The differentiations of Actions by names.

SÛTRA II. ii. 22.

संज्ञा चोत्पत्तिसंयोगात् ॥ २२ ॥

संज्ञा Sañjñâ, name. च Cha, also. उत्पत्तिसंयोगात् Utpattisamyogât, because of its occurring in the originative injunction.

22. Name also (serves to distinguish Actions) because of its occurring in the originative Injunctions.—22.

COMMENTARY.

The differentiation of Actions by means of Accessories and context, bristling with many discussions, is postponed for a future occasion; and we proceed to consider the case of name.

[In connection with the sentence 'Athaiṣâ jyotiḥ atha viśvajyotiḥ, atha sarvajyotiḥ' there arises the following doubt—Do these names only serve to refer to the Jyotiṣtoma for the purpose of laying down 'a thousand' as the sacrificial gifts in connection with it? Or do they lay down

other Actions at which that is the sacrificial gift? And on this we have the following]—

Pūrvapakṣa.—Inasmuch as the words ‘*atha*’ and ‘*eṣa*’ stand in need of something that has gone before, and as the rejection of the original subject and the taking up another is a faulty process,—it follows that the various names apply to the single sacrifice ‘*Jyotiṣṭoma*’ for which, as in the case of the ‘*Dâkṣâyana*’ Sacrifice another detail (in the shape of the gift of a ‘thousand’) is laid down. And when we already have a sentence ‘*Jyotiṣṭomena Svargakâmo Yajeta*’ that lays down the connection between the material and the result, if we accept the words in question to be the names of the same Actions, we are saved the necessity of assuming—(1) another Action, (2) an *Apūrva* in keeping with that Action, and (3) wholly unheard-of methods for the accomplishment of that *Apūrva*, etc., etc., and there would be the further advantage that as the mention of the gift of ‘a thousand’ could be taken as laying down a method of procedure with regard to the *Jyotiṣṭoma*, we would not have to get aside this sacrifice (which forms the original subject of the context). If the sentences in question were to be Injunctions of other Actions, there would be no use for the word ‘*atha*’ which refers to something gone before; for one sacrifice does not stand in need of another; nor does any significance attach to any order of sequence among the sacrifices (that are independent of one another) as we shall show later on. And hence the word ‘*atha*’ cannot be taken as signifying this order of sequence. Nor does the *Name* express a *Bhāvanā* nor is the *Root-meaning* found to be mixed up with the *Name*, in the sentence in question, as is the case with the root ‘*yaji*’ (which is often mixed up with names of Sacrifices), and as such there could be no idea of difference among the *Root-meaning*. Nor again is the *Name* an *injunctive word*, whereby it could urge people to other (actions than the *Jyotiṣṭoma*); and so long as the human agent is not urged into activity, even if a difference could be *cognised*, we could attach no significance to it exactly as we do with regard to the singular number in ‘*graham*’ (in the sentence *graham sammârṣti*). The *injunctive word* (in the sentence *Etena Sahasradakṣiṇena yajeta*) that we have in connection with these sentences, is taken up by the mention of the accessory detail (in the shape of the sacrificial gift of ‘a thousand’); and as such it cannot pertain to the form of any Action. If the *Injunctive words* were not thus set aside then, too, the difference of the two *Sacrifices* would be based upon the repetition of the word *yajeta* and not upon the *Names*.

The mention of a Result also does not give rise to the idea of difference among Actions, in accordance with the *Sūtra* II.iii.26. Or,

it may be that inasmuch as the (gift of a thousand rests upon the previously mentioned *Jyotiṣṭoma*, the particular result mentioned in connection with this gift may be taken as following from the employment of this accessory gift in connection with the same '*Jotiṣṭoma*,' just as the employing of different accessories (at the same sacrifice) such as '*dadhi*' and '*milking vessel*' is laid down, with a view to particular results (in the shape of the obtaining of an organ of sense and Cattle, respectively). And thus, too, the Action referred to cannot be a new one.

In the case of the word '*Jyotiṣ*,' etc. there is a further peculiarity: they form part of the name '*Jyotiṣṭoma*' and as such they cannot fail to give an idea of the '*Jyotiṣṭoma*'. Specially as we find the '*Jyotiṣṭoma*' actually spoken of as '*Jyotiḥ*' in the sentence '*Vasante Vasante Jyotiṣi*, etc.

For these reasons, we conclude that inasmuch as in the case in question, we find none of the abovementioned grounds of diversity, viz.—Difference of words, Repetition of the same word, Number, the mention of an Accessory incompatible with the original Action, and a Difference of context—the actions referred to cannot be any other than the original '*Jyotiṣṭoma*.'

Siddhānta.—To the above we make the following reply: when no word expressive of the Action has been used, the name that happens to be mentioned first cannot but give rise to the idea of something new. That is to say, in a case where the Action has been already laid down by means of a previously pronounced verb, before the name comes to be mentioned, the unity or diversity of the Actions concerned having, in that case, already been ascertained elsewhere by means of the verb, the subsequently appearing Name would not distinguish the Actions. In the case in question, however, we find that the name is mentioned in connection with an Action that has yet to be laid down (by the subsequent sentence '*Etena Sahasradakṣiṇena yajeta*') and such like the number, it must be expressive of *Separateness*. Because in all cases, it is most improper to use one word in more than one sense, or to express one thing by more than one word; and hence whenever we come across a new thing, we look for a new name; and vice versa whenever we find a new name we look for a new thing. When, however, we directly perceive both of these to be the same that has been known before, then this perception sets aside the weaker authority of the aforesaid character of the name. But so long as there is no such recognition of identity, there is nothing to set aside the idea of difference naturally afforded by the difference of names.

For instance, in the case in question, we find that entirely different from the previously mentioned *Jyotiṣṭoma*, there is, later on, a new name

'*atha gauḥ*' ; and as this latter has apparently no connection with what has gone before, it cannot bring about any idea thereof ; and hence it gives rise to the notion of something else coloured by itself (*i.e.*, the name *gauḥ*.) And then we proceed to look out, in what follows as well as in what has gone before, for that thing of which this is the name, and we find that all the '*yajatis*' that has gone before refer to, and have been absorbed by the *Jyotiṣṭoma*, and as such cannot refer to anything else or have any other name ; but as for the '*yajati*' that comes afterwards (in the sentence '*Etena sahasradakṣiṇena yajeta*') though, on account of the mention of the Result, the Injunctive potency is taken up by the laying down of something else (*i.e.*, the accessory gift of 'a thousand'), and as such the Injunction itself does not serve to distinguish the Action,—yet, inasmuch as according to Sūtra II. i. 49, on account of the intervention of an unconnected word '*gauḥ*' (between the passages dealing with the *Jyotiṣṭoma* and the sentence '*Ath iṣa Jyotiḥ*' etc.) the word '*gauḥ*' does not very well fit into what has gone before ; and hence the idea of what has gone before not presenting itself at the time that the sentence '*Atha gauḥ*' appears, the continuance of the previous context is broken off, and the mind naturally seeks for something else ; and the subsequent '*yajeta*' presenting itself to the expectant mind and being incapable of referring to the *Jyotiṣṭoma* sacrifice, which is already possessed by another name and turns itself to an object other than the taking up of that the continuation of which has been broken off. Consequently then, the subsequent '*yajati*' being separated from the previous context, by the giver of the name '*gauḥ*' cannot go over to it, nor does the previous context go over to it ; and hence *per force* it goes over to another object.

Thus, then, the word '*atha*' not being able to be taken as signifying either reference to what has gone before, or immediate sequence it is taken as serving the purpose of introducing another Action. The word '*eṣa*' also, being expressive of that which is perceptibly near it, is as applicable to what has gone before as to what appears subsequently, because both are equally perceptibly proximate to it, and hence the signification of this word does not affect the discussion. Thus, then we conclude that in consideration of the direct signification of the words '*Jyotiḥ* etc.,' these names must be taken as differentiating the Actions referred to by them from what has been mentioned before.

*Adhikarāṇa IX.—Differentiations of actions
through their deities.*

SŪTRA II. ii. 23—24.

गुणश्चापूर्वसंयोगे वाक्ययोः समत्वात् ॥ २३ ॥

गुणश्च Guṇaścha, an accessory also. अपूर्वसंयोगे Apūrvasamyoge, when it is a new one. वाक्ययोः Vākya-yoh, of the sentences. समत्वात् Samatvât, because of equal independence.

23. An accessory also (serves to differentiate actions) when it is a new one, and incapable of being connected with the foregoing (action) because both the sentences are equally independent of each other.—23.

COMMENTARY.

Before dealing with the differentiating of Actions by context, we proceed to consider the Diversity and Unity of Actions based upon their Accessories.

In connection with the Châturnâsya sacrifice with reference to the *Vaiśvadeva Parva*, we find the sentence '*Vaiśvadevyâmikṣâ*,' which serves to lay down the *sacrifice* implied by the connection between the material and the Deity herein mentioned; and following on this we find the sentence '*Vâjibhiyo Vâjnam*.' And on this point there arises the following doubt: Does the second sentence lay down an accessory material for the sacrifice laid down by the former sentence or does it serve to lay down a distinct sacrifice implied by the particular connection of the material and the Deity mentioned in itself?

Though there was a third alternative also possible, namely, that both the material and the Deity mentioned in the second sentence are laid down with reference to the previous sacrifice, yet this has not been put forth, because it has been shown in the *Adhikarāṇa* dealing with the *Paurṇamâsî* sacrifice, that it is not possible for many accessories to be laid down in connection with an Action that has been already enjoined by a previous sentence.

Thus, then, the question comes to be this: Is the material *Vâjina* connected, in the previously laid down sacrifice, with the Deity (*Viśva-devas*) of that sacrifice, or is it connected with another Deity (*Vaji*) another sacrifice and another *Apūrva*!

On this, we have the following:—

Pūrvapakṣa—The second sentence serves to lay down the material *Vâjina* with regard to the previous sacrifice.

Because of the word *Vaji* being taken as one who has *Vâja* or food and the food meant being the *Âmikṣâ* that has been laid down in the immediately preceding sentence (*Vaiśvadevyâmikṣhâ*) it is the action too referred to in this second sentence being the same as that laid down in the former sentence, what this second sentence does is to lay down a new material, in the shape of the *Vâjina*.

That is to say, we do not know of any such deities as the *Vâjis* and no unknown meaning of the words can serve to complete the meaning of a sentence; but as a rule wherever the meaning of a word as a whole is unknown, what we do is to accept the meaning that is afforded by its constituent parts; and in the case in question we find that in the first sentence, the *Viśvadevas* are represented as '*Vaji*' because of their having *Âmikṣâ* (which is a food, *Vâja*) and then these same Deities being understood, in the second sentence, to be connected with the material '*Vâjina*' they cannot be set aside from this connection (because there is no other known meaning of the word *Vâji* as a whole). These Deities (*Viśvadevas*) are already impressed with the connection of the sacrifice previously implied by the first sentence; consequently, when with a view to establishing their relationship with the material *Vâjina*, we come to assume a 'sacrifice' we find that there is no reason why we should set aside the sacrifice that is pointed out by the word '*Vâji*' (which is synonymous with *Viśvadevas*, and as such points to the sacrifice implied in the former sentence); and while we have that sacrifice, there arises no further inconsistency with regard to anything else; and hence we conclude that in the second sentence we have the same sacrifice, the same *Apūrva* and the same Deity as those in the previous sacrifice, and as such there is no reason for assuming any other sacrifice.

For these reasons we conclude that in view of the two sentences in question, the two materials, *Âmikṣâ* and *Vâjina* must be taken as pertaining to the same sacrifice, to be employed in it either as optional alternatives or both jointly and that the action mentioned in the second sentence is not different from that laid down in the first.

To the above, we make the following reply :---

Siddhânta.—Inasmuch as the sacrifice laid down by the first sentence has already a material mentioned for it, another material (mentioned in the second sentence) cannot possibly belong to it; and hence the mention of such a material, for the sake of establishing its relevancy, could not but indicate another Action.

The meaning of the *Sûtra* thus comes to be this: Inasmuch as the *Guṇa* (material) is new and incapable of being connected with the

previous Action it gives rise to the idea of a distinct Action ; specially as the two sentences are equal, i.e., independent of each other. That is to say, each of the two connections between Deity and material (that the two sentences speak of), not allowing the presence of the other, as incompatible with itself, lays down a distinct Action.

The passage in question comprises two distinct sentences '*Vaiśva-devyâmikṣâ*' and '*Vajibhyovâjinam*' and the case of the two sentences is not alike as in the sentence '*Vaiśvadevyâmikṣâ*' there are two relationships: (1) The Relationship of the material and the Deity, and (2) the Relationship of the qualifier and the qualified ; and of these the former is directly mentioned by the words, while the latter is indicated by syntactical connection.

For this reason, the qualification of the word '*âmikṣâ*' by the word '*Vaiśvadevi*' is not through the meaning of these words; as it is in the case of the expression '*Nilotpâlâm*' what the fact is, is that the Nominal affix itself directly denotes the *Âmikṣâ* together with the Deity *Viśvedevah* and the particular material referred to (by the pronoun '*asyâḥ*' in the expounding of the Nominal affix) is indicated by the proximity of the word '*Âmikṣâ*.' The case of the other sentence '*Vâjivjobajinâm*' is entirely different.

Because, *firstly*, in the sentence '*Vajibhyo Vajinam*,' the material to be offered is not denoted either by the noun '*Vajin*' or by the Dative affix (in the word '*Vajibhyah*') ; nor do any of these express the connection of that material with the Deity ; and hence we cannot cognise these by any other means save the syntactical connection (of the two words). That is to say, in the word '*Vajibhyah*' either the basic noun or the affix or both of them together express either the material in general or a particular material or connection of some material with the Deity, all that the word denotes is that "*the object signified by the noun is the recipient ;*" and certainly there is no idea of the relationship of the "*material*" included in the word ; and hence it has to be cognised by means of the syntactical connection based upon the proximity of the word '*Vajinam*.'

And, *secondly*, in the case of the word '*Vaiśvadevi*' we find that the signification of the Pronoun '*asyâḥ*' is included in the Nominal affix, but in the case of the word '*Vajibhyah*' the Dative is not laid down in the sense of that of which the object signified by the basic noun is the receiver of the gift : That is to say, in the case of the former, we find that the Nominal Affix has been laid down by grammarians in the sense of '*that of which* the object signified by the basic word is the Deity' ; while the Dative has not been laid down in the sense that '*that which* is signified by the basic noun is the receiver of *that* (a certain gift)' ;

and as such in the case of a word with the Dative ending, there can be no indication of the meaning of the pronoun 'asyâḥ'; and as a matter of fact what such a word actually expresses is the mere character of the 'recipient' and hence, it is only on account of the inconsistency of the mention of a 'recipient' without the object to be received, that the word with the Dative can give rise to a desire on our part for some such thing; and certainly this does not make this thing to be directly expressed by that word, as, in that case, all that is signified by the sentence would become the denotation of that word. All that the said 'desire' raised by the Dative does it to bring about the requisite relationship when the other word is uttered; for if there were no such desire raised by the first word, even the second word could not bring about the said relationship.

Thus, then, though the Dative Affix directly denotes the deitic character (of *Vâjin*), yet its relationship with the material (*Vâjina*), is indicated by syntactical connection alone. Our connection is with regard to this relationship (of the material and the Deity) and there is no doubt that the relationship of the material *vajina* (with the Deity *Vajin*) (as indicated by syntactical connection) is very much weaker in authority than that of the *Āmikṣa* with the *Viśvedevas* because this latter is mentioned directly by the Nominal Affix in the word '*Vaiśvadevi*.'

अगुणे तु कर्मशब्दे गुणस्तत्र प्रतीयेत ॥२४॥

अगुणे Aguṇe, not being accompanied by the mention of any accessory. तु Tu, but. कर्मशब्दे Karmasabde, the word mentioning a previous action. गुणः Guṇaḥ, an accessory. तत्र Tatra, in that case. प्रतीयेत Pratiyeta, should be recognised.

24. When however the word mentioning the previous action is not accompanied by the mention of any accessory, the accessory mentioned in another sentence should be taken as pertaining to that same action.—24.

COMMENTARY.

This "Sūtra" mentions a counter-instance to the foregoing. The sense of it is that when a certain Action has not got any definite accessory laid down by its original injunction, if another sentence is found mentioning an Accessory, this latter sentence can be taken as laying down the Accessory for the same sacrifice that has been laid down by the previous sentence, and hence in such cases, the mention of the Accessory does not serve to distinguish the Action (from the previous one).

Adhikarāṇa X.

The Bhāṣya has also taken Sūtra 24 to represent an Adhikarāṇa by itself. In the case of the two sentences 'Agnihotrena juhōti' and 'Dadhnd juhōti' the question arising as to whether the two sentences refer to the same or to different actions. The conclusion is that the former sentence not laying down any material for the 'Homa' the latter sentence should be taken as laying down the material for that same 'Homa.'

It may be noted that there is no difference in the actual interpretation of the 'Sūtra.' In both cases the Sūtra deals with a counter-instance to what has gone before. The only difference is that by one interpretation the Sūtra is made a portion of Adhikarāṇa IX while by another it is made an independent Adhikarāṇa by itself.

Adhikarāṇa XI.—The mention of definite materials is with a view to distinct results.

SŪTRAS II, ii. 25, 26.

“फलश्रुतेस्तु कर्म स्यात् फलस्य कर्मयोगित्वात्” ॥ २५ ॥

फलश्रुतेः Phalaśrūteḥ, because of the mention of distinct result. तु Tu, really. कर्म Karma, a distinct action. स्यात् Syāt, should be. फलस्य Phalasya, of the action. कर्मयोगित्वात् Karmayogitvât, being connected with a definite action.

25. Because of the mention of a distinct Result, there would be a distinct action (laid down by the sentence) specially as the Result is always connected with a definite Action.—25.

COMMENTARY.

In continuation of the sentence 'Agnihotram juhōti' we find the sentence 'Dadhndriyākāmasya juhuyât' and this gives rise to the following doubt: Does this second sentence lay down an Action different from that laid down by the former sentence? or does it only serve to mention a distinct result as following from the offering of a particular material at the same sacrifice?

Two conclusions have been previously arrived at: (1) If the original Injunction of the Action contain the mention of no accessory, the accessory mentioned in a subsequent passage pertains to the Action laid down by that Injunction, (2) If the original Injunction contain the mention of an accessory, there being no possibility of the connection of more than one enjoined accessory, the mention of another accessory pertains to another

Action. In the case in question, we find that the sentence laying down the original action—‘*Agnihotram juhōti*’—does not mention an accessory (*viz.*, the material ‘*Dadhi*’ and the Result ‘*Acquiring of sense, efficiency*’); and there arises a doubt as to the likelihood or otherwise of these latter appertaining to the former Action.

For the purpose of settling this doubt, we have got to settle at first the question as to whether the Result mentioned in the second sentence follows from the ‘*Homa*’ or from the particular material ‘*Dadhi*.’

There being every reason for a doubt in connection with the sentences in question, we proceed at first to deal with the following:—

Pūrvapakṣa.—Though in the case in question, the previous sentence ‘*Agnihotram juhōti*,’ mentioning the material, yet the sentence in question (‘*dadhnendriyakāmasya juhuyāt*’) lays down a distinct Action; because this latter contains, *i.e.*, distinctly mentions, a Result (‘*Sense-efficiency*’), and it is only from an Action that a result can follow.

The whole of the *Bhāvārthādhikaraṇa* (II. i. 14) serves as the present *Pūrvapakṣa*. Because the conclusion therein arrived at was that it is only *Verbs* and not *Nouns* or *Adjectives* (laying down the material or other accessory details), that are connected with the word speaking of the Result, and hence inasmuch as the Result is always connected with an Action, when there is a distinct Result mentioned, the sentence in question must be taken as laying down a distinct Action, and not as only pointing out another material (*dadhi*) for the previously mentioned Action (*Agnihotra*).

Because the *material* having been already mentioned once, the same cannot be enjoined over again; and if you hold the sentence to lay down a material that has not been already laid down, then the mention of the Result would be altogether superfluous (as no Result can ever follow from the material ‘*dadhi*’). That is to say, in a case where the word speaking of the Action does not speak of a material, we can take another sentence as laying down that material, only if either that material does not happen to have been laid down already by a previous sentence, or if the sentence in question is not found capable of asserting anything more than what has already been mentioned. In the case in question, however, we find none of these conditions present, as the material ‘*dadhi*’ has been previously laid down by another sentence ‘*dadhnā juhōti*,’ and the sentence in question mentions a Result (sense-efficiency) over and above what has been spoken of before. It is with a view to all this that the *Bhāṣya* has summed up the *Pūrvapakṣa* in the words: we find a distinct result mentioned in the sentence in question; and a (distinct) Result can, rightly speaking, follow from a (distinct) Action only.

अतुल्यत्वात् वाक्ययोर्गुणे तस्य प्रतीयेत ॥ २६ ॥

अतुल्यत्वात् Atulyatvât, on account of not being exactly similar. तु Tu, but. वाक्ययोः Vâkyayoh, of the two sentences. गुणे Guṇe, as laying down an accessory. तस्य Tasya, for the action. प्रतीयेत Pratīyeta, should be recognised.

26. The two sentences not being exactly similar, the second sentence should be taken as laying down an accessory for the previously mentioned Action.—26.

COMMENTARY.

The sentence in question is not similar to those with reference to which it has been concluded, under the Bhâvârthâdhikarana (II. i. 1), that the Result follows from that which is expressed by the Root. Because so long as the potency of the Injunctive has not been removed from that which is expressed by the verbal root, whatever result is mentioned is taken as pertaining to that Root-meaning; when however, the potency of the Injunctive is transferred to the Accessory, if a Result happens to be mentioned, then inasmuch as this mention of the Result would be touched by the Injunction of the Accessory it is along with that necessary that the Result comes to be taken.

That is to say, the Injunctiveness in reality residing in the *Bhâvanâ* is transferred to from one to the other factor, according as that factor comes to be recognised as helping that *Bhâvanâ*. And at the time that the Injunctiveness, as transferred to the Root-meaning, gets at the *Bhâvanâ* with a particular result,—it is the Root-meaning that is made the Instrument (of its accomplishment); and everything else becomes subservient to that Root-meaning. This (fact of Injunctiveness pertaining to the Root-meaning) is found to be the case, in connection with the sentence ‘*Agnihotram juhuyât svargakâmaḥ*,’ where the name (Agnihotra) is incapable of wresting, for itself, the operation of the Injunctive. On the other hand, in the case of the sentence in question (‘*dadhnêndriyakâmasya juhuyat*’), the word ‘*dadhi*’ has got none of the various characteristics of a Nâmadheya (Name of a sacrifice) (as detailed in the Fourth Pâda of the First Adhyâya) and hence it must be taken as something enjoined; and as such it wrests to itself the Injunctive operation that had been pointing to the Root-meaning. Thus then, the *Bhâvanâ* in question, affected by its contact with the *Dadhi*, comes to stand in need of reference (to a previous Action) by means of the Root-meaning of the sentence; and consequently when we find a Result mentioned, we at once conclude this Result to be something to be brought about by the instrumentality of the *Dadhi*, and not by that of the *Homa* (expressed by the Root-meaning

of 'juhuyat'; specially because those that are not enjoined cannot be accepted to have the Character of the Instrument; and when we have accepted a certain other thing to be the object of the Injunction, we can never take the sentence as laying down that from which the Injunctive operation has been wrested, as we have already shown above (under Sūtra II. ii. 11) just as on account of the Injunctive operation being wrested by the *Dadhi* we deny the fact of the sentence enjoining the *Homa*, so in the same manner, on account of the presence of the word mentioning the Result, we cannot take the sentence as enjoining the *dadhi* with reference to the *Homa* (because of the chance of syntactical split, etc., etc.); hence what we hold is that the sentence enjoins the *Dadhi* with reference to the *Bhūvanā*, and as such, it must be admitted that the Result follows from the *Dadhi*, and the sentence does not lay down a distinct action.

Adhikaraṇa XII.—The *Vāravantīya*, etc., are
distinct Actions.

SŪTRA II. ii. 27.

समेषु कर्मयुक्तं स्यात् ॥ २७ ॥

समेषु Sameṣu, the sentences being similar. कर्मयुक्तं Karmayuktam, related to the actions. स्यात् Syât, should be.

27. When the sentences are similar (the Result) would be connected with distinct Action.—27.

COMMENTARY.

We now proceed to deal with an exception to the foregoing *Adhikaraṇa*.

The subject of the *Adhikaraṇa* is thus shown: (1) we have the sentence 'trivṛidagniṣṭomah, tasya vāyavyāsu ekaviṁśamagniṣṭomasāma kṛtvā brahmavarchasakāmo yajetā' and then in continuation of this *Agniṣṭut* sacrifice we have the sentence 'vāravantīyamagniṣṭomasāma kāryam' which lays down an accessory in the shape of the *vāravantīyamagniṣṭomasāma kṛtvā paśukāmo hyetenā yajetā*. [This difference between the bearing of the two sentences being that when the *Varvantīya* is sung to in connection with the *Vāyavya* verses then the result is in the shape of 'Brahmic glory' while when the same is sung in connection with the *Revati* verses, the Result is in the shape of 'Cattle'].

Here, too, we have as before, the following doubt:—Does this last sentence enjoin an independent action, distinct from that laid down in the previous sentence, as qualified by a distinct material (in the shape

of the *Varvantīya* in connection with the *Revatī* verses)? Or, does it only serve to lay down this distinct material only, with reference to the same Action, just as in the case of the sentence dealt with in the foregoing *Adhikaraṇa*?

And on this we have the following:—

Purvapakṣa.—In view of the reasons detailed, and the conclusion arrived at, in the foregoing *Adhikaraṇa*, it must be admitted that the sentence in question serves only to lay down the *Result* as following from a particular accessory (in connection with the previously mentioned action). Because, as a matter of fact, we find that the Injunctive potency of the sentence is taken up by the connection between the *Revatī* and the *Vāravantīya*, and then we find a *Result* mentioned along with this Injunction; consequently we cannot take the sentence as laying down the *Sacrifice* (as that would entail a dual junctioning of the Injunction, thereby leading to syntactical split). And as for the connection between the *Revatī* and the *Vāravantīya*, this would be brought about, without a repetition of the Injunctive affix, by the word '*kritvā*' which is mentioned distinctly by itself (and as such this would not involve the said syntactical split).

To the above we make the following reply :

Siddhānta.—When there is an Accessory which accepts the previously mentioned Action as its substratum, then alone is it so that we do not perceive any difference between the Actions (mentioned in the two sentences), and the reason is that in such a case what the latter sentence does is only to *refer* to the previous Action for the sake of its connection with the new Accessory.

That is to say, we find the sentence in question '*etasyaiva revatiṣu*,' etc., containing the mention of 'sacrifice' directly by means of the root '*yajī*'; under the circumstances, if the exact sort of 'sacrifice' that is herein mentioned had been previously mentioned in another sentence, then alone could we conclude that the one mentioned in the sentence in question is not a distinct sacrifice. As for instance in the case of the sentence '*dadhnendriyakāmasaya*, etc.,' we find that the sentence directly lays down only the relationship with the particular *Result*, and then the context helps to supply the other substrate of the relationship in the shape of *Homa*; and in this case we admit the mention of '*Homa*' in the sentence to be a mere reference to a previously mentioned '*Homa*' and another reason for this is that the *Dadhi* by itself also is capable of directly accomplishing the *Homa*. In the case in question, on the other hand, we find that the *Vāravantīya* qualified by the *Revatī* verses is not,

by itself, capable of directly accomplishing the sacrifice; because it is neither a Deity nor a material (which two alone are directly accomplishing the sacrifice); because the sacrifice requires for its accomplishment, no other helping factors, except those of the Deity, the material, and the performer; and hence it is never accomplished directly by means of a *Soma* (*Vâravantīya* and the like).

Thus then, though through the peculiar character of the context, the sacrifice (previously mentioned) is present in the mind, yet it does not become cognised as the substrate of the said *Soma*, because of its inherent incapability of having that character; and hence that 'sacrifice' cannot be accepted as *referred* to by the sentence in question (*Revatiṣu*, etc.,) specially as we have no grounds for believing that the sacrifice herein mentioned is the same as the one previously mentioned. As for the *Hymning*, that forms a part of the previous 'sacrifice' and which being accomplished by means of the *Varvantīya Soma*, is capable of being taken as its substrate—it is not pointed out by the context; because the presence of *Hymning* in the previous 'sacrifice'; the '*Agniṣṭut*' is only based upon an indirect implication.

— — —

Adhikaraṇa XIII.—A single result following from two Actions.

SŪTRA II. ii. 28—29.

सौभरे पुरुषश्रुतेः निधनं कामसंयोगः ॥ २८ ॥

सौभरे Saubhare, in connection with the Subhara. पुरुषश्रुतेः Puruṣaśruteḥ, because of the mention of human effort. निधनं Nidhanam, with the Nidhana. कामसंयोगः Kāmasaṃyogaḥ, connection of a desirable result.

28. Because of the mention of human effort in connection with the Saubhara there must be a distinct desirable result connected with the Nidhana.—28.

COMMENTARY.

From among the Ukthya Hymns, the Saubhara is the *Brahmasāma* that has been laid down in connection with the *Jyotiṣṭoma*; in connection with this we have the sentences '*Yadi Rathantaram*,' etc., which serve to lay down certain motive causes; and then later on, we meet with the sentence.—(1) '*Yo Vṛiṣṭikāmo yo annādyakāmô yaḥ svargakāmaḥ sa saubharena stuvīta*,' which mentions the three results in connection with the *Saubhara* which is a necessary accompaniment of the *Jyotiṣṭoma* sacrifice, in accordance with the rule that all such desirable results are

connected with the necessary accompaniment, because this is equally present in all cases ; and it will be shown later on, under *Sûtra* IV. iii. 5, that such an accompaniment can be only that which helps the sacrifice and fulfils a desirable end of the human agent ; and under *Sûtra* IV. iii. 26, that the several results mentioned follow from the said necessary accompaniment, alternatively. Then again, with reference to the aforesaid *Saubhara*, we have the following sentence (2) *Hiṣiti : vṛṣṭikâmdya nidhanam kuryât urgityannâdyakâmdya ân iti svargakâmasya* [*Nidhanam* is the concluding part of the *Sâma*.]

In connection with these two sets of texts, we proceed to consider the following question : Does the *Saubhara* (mentioned in the former sentence) bring about its result by itself, independently of the *Nidhanas*, *hiṣ* and the rest [mentioned in sentence (2)] which bring about separate results of their own (apart from that of the *Saubhara*), or these ‘*hiṣ*’ etc., have been laid down as the various instruments which when employed in connection with the same aforesaid *Saubhara*, help it in bringing about the said results?

Though this question has nothing to do with the difference or non-difference of Actions, yet it has been introduced here as in a way connected with the subject. Or, it may be that, like the difference and non-difference of Actions, the difference and non-difference of the resultant *Apârva* also forms the subject matter of the *Adhyâya*.

On the above question, we have the following :—

PŪRVAPAKṢA (A).

Pūrvapakṣa—If the results mentioned in the latter sentence were the same as those that followed from the *Saubhara* itself, then their repetition (in the latter sentence) would be wholly useless ; because in that case, there would be nothing that would be laid down by the sentence in question ; because the *hiṣ* and the rest are already known, from other Vedic texts, as the *Nidhanas* of the *Saubhara* (and the only other object spoken of in the sentence is the result, and this you take to be the same as that previously mentioned, and so the sentence would have nothing new to say.) Nor can it be urged that the sentence in question would serve the purpose of restricting the *Nidhanas* because these being directly laid down (in other Vedic texts) as the *Nidhanas* to be employed they cannot rightly be set aside on the strength of any such implied restrictions. As a matter of fact, in all cases, restriction as serving the sole purpose of setting aside something, is highly objectionable. But when all other objects are indirectly implied, then it is possible for the one that is directly laid down to set aside the rest. Because we find that they are all directly laid down by

the text that lays down the *Saubhara* ; and under the circumstances it is scarcely right to take any one of them as setting aside the rest, on the mere ground of repetition actuated by an Injunction ; specially when this latter admits of another explanation. In accordance with our theory, however, the use of '*hiṣ*' and the rest having the capability of bringing about distinct results of their own, would be more desirable, for the agent, than those that have been mentioned as forming part of the *Saubhara* and thereby helping in the accomplishment of the sacrifice ; and on ground of this greater desirability the former would very rightly set aside all the latter.

(2) The sentence in question would serve a useful purpose, only if it laid down the relationship (causal) between the Rain, etc., and the *hiṣ* etc., which is not laid down in any other sentence. And this would also save us from the anomaly of taking the word '*Vṛṣṭikāmaḥ*' as a mere qualification of the *Saubhara* in a sentence which would be taken as serving to restrict the *Nidhanas*,—while it is quite capable of being taken directly by itself (as mentioning the result following from the *Nidhanas*).

(3) In the *Veda*, which consists of Injunctions, we always want a lot of desirable results, because that makes it easier for the Injunctions to urge the human agents to action.

For these reasons we conclude that the results following from the *Nidhanas* are distinct from those mentioned as following from the *Saubhara* itself.

सर्वस्य वोक्तकामत्वात् तस्मिन् कामःश्रुतिः स्यात् निधनार्था
पुनःश्रुतिः ॥ २६ ॥

सर्वस्य Sarvasya, of the whole. वा Vâ, but. उक्तकामत्वात् Uktakâmatvât, having their results already mentioned. तस्मिन् Tasmin, to that. कामः श्रुतिः Kâmaḥśrutiḥ, mention of the result. स्यात् Syât, should refer. निधनार्था Nidhânâarthâ, for the purpose of restricting the Nidhana. पुनः श्रुतिः Punaḥśrutiḥ, repetition.

29. But because the results mentioned pertain to the whole *Saubhara* the result mentioned subsequently should also pertain to the same. The second mention is only for the purpose of restricting the *Nidhana*.—29.

COMMENTARY.

In answer to the aforesaid *Pūrvapakṣa* we have the following :—

Siddhânta (A.)—The *hiṣ* cannot be connected with the Result, because that would make the mention of the *Nidhana* wholly redundant ; while if

the *Nidhana* be taken as connected with the *Saubhara*, the Result could be taken as qualifying the *Saubhara*.

That is to say, if we were to take the sentence as—‘one should bring about rain by means of the *hiṣ* and by that as a *nidhana* of the *Saubhara*,’—there would be a syntactical split; for if the *hiṣ* were not connected with the *Saubhara*, then the sentence would be wholly redundant. In accordance with our theory, there is nothing without some use; and out of the things spoken of in the sentence in a question, the *Saubhara*, as bringing about Rain, etc., mentioned in another sentence, has already been laid down elsewhere, as also the Results themselves, and hence all that the sentence has got to lay down is the relationship between the *hiṣ* etc., and the *Saubhara*; and as such there is no syntactical split.

Nor is the sentence altogether useless, as it serves the purpose of restricting the particular *nidhanas*. Even apart from any consideration of the one being more desirable, there is, in the case in question, a distinct setting aside of the one by the other, on the ground of one being more generic in its character than the other; as, for instance, the word ‘*Saubhara*’ applying to all parts of that *Soma*, it is only by indirect indication that all its *nidhanas* (*hiṣ* etc.,) could be mentioned by the sentence speaking of the ‘*Saubhara*’; while the sentence in question mentions the particular *nidhanas* directly; and as such this latter is more authoritative than the former (and as such this would very well restrict the use of the *nidhanas* implied in the former sentence). And just as that which is implied is set aside by that which is directly mentioned, so is also that which is indirectly indicated. Or, the sentence in question does not set aside anything of the *song* mentioned by the word ‘*Saubhara*’ because all that it does is to lay down certain letters ‘*triṣ*,’ for instance, and as such it would set aside certain other letters only (and not the song itself.) If the sentence had laid down the part of some other song, then the part of the ‘*Saubhara*’ would be set aside by that; as a matter of fact, however, the restriction of the *nidhana* only serves to preclude certain letters of the *śloka* (the *Sāma*). And as such there is no anomaly of the preclusion of that which has been directly laid down.

For these reasons, we conclude that the repetition of the Results in the sentence in question serves to restrict the *Nidhanas*.

Kumārila is not satisfied with the above presentation of the Adhikarāṇa and he makes the following observations:—

As for the form of the *doubt* itself, there can be no such doubt, because the construction of the sentence in question is wholly different from that on which the abovementioned doubt has been based, because (in the

sentence 'trīṣṭi vṛīṣṭikāmāya nidhanam', trīṣ cannot be taken along with the nidhanam because of the intervention between them, of the word vṛīṣṭikāmāya as it would be very undesirable to take the sentence as trīṣ is the nidhana, etc. (This is the case of the above representative of the Pūrvapakṣa).

So also in the case of the above representation of the Siddhānta, if the sentence be taken as laying down the 'trīṣ' with reference to the nidhana as qualified 'desire for rain,' then, inasmuch as it would contain a reference to a qualified object, there would be distinct syntactical split. If it be taken as laying down the trīṣ with reference to the nidhanas only (not qualified by "desire for rain"), then the mention of the Result would be wholly useless. Because the connection with all nidhanas has already been laid down by mere mention of the 'saubhara' and hence no useful purpose would be served by the sentence laying down such a connection only. If again, the sentence be taken as—'Vṛīṣṭikāmāya yat saubharam tasya yannidhanam tatra hiṣ padamprayuñjīta' (one should use the word trīṣ in the nidhana of that Saubhara which is sung for the sake of Rain)—then, inasmuch as this would involve various predictions, there would be a syntactical split. Though 'desire for rain,' Saubhara and its nidhanas have all been mentioned before, yet inasmuch as there are many other nidhanas present in the Saubhara it is necessary to make an attempt to preclude these and thereby the sentence would come to serve more purposes than one; and that would entail a syntactical split.

Then again, the Siddhānta as represented above, has not quite effectually refuted the Pūrvapakṣa; as the fact of the trīṣ, etc., being nidhanas is mentioned by Veda itself.

For the above reasons, we must explain the Adhikaraṇa as follows:—

The trīṣ being taken with the word vṛīṣṭikāmāya there arises a doubt as to whether the sentence point to its connection with the result or with the means. That is to say, the sentence being taken as trīṣṭi vṛīṣṭikāmāya there arises a doubt as to whether the trīṣ is related directly to the Result, or to a particular means (in the shape of the Saubhara) as qualified by the Result?

In fact, it is this construction of the sentence that has been shown in the Bhāṣya by means of the sentences 'trīṣṭi nidhanamiti etat phalambhavatīti.' The sentence 'Vṛīṣṭikāmāyeti Saubharaviśeṣaṇam' (Bhāṣya)—means that the Saubhara not being mentioned by name in the sentence in question, it is only by means of indirect indication that it could be qualified by the Result therein mentioned. The assertion 'Na trīṣā sambandhāt—means that the trīṣ has no connection with the form of the result.

And then, inasmuch as the position of the *Pûrvapakṣa* based upon the repetition of the Injunction would be established otherwise, through the force of the Collective Injunction relating to the sacrifice in question, we proceed to put forward the following position of the

Pûrvapakṣa (B).—If every one of the *nidhanas* were restricted with reference to the *Saubhara* as engaged in fulfilling its own function,—then, inasmuch as the Injunction of the *trīṣ* and the rest would be established by the very fact of these being brought forward by the Collective Injunction of the sacrifice in question, there would be no use of another Injunction of them (in the sentence in question). No such Collective Injunction, however, is capable of expressing the independent relationship of the *hiṣ* with the particular Result; and as such, in giving expression of this relationship, the sentence would be serving a distinct useful purpose.

And further, the word '*Vṛīṭtikāmāya*,' having directly mentioned the human agent concerned—it is only natural that when this agent comes to look for the means of accomplishing the Result, this want is supplied by the mention of *trīṣ*, etc. Otherwise (if the result belonged to the *Saubhara*, then) this *Saubhara* could be mentioned as the *means* sought after, only through indirect Injunction, based upon the fact of its occurring in the same context and being capable of bringing about the Result in question. And certainly there can be no ground for having recourse to such an indirect Indication (so long as the want is found to be supplied by means of Direct Assertion).

This representation of the *Pûrvapakṣa* appeared to have been intended by the *Bhāṣya* as is shown by the sentence '*Tathāśrutilakṣaṇā viśaye, etc.*'

The *Siddhānta* in that case would be represented as follows :—

Siddhānta (B).—The previous sentence having spoken of a certain Result as following from the *Saubhara* as a whole, what the sentence in question does is to restrict the particular *nidhanas* of the *Saubhara* with reference to each one of the results mentioned (and thus the mention of the results in the previous latter sentence is a reference to the very same results mentioned in the sentence).

That is to say, inasmuch as the results mentioned in the sentence in question are distinctly recognised as being the same as those mentioned previously in connection with the *Saubhara* as a whole—we can never believe them to be distinct results (following from the particular *Nidhanas*).

To the question—"Why then should there be a repetition?"—the answer—'*Nidhanārtha punaśrutih*' (the repetition is for the purpose of

restricting the Nidhanas). This *Adhikaraṇa* embodies the exception to two of the foregoing *Adhikaraṇas*, viz., that the result follows from the Accessory (II. ii. 26), and that it follows from the Action and not from the Accessory (II. ii. 27). Because what is herein shown is that the sentence in question does not lay down the Result, but only indicates the 'Hiṣ' etc., as part of the *Saubhara* leading to the aforesaid results.

The *syntactical split* that had been urged against us, would have been possible, if we admitted of a relationship of the *Nidhana* (with the *Hiṣ*, etc.) or if we took the *Nidhana* as directly qualifying the *Saubhara*. As a matter of fact, however, we do none of these, as we hold the relationship to exist between the *Hiṣ* and the word '*Vṛṣṭikāma*'; and the fact of the *Nidhana* being the qualification of *Saubhara*, we deduce from the *context*; and certainly the peculiarities deduced from the context do not cause a syntactical split. And hence the anomaly of syntactical split does not quite apply to us.

[SUPPLEMENTARY ADHIKARAṆA.]

There is yet another point to be considered in this connection : (1) Does the sentence in question serve to restrict the *Hiṣ*, etc., with reference to the means of accomplishing Rain, etc., in the shape of the *Saubhara* in whatever rescension of the Veda the *Sāma* may be found to appear? Or is the *Saubhara* to be employed for one desiring rain, in that form in which it appears in that rescension wherein it is found with the *Hiṣ* as its *Nidhana*? Similarly with the other two *Nidhanas*—*Ūrg* and *Ūn*.

And on this point we have the following :—

Pūrvapakṣa.—As all the *Saubharas* appearing in the thousand rescensions of the *Sāmaveda* are recognised as optional alternatives, what the sentence in question does is merely to restrict the *Hiṣ*, etc., with regard to the *desire for rain*, etc., (the *Saubhara* being of any Rescension of the *Sāmaveda*.)

To the above we make the following reply :—

Siddhānta.—As a general rule, the song to be employed for the sake of Rain etc., must be of that particular *Nidhana*.

Because in order that the form of the song may not be utterly destroyed, one song is never connected with the parts of another song; and hence what is recognised as the alternative to be employed is *the whole of the song* (together with its *Nidhana* and other parts); and as such all its restrictions should always follow the way in which it appears in the Veda.

The sentence in question is capable of yet another interpretation. The sentence lays down the mere relationship between the *Saubhara* and the *Hiṣ* both of which have been mentioned previously the construction of the sentence being 'Yat vṛiṣṭtikâmâya saubharam, yacca hiṣityevam nidhanam, tadekatra Sampâdanîyam.

Thus, then we conclude that the sentence serves to restrict the use of the whole *Saubhara Sâma* with reference to the various results.

SECOND ADHYÂYA.

THIRD PADA.

Adhikâraṇa I.—The Grahâgrata is subsidiary to the Jyotiṣṭoma.

SŪTRAS II. iii. 1—2.

गुणस्तु ऋतुसंयोगात् कर्मान्तरं प्रयोजयेत् संयोगस्याशेष-
भूतत्वात् ॥१॥

गुणः Guṇaḥ, the accessory. तु Tu, really, ऋतुसंयोगात् Kratusamyogât, on account of connection with the sacrifice. कर्मान्तरं Karmântaram, a distinct action. प्रयोजयेत् Prayojayet, would bring about. संयोगस्य Samyogasya, of the connection. अशेषभूतत्वात् Aśeṣabhûtatvât, on account of being in its entirety.

1. The Accessory, being in connection with the sacrifice, would bring about a distinct Action, because the connection is in its entirety.”—1.

COMMENTARY.

In connection with the *Jyotiṣṭoma*, from among the various alternative Sâmas, the *Brahadrathântara* has been laid down as the means of accomplishing the particular hymn (Prohtha); and then we find the sentence ‘*Yadi Rathantarâsâmâ somah syât aindravâyavâgrân grahân grihñîyât, yadi Brihatsâma śukrâgrân* (If the soma is connected with the *Rathantara sâma*, precedence should be given to the holding of the vessels dedicated to *Indra* and *Vâyu* etc., etc., etc.)

And in connection with these two sentences, there arises the following question with regard to the Action with its Accessory that is mentioned in the latter sentence: Is it an action distinct from the *Jyotiṣṭoma* or is it the same *Jyotiṣṭoma* mentioned over again, for the purpose of pointing out the reason for the precedence of the various vessels at the same sacrifice, as characterised by the *Rathantara Sâma*?

For the sake of this question, we have got to consider the following question:—Is the *Rathantara* related to the sacrifice in its entirety (i.e., is the *Rathantara* the only *Soma* to be used at it)? Or is it related by

mere existence (i.e., the *Rathantara* is one of the many used in the sacrifice.) ?

And this leads us to another question—Is the *Rathantara* accepted as qualified by the sacrifice or the sacrifice as qualified by the *Rathantara*?

The conclusion that would suggest itself at the first sight, in connection with the above questions, would be as follows :—The action mentioned in the sentence in question is none other than the *Jyotiṣṭoma* itself—(1) because the presence of the *Rathantara Sâma*, as also that of the *Bṛihat Sâma*, is mentioned by another sentence ; (2) because the word ‘*yadi*’ distinctly points to the conditional character, which depends upon the previous mention of that which is laid down as the condition ; (3) because the particular precedence of the vessel is included in the collective sentence laying down the whole procedure of the Action collectively ; (4) because the accessory mentioned more authoritatively elsewhere ; specially so, in accordance with the *Sûtra* II. ii. 16.

In opposition to this position of the *Siddhânta*, we proceed to put forward the *Pûrvapakṣa* embodied in the *Sûtra* :—

Purvapakṣa.—The Action mentioned in the sentence in question is a distinct Action because a compound is possible only, when the words compounded have a certain capability ; and this capability is held to exist in the qualifying *Sâma* ; and the qualification serves to differentiate the object qualified ; while in the *Jyotiṣṭoma* we do not find the *Rathantara* differentiating the sacrifice (by precluding all other *Sâmas*).

It has been explained above under *Sûtra* II. ii. 23, that it is only when the Accessory mentioned is wholly unconnected with the previously mentioned action, that it serves to differentiate the Action mentioned in the sentence from that mentioned before. In the case in question, however, we find that the existence of the object expressed by the *Bahuvrîhi* compound—‘*Rathantara Sâma*’—is pointed out by the word ‘*yadi*’ as the condition (for the precedence of the vessel) ; and the character of the condition is not found to belong to the existence of the mere *Rathantara* ; as that has only a subordinate position in the compound (being only a qualification of that which is expressed by the compound). Specially as in the sentence, we do not recognise the *Rathantara* to be qualified by the *Sacrifice*—we could not very well take the existence of the *Rathantara* as the condition. Nor is it possible for the *Sâma* (*Rathantara*) to be differentiated by the *Sacrifice* ; because that (*Sâma*) exists elsewhere also. It could have been so differentiated, if the *Rathantara* was the *Sâma* peculiar to the sacrifice in question alone ; but as a matter of fact, that is not so,

Therefore we must take the compound as expressing the fact of the *Rathantara* being the only *Sâma* connected with the particular sacrifice; and inasmuch as we do not find either the *Jyotiṣṭoma* or any other sacrifice, connected with that *Sâma* only, the presence of the mere *Rathantara* could not be the condition of any such sacrifice.

Thus, then, having to renounce all notion of *condition*, we find the word '*Rathantarāsâma*' to be inexplicable, and from this apparent inconsistency of the word, we come to take it as laying down an altogether distinct Action, at which the *Rathantara* would be the only *Sâma* employed. Specially as that distinct Action is quite capable of being performed. And the mere existence of the *Rathantara* cannot be a qualification, as it does not extend over the whole of the Sacrifice, and not being a qualification it cannot have the capability (of being compounded); and without the capabilities, there can be no compound; but as a matter of fact, we find the *Samâsa* actually present in the case in question; consequently the Action mentioned in the sentence is not recognised as being the same as the one mentioned before. For these reasons it is concluded that the sentence in question is the Injunction of a distinct Action.

एकस्य तु लिङ्गभेदात् प्रयोजनार्थमुच्येतैकत्वं गुणवाक्यत्वात् ॥२॥

एकस्य Ekasya, of the same Action. तु Tu, but. लिङ्गभेदात् Liṅgabhedât, on account of diverse characteristics. प्रयोजनार्थं Prayojanârtham, for a certain purpose. उच्येत Uchyeta, could be mentioned. एकत्वं Ekatvam, being one only. गुणवाक्यत्वात् Guṇavâkyatvât, being a subsidiary sentence.

2. The same Action having diverse characteristics these could be mentioned for a certain purpose—the Action being one only, on account of the sentence (in question) being subsidiary (to the previous sentence).—2.

COMMENTARY.

On account of the reasons shown briefly at the opening of the present *Adhikarana*, we conclude that the sentence in question merely lays down accessory details for the previously mentioned *Jyotiṣṭoma*, and does not put forward a distinct sacrifice. (1) Because it is the same sacrifice of the *Jyotiṣṭoma* that is mentioned with its several characteristic *Sâmas*, with a view to serve the purpose of showing the cause or condition of the precedence to be accorded to one or the other of the vessels; and inasmuch as the sentence in question is subsidiary to the foregoing sentence, it cannot give rise to any notion of a distinct sacrifice; and hence the *Sacrifice* in question is believed to be one and one only. (2) Or,

because of the fact of the *Rathantara*, etc., being laid down in the sentence in question, it is concluded that it is the *Jyotiṣṭoma* sacrifice that is laid down as having these *Sâmas* mentioned in the sentences that are subsidiary to the original Injunction of the *Jyotiṣṭoma*; and consequently, the Action mentioned in the sentence in question is none other than the *Jyotiṣṭoma*, which therefore is the only one sacrifice spoken of in the two sentences.

For these reasons we conclude that the sentences in question only serve the purpose of laying down certain conditions of *precedence* [and do not lay down distinct actions].

Adhikarana II.—The Aveṣṭi is a distinct sacrifice.

SŪTRA II. iii. 3.

अवेष्टौ यज्ञसंयोगात् ऋतुप्रधानमुच्यते ॥३॥

अवेष्टौ Aveṣṭau, in the Aveṣṭi. यज्ञसंयोगात् Yajñasamyogât, on account of connection with the sacrifice. ऋतुप्रधानं Kratupradhânam, pointing chiefly to a sacrifice. उच्यते Uchyate, must be accepted.

3. Because of the mention of the Aveṣṭi being connected with the mention of the sacrifice it must be accepted as pointing chiefly to a Sacrifice (and not to an Accessory).—3.

COMMENTARY.

In the same context with the sentence '*Râjâ râjasûyena svârâjyakâmo yajeta*', we find the sentence—(i) *Âgneyoṣṭâkapâlo hiraṇyân dakṣiṇâ* and so forth, which serve to lay down, by mentioning the relationship of certain substances with particular deities, the sacrifice known as '*Aveṣṭi*'; and then subsequently, we come across the following sentence: (ii) '*Yadi Brâhmaṇo yajeta Bârhaspatyam madhye nidhâyâ hutimâhutim hutvâ hutvâ'bhighârayet yadi Râjanya Aindram, yadi Vaiśyo Vaisvadevam.*'

With regard to this last sentence, there arises a doubt, as before; and it is this: (a) Does it serve to lay down the inserting of the *Bârhaspatya*, etc., as due to (conditioned by) the connection of the *Aveṣṭi* as forming part of the *Râjasûya*, with the various castes, a connection that has already been laid down in the previous sentences? Or, does it lay down a distinct performance (of the *Aveṣṭi*), in connection with the *Brâhmaṇa* etc., not mentioned before?

This leads us to the further question: *viz.*, (b).—Are all the three castes entitled to the performance of the *Râjasûya* or the Kṣatriya only.

[As if the latter, then the connection of the three castes with the *Aveṣṭi* of the *Râjasûya* cannot be said to have been previously mentioned.].

(c) And this last question would lead us to the consideration of the word '*Râja*,' which is the word that specifies the agent entitled to the performance of the *Râjasûya*; and in connection with the word '*Râja*,' we shall have to consider the question as to whether it signifies the *Kṣatriya* or one who performs the functions of a king?

And on this question we have the following :—

Pûrvapakṣa.—In view of the conclusion arrived at in the foregoing *Adhikaraṇa*, it must be admitted that the latter sentences only serve to lay down the conditions for the particular *insertions*.

And to the performance of *Râjasûya*, all the three castes are entitled, as shown by the word '*Râjâ*' which signifies 'one who performs the functions of a king.' Because all through the word, it is only one performing the kingly functions that is spoken of as '*Râjâ*.' And it is thus alone that the text in question can have an extended application.

That is to say, when it is possible for the word '*Râjâ*' to be taken both ways (*i.e.*, as signifying the *Kṣatriya*, and as signifying one who performs the kingly functions), it is far more advisable to accept the signification of all the three castes; because this interpretation alone would be compatible with the mention (in the subsequent sentences) of the conditions ('*Yadi Brâhmaṇa, etc.*') and with the context, *etc.*, and also because this interpretation would not curtail the scope of the declaration of all the three castes being entitled to the performance of the *Râjasûya*.

For these reasons it must be admitted that persons of all the three castes, performing the functions of a king are '*Râjâs*' and these functions are well known to consist in the protection of the people and the removal from among them, of all troublous factors.

To the above we make the following reply :—

Siddhânta.—The sentence in question serves to lay down the connection of the *Brâhmaṇa, etc.*, with the sacrifice; because such connection has not been mentioned before, the mere performing of kingly functions not sufficing to make one known as '*Râjâ*'.

That is to say, the word '*Râjâ*' denotes the *Kṣatriya* and cannot be taken in its literal sense. Because the literal meaning might consist, either in the performing of the kingly functions, or, according to the significations of the root '*Râj*' in *Brightness* or *Effulgence*, and both of these are impossible; because we find the word having a well known meaning apart from the *literal*; and even though this meaning may be known in one part of the country only, yet it will always set aside the

applicability of the *literal* meaning ; and then, too, there is no one definite literal meaning that is recognised as universally applicable ; as on the one hand, the word '*Rājâ*' is not found to be applied to such bright things as Fire and the like ; nor, on the other, to such representatives of the king as are not duly anointed, though performing quite well the kingly functions of protecting the people and the like.

Adhikaraṇa III.—The laying of the fire is an object of Injunction.

SŪTRA II. iii. 4.

आधाने सर्वशेषत्वात् ॥ ४ ॥

आधाने Âdhâne, to the laying of fire. सर्वशेषत्वात् Sarvasēṣatvât, because it forms an integral factor of all sacrifices.

4. The Injunction does not point to the laying of fire as this forms an integral factor in all sacrifices.—4.

COMMENTARY.

In connection with the sentence '*Vasante Brâhmaṇo grîṇâdadhita*,' there is a doubt, as in the previous instance, as to whether the *âdhuina* (laying of fire) has been previously mentioned then even in the absence of the conditional 'if', the sentence would be taken as laying down the condition (for the particular season to be chosen) ; and in that case, the construction of the sentence in question being—'*Yad Brâhmaṇa âdadhîta tad Vasante*.—The *Vasanta* and the *Brâhmaṇa* would come to restrict one another (i.e., the spring would be the time for the *Brâhmaṇa* and *Brâhmaṇa* would be the performer in the *Spring time*). While on the other hand, if the laying of fire be not found to have been previously mentioned, then the sentence in question would become the Injunction of the Laying as performed by the *Brâhmaṇa* at the time of the *Spring* and the following would be the advantages of this latter interpretation :—

(1) In the three sentences—(a) *Vasante Brâhmaṇo'gninâdadhita*, (b) *Grîṣme Rājânyah*, (c) *Śâradi Vaiśyah*,—inasmuch as the laying mentioned in the first sentence would be wholly taken up by the accessories (*Brâhmaṇa* and *Vasanta*) mentioned in the same sentence ; the accessories mentioned in the other two sentences would point to distinct actions of (Laying) ; and as such there would be *three* Layings of fire ; (2) the presence of the *Âtmanepada* affix in *âdadhîta* would point to the necessity of the sacrificer himself laying his own fire ;

(3) the *Śūdra* would become precluded (from sacrifices), as only the three layings of fire are laid down and without the laying of fire, no sacrifice would be performed. If, on the other hand, the sentences be taken, not as Injunctions of the laying, but as simply laying down conditions, then we would have the reverse of all these three advantages.

What is said in regard to the sentences in question would also apply to such other passages as *Vasante Brāhmaṇam upanayita, grīṣme Rājanyam, śāradi Vaiśyam* ; as the condition of these sentences is exactly like that of those dealt with in this *Adhikaraṇa*.

The *Adhikaraṇa* may be briefly summed up thus :—

Pūrvapakṣa.—The *Laying of Fire* having been implied by an injunction of a sacrifice in general (as *swargakāmo yayetā*) or laid down by a general Injunction (such as *ya evamvidvānaginādhatte*) its mention over again in the sentences in question must be taken as mentioning the various castes as conditions for the particular times of the Laying.

That is to say, in the first instance the first argument in our favour is that, inasmuch as the Injunction of such actions as the *Agnihotra* and the like would not be possible without the sacrificial fire made ready by the proper method of *laying* it, this laying of the fire must be taken as implied by those very Injunctions; and hence the mention, in the sentences in question, of the same *Laying* must be taken as serving the purpose of laying down the *Brāhmaṇa*, etc., by way of specifying certain conditions. If, however, it be argued, that on account of these injunctions having other direct objects of Injunctions they cannot rightly serve the purpose of indirectly implying any such action as the said *Laying*—then, in that case we would bring forward another independent Injunction of the laying itself, in the shape of the sentences '*Ya evamvidvām āgninādhatte*, etc.'; an Injunction which is wholly distinct from the previous Injunction, which has its Injunctive potency taken up by the laying down of the Accessory details. And thus then, the *Laying of Fire* having been already laid down in this Injunction, the sentences in question could not be taken as enjoining the same *Laying of Fire*.

The argument of the *Siddhānta* may be thus summed up :—

Siddhānta.—So long as we have a direct Injunction, we cannot very well admit of an implied or inferred one; and hence either the mention of the purpose to be served or that of the existing state of things, can never serve as Injunctions.

That is to say, the mere mention of the purpose to be served by the *Laying of Fire* (in the shape of the accomplishment of the sacrificial,

Āhavanīya fire for the Agnihotra &c.), cannot be taken as necessarily pointing to the injunction of the said *Laying* as the necessary fire could be obtained by merely begging it of another Agnihotra performer, specially as in the case of the injunction of the *Laying of fire* being implied by those of *Agnihotra*, etc., there is no *Ātmanepada* restricting the fire to that which is prepared by the Sacrificer himself. When, however, the necessary Injunction is found to be directly asserted (by a Vedic text), there is no Inconsistency which could lead us to assume an unheard of text (as containing the required Injunction) the only ground for assuming such text being some sort of an Apparent Inconsistency. Then, as for the mention of the existing state of things, in the sentence 'Ya evam vidvanāgniṇādhatte,' etc.,—so long as we find a direct Injunction of the *Laying of fire* in the shape of the sentences in question 'Vasante Brāhmaṇo' gniṇādhātā,' etc., etc., any mere description of the existing state of things can never acquire an Injunctive potency (to the same effect); specially as this latter has got to serve a distinct purpose of laying down all such details as the fetching of the water, etc., mentioned in the original direct Injunction.

For these reasons, it must be admitted that the sentences in question serve to lay down the hitherto unmentioned *Laying of fire* as performed by the *Brāhmaṇa*, etc.

Adhikaraṇa IV.—The Dākṣāyaṇa, etc., are Accessories.

SŪTRAS II. iii. 5 to 11.

अयनेषु चोदनान्तरं संज्ञोपबन्धात् ॥ ५ ॥

अयनेषु Ayaneṣu, in the sentences containing the word Ayana. चोदनान्तरं Chodanāntaram, distinct injunctions. संज्ञोपबन्धात् Sanjñopavandhāt, because of the particular names.

5. "The sentences containing the word Ayana must be taken as containing Injunctions of distinct actions:—(1) because of the particular names attached to them."—5.

COMMENTARY.

[In connection with *Darśa-Pūrṇamāsa* we find the sentence 'Dākṣāyina-yajñena yajetā prajākāmah. Sākamprasthāpyena yajetā pasukāmah, saṅkramayāgena yajetā annādyākāmah.' And in connection with this there arises a doubt as to whether these sentences simply lay down certain accessories for the *Darśa-Pūrṇamāsa* or as bring about certain definite results or they lay down distinct sacrifices independent of the *Darśa-Pūrṇamāsa*,

Pūrvapakṣa.—In connection with the sentence ‘*Dadhnedriyakâmasya juhuyât*,’ it has been shown above (II. ii. 25, 26) that this sentence lays down a certain result following from a certain accessory of the same sacrifice. And this is quite proper; because in that case the *Dadhi* is not mentioned as co-extensive with the *Homa*, that would on account of this name, be taken as different from the previous *Homa*. In the case in question, on the other hand, we find that the name *Dakṣaṇa* is mentioned as co-extensive (identical) with the *sacrifice*, as has not been applied to the previous sacrifice (the *Darśa-Pūrṇamâsa*); consequently in this case, there can be nothing incongruous of the fact of the word ‘*Dakṣaṇa*’ pointing to distinct *sacrifice* qualified by that name. Nor is there any such substance as ‘*Dakṣaṇa*’ known to exist, as we do find those like the *Dadhi*. Consequently, on account of the reasons shown under II. i. 1, we conclude that inasmuch as the sentence lays down a sacrifice with reference to a definite result, that sacrifice is wholly distinct from the previous *Darśa-Pūrṇamâsa*.

“अगुणा च कर्मचोदनाम्” ॥ ६ ॥

अगुणा Agunâ, not pertaining to the accessories. च Cha, also. कर्मचोदनाम् Karma-chodanâm, injunctions of actions.

6. “Because the Injunction of the Action does not pertain to the Accessory.”—6.

COMMENTARY.

That is to say, the Injunctive potency of the sentence in question has not been removed away from the Action, so that it could go over to the Accessory.

“समाप्तं च फले वाक्यम्” ॥ ७ ॥

समाप्तं Samâptam, complete. च Cha, also. फले Phale, by the mention of the result. वाक्यम् Vâkyam, the sentence.

7. “Because the sentence is quite complete with the mention of the result.”—7.

COMMENTARY.

Inasmuch as the result can never form the object of Injunction, the sentence cannot be said to lay down the Result with reference to the sacrifices,—in the same way as the Corn is taken as laid down, in the sentence *Vrîhibhîryajêtâ*; and as such the sentence must be taken as enjoining an Action (as no third object of Injunction is possible in the sentence), and (inasmuch as no Action that has already been enjoined once

could form the object of another Injunction) it must be admitted that the Action herein enjoined is distinct from all—*Darśa*, *Pûrnamâsa*, etc.,—that have been enjoined before.”

SIDDHÂNTA.

विकारो वा प्रकरणात् ॥ ८ ॥

विकारः Vikârah, modification. वा Vâ, really. प्रकरणात् Prakaraṇât, because of the context.

8. It is really a modification of the previous sacrifice.—8.

COMMENTARY.

Even though the sentence be the Injunction of Action, yet, that Action cannot be any other than the one laid down before,—for reasons shown under *Sûtra*, II. iii. 26, specially as the sentence is found to bring about an idea of the (causal) relationship between an Accessory (*Dâkṣa-yana*) and a Result (acquiring of children);—just as in the case of the sentence ‘*Dadhnendriyakâmasya*, etc,’ it must be admitted that the sacrifice referred to is the same that has been laid down before.

It has been argued that there is no Accessory known as ‘*Dâkṣa-yana*.’ But this is scarcely true; because the fact of there being such an accessory is pointed out by the context itself—just as are many other accessories, like the *Ukthya* and the rest; that is to say, we find in the context that after the sentence in question has laid down the *Dâkṣa-yana* as an Accessory; there is another sentence that points out the actual form of that Accessory.

And just as in the case of *Dadhi*, so here also, the *Dâkṣa-yana* is not found to be taken as co-extensive or identical with the *sacrifice*.

And further, even if the *Dâkṣa-yana*, etc., be taken as co-extensive with ‘*sacrifice*’ then too, on account of their proximity to the *Dadhi*, etc., these sacrifices would be recognised as mere modifications (of the *Darśa-Pûrnamâsa*). Consequently even in this case, what the sentence would do would be to lay down the Result following from a modification of the *Darśa-Pûrnamâsa* and not from any other sacrifice wholly distinct from it.

In this way, an utter disruption of the context would also be avoided. Though there will be a rupture of the context in connection with the *Dâkṣa-yana* to this extent, that which is mentioned as leading to a definite Result (e. g., the *Dâkṣa-yana*) cannot be taken as part of the procedure,—yet inasmuch as the *Darśa-Pûrnamâsa* would form the substrate of the *Dâkṣa-yana*, the mention of the *Darśa-Pûrnamâsa* could very well be connected with the subsequent sentences (under consideration) and thus help them (in their denotation).

लिङ्गदर्शनाच्च ॥ ६ ॥

लिङ्गदर्शनाच्च Liṅga darśanât cha, also because we find indicative Vedic texts.

9. Also because we find Vedic texts indicative (of non-difference).—9.

COMMENTARY.

We have the sentence—‘*Trimśatam varṣāṇi Darśa-pûrṇamâsâbyâm yajetâ yadi Dâkṣâyāṇayajî syât atha api pañchadaśaiva varshāṇi yajeta atra hi eva sâ sampadyate; dve hi paurṇamâsyâm yajetâ dve amavâsyê âtra hi eva khalu sâ sampad bhavati*’ ‘one should perform the *Darśa-Pûrṇamâsa* for thirty years; but if the sacrificer happens to be a performer of the *Dâkṣâyāṇa*, he could finish it in fifteen years as in this sacrifice two *Paurṇamâsâs* and two *Darśas* are performed; and hence the requisite number of these latter would be completed by the *Dâkṣâyāṇa* being performed for fifteen years only!

This completion of the ‘thirty years’ and the *Darśa-Pûrṇamâsa* (by the performance of the *Dâkṣâyāṇa*) distinctly indicates the non-difference of the *Dâkṣâyāṇa* from the *Darśa-Pûrṇamâsa*. For the thirty years’ course of the *Darśa-Pûrṇamâsa* could not be made up by the performance of an altogether different sacrifice (while the text distinctly lays down the fact of the thirty-year-course being made up by the fifteen-year-course of the *Dâkṣâyāṇa*). Nor could there be a gratuitous rejection of the thirty-year limit, whereby the fifteen-year course would be due to a different sacrifice (that is to say, the mere performance of an altogether different sacrifice could not justify a rejection of the original thirty-year limit). Nor can it be urged that the course of the *Darśa Pûrṇamâsa* is reduced to one of a *fifteen years*’ by reason of the performer being a performer of another sacrifice in the shape of the *Dâkṣâyāṇa*. Because if this latter were wholly distinct from the former, there would be no relationship between the two (whereby the performance of one could reduce the course of another). And also because in that case, there would be no justification for the explanatory sentence ‘*Dve hi paurṇamâsyâm dve amavâsyê*’ (which lays down the fact of two of each of these being performed in the *Dâkṣâyāṇa*, instead of one only, as in the case of the ordinary *Darśa Pûrṇamâsa*, as the reason for the thirty-year limit being reduced to one of fifteen only.)

गुणात्संज्ञोपबन्धः ॥ १० ॥

गुणात् Guṇât, due to peculiarity. संज्ञोपबन्धः Saṃjñopabandhaḥ, the name.

10. The name (*Dâkṣâyāṇa*) is due to the peculiarity of the Accessory.—10.

COMMENTARY.

(This *Sûtra* meets the *Pûrvapakṣa* argument of *Sûtra* 6).

The *Name* serves the purpose of distinguishing an Action from others, only when it occurs in the originative Injunction of that Action. In the case in question, however, we find that the name '*Dākṣāyana*' is not connected with any originative Injunction ; specially as in this case we do not find the sentence introduced by any word expressing the beginning of a new action,—as we do in the sentence '*Atha eṣa jyotiḥ*' etc., And then, inasmuch as the name is quite capable of being explained as mentioning an Accessory of the previous Sacrifice, it cannot serve the purpose of distinguishing the Action. That the word '*Dākṣāyana*' denotes a mere repetition of the previous sacrifice of the *Darśa-Pûṇamâsa* is shown by the sense afforded by the components of the word itself, as also by the above-quoted text (that there are two *Darśas* and two *Pûṇamâsas*, in the *Dākṣāyana*). Hence we conclude from the context that the Result mentioned in the sentence in question follows from the *Dākṣāyana* as based upon the *Darśa-Pûṇamâsa*. The word '*Dakṣa*' means 'the Sacrificer' who is expert and very quick at the performance of the Sacrifice ('of thirty years, in only half the time'); the Priests appointed by such a sacrificer are '*dakṣa*' (appointed by the clever sacrificer); and the '*ayana*' (performance of these priests) is the '*Dākṣāyana*' (and thus we find that the constituent parts of the word also points to the same fact that is mentioned in the text quoted above).

The name '*Sâkamprasthiya*' also means that the substance referred to by this word is *offered* (*prasthîyate*) along with (*sâkam*) the smaller vessels, before the cutting up of the '*Sânnâyya*' cake ; and thus this name is also found to belong to a material only, in connection with the previous sacrifice ; and hence in this case also there is nothing to oppose the recognition, in the sentence in question, of the Action that has been mentioned before.

समाप्तिरविशिष्टा ॥ ११ ॥

समाप्तिः Samâptiḥ, completion. अविशिष्टा Avīṣiṣṭâ, nothing peculiar.

11. There is nothing peculiar in the completion (of the sentence with the mere mention of the result).—11.

COMMENTARY.

[This meets *Sûtra* 7.]

Though the sentence does not enjoin the Result in reference to the Action, yet, inasmuch as it does not speak of any connection between

the Action and the Result, the Action therein mentioned cannot be different from the previous sacrifice. Just as the fact of the Result following from the Action has been established under *Sūtra* II. i. 1, *et seq.*—so, exactly in the same manner, has it also been shown, under *Sūtra*, II. ii. 26, that there are certain sentences that serve the sole purpose of establishing the relationship between a Result and a certain Accessory of the previous sacrifice. And hence there being a doubt as to which of these two previous conclusions should be applied to the case in question, the presence of certain other words (such as those cited under *Sūtra* 9) distinctly points to the conclusion that in the present case, the Result is mentioned as following from the Accessory (of the previous sacrifice) and not from any distinct sacrifice.

Adhikaraṇa V.—Actions mentioned with specific substances and deities should be regarded as distinct.

SŪTRAS III. iii. 12 to 17.

“संस्कारश्चाप्रकरणेऽकर्मशब्दात्” ॥ १२ ॥

संस्कारश्च Samskāraḥ Cha, a mere preparatory rite. अप्रकरणे Aprakarane, not occurring in any particular context. अकर्मशब्दात् Akarmaśabdāt, as there is no word mentioning an action.

12. “It is a mere preparatory rite as not occurring in the context (of any particular sacrifice); specially as there is no word denoting an Action.”—12.

COMMENTARY.

Without reference to any particular sacrifice, we find the sentence ‘Vāyavyam śveta mātabheldā bhūtikāmaḥ,’ ‘Sauryam charum nirvapet brahmavarchasakāmaḥ.’ And in connection with this there arise the following questions:—(i). Inasmuch as, as a general rule, all sentences not appearing in reference to any particular sacrifice, are taken as serving some purpose of the Action, mentioned in the context,—does the sentence simply lay down the accessories ‘Śveta’ and ‘charu’ respectively of the ‘Touching’ and ‘Preparing’ that form part of the *Darśa-Pūrṇamāsa* sacrifice, which is the action mentioned in the context? Or does it lay down two independent and distinct Actions? (ii). (If the Actions mentioned are distinct and independent), are these actions only those that are mentioned by the actual words of the sentence? Or is it these actions as accompanying the ‘sacrifice’ that are meant?

On the above questions, we have at first, the following:—

Pûrvapakṣa (A).—Just as in the case of the *Dakṣâyana* it has been found (in the foregoing *Adhikarâṇa*) that, the sentence mentioning the connection of the Accessory, and thus there being no word injunctive of any Action, the sentence could not be taken as laying down a distinct Action,—so would it also be in the case in question. This similarity between the two cases is what is implied by the word ‘*cha*’ in the *Sûtra*.

“यावदुक्तं वा कर्मणः श्रुतिमूलत्वात्” ॥ १३ ॥

यावदुक्तं Yâvaduktam, what is distinctly mentioned. वा Vâ, but. कर्मणः Karmaṇah, of the action. श्रुतिमूलत्वात् Śrutimûlatvât, being based on direct Vedic declarations.

13. “The Action meant to be laid down is just what is distinctly mentioned, because the only basis for Actions is direct declaration.”—13.

COMMENTARY.

[In reply to the above *Pûrvapakṣa* we have the following arguments which, however, embody another theory which is not acceptable to the *Siddhânta* and which is on that account put forward as a second *Pûrvapakṣa* answered in the next *Sûtra*].

Pûrvapakṣa (B).—As direct declaration is the only basis for the enjoining of Actions, the Action meant to be laid down must be just what is distinctly mentioned by it, so that in the case in question the only Actions mentioned are those of ‘touching’ and ‘preparing.’ Hence these are the only Actions that must be regarded as accomplishing the results mentioned. And the element of *sacrifice* need not enter into these Actions at all.

As for the word ‘*Vâyavyam*’ (which might be urged as pointing to the fact of the ‘white object’ being offered to the Deity *Vâyu*, which offering would constitute a *sacrifice*), it could be explained away, as being a mere reference, on the ground that all substances are capable of being, in some way or other, related to certain deities (even without their being actually offered to them). Or, the sentence might be taken to mean that—‘when one has set aside a certain object for the sake of *Vâyu*, if we happen to touch it, it would bring prosperity to us.’ And as the sentence embodies a qualified Injunction, there would not be any very great trouble in taking the sentences thus. Or, the sentences might mean that the desirable results are obtained as soon as the white object is touched for the sake of *Vâyu*, or when the boiled rice is prepared for the sake of the Sun. And certainly it is not in a *sacrifice* alone that anything can be done for the sake of certain Deities. Because there is no incompatibility in something being done for the sake of a certain Deity, whenever that

happens to be enjoined for being done as such (even if it be not a sacrifice). Therefore all that the sentence in question means, in accordance with the expressed Injunction, is that 'something white should be touched for the sake of *Vāyu*.'

Thus there being no ground for connecting the sentences with any original primary Action mentioned before they must be taken as laying down a distinct touching and preparing.

यजतिस्तु द्रव्यफलभोक्तृसंयोगात् एतेषां कर्मसंबन्धात् ॥ १४ ॥

यजतिः Yajatiḥ, the action of sacrifice. तु Tu, but. द्रव्यफलभोक्तृसंयोगात् Dravyaphala-bhoktrisaṃyogāt, because of the mention of the substance, the result, and the Deity. एतेषां Eteṣām, of these. कर्मसंबन्धात् Karmasamvandhāt, on account of being related to an action.

14. But the 'sacrifice' is laid down ; because of the mention of the enjoyer of the substance and the Result, which are related to some sort of an Action.—14.

COMMENTARY.

Inasmuch as, as a matter of fact, the Injunction in question depends upon each of the words contained in the sentence, it must be taken in the case in question, as pertaining to the relationship of the substance, the Deity and the word '*Vâyavyam*' expressing the relationship. And as the relationship would not be possible without the action of *sacrifice*, it naturally implies such an Action, specially as no other action is capable of bringing about the relationship. For if we were to *touch* the substance, without offering to the Deity *Vāyu*, it would not be '*vâyavya*.' Nor can the sentence be taken to mean that we touch only that particular substance which is ordinarily known as *vâyavya* (dedicated to *Vāyu*) ; because such dedication to a Deity can be brought about only by *sacrifice*. Hence the sentence could not but be taken as meaning that 'the white substance should be offered to *Vāyu* ; and from this we conclude that the sentence is the Injunction of a 'sacrifice' (in the shape of offering). Specially as without the action of 'sacrifice' the result mentioned would not be attained. Because the 'Injunction of Sacrifice' will be defined later on as '*Yajatichodanā dravyadevatākriyam samudāye kriyārthatvāt* (IV. ii. 27).

लिङ्गदर्शनाच्च ॥ १५ ॥

लिङ्गदर्शनाच्च Liṅgadarśanāt Cha, also because we find texts indicating the same conclusion.

15. Also because we find texts indicating the same conclusion.—15.

COMMENTARY.

We have the text 'Saumādraudrān charun nirvapêt...pariśrite yajetâ'; and in this as soon as the word 'Saumādraudrān' (which speaks of the connection of the corn with the deities, Soma and Rudra) has been uttered, though there is no word expressing 'sacrifice'—yet inasmuch as the sentence 'Pariśrite yajetâ' which lays down the proper cooking of the rice, refers to a previous Sacrifice by the word 'yajetâ'—we always recognize the sentence as laying down a certain action connected with 'sacrifice.' In fact, in the case of the sentence 'Agniṣounyam paśumālabheta' it is only by the above reason that the presence of 'sacrifice' is admitted.

In the previous *Adhikarāṇa* we considered the question as to whether the sentence is an Injunction or a mere reference to a previous Action; while what we have considered in the present *Adhikarāṇa* is the question as to,—the Injunctive character having been established,—what sort of an Action (either mere *Touching* or *Sacrifice*) is enjoined by it. And as such there is no mere useless repetition.

Adhikarāṇa VI.—Such actions as the Touching of the Calf and the like are purely purificatory.

SUTRA II. iii. 16—17.

विषये प्रायदर्शनात् ॥ १६ ॥

विषये Viṣaye, in a doubtful case. प्रायदर्शनात् Prâyadarśanât, by a perception of similarity.

15. In a doubtful case, the correct conclusion is arrived at by a perception of similarity.— 16.

COMMENTARY.

In connection with the present *Sūtra*, Upavarśa has cited the sentence *Vatsamālabhetâ* found in the *Agnihotra* section, in connection with the milking of the cow. And he has shown that, with regard to this sentence also, we have a threefold doubt: (1) Does the sentence lay down the calf with the reference to the Touching originally mentioned in the context? (2) Or, does it lay down mere 'Touching'? (3) Or, does it lay down a 'Sacrifice.'

As to the first alternative, it has been left out, because there being no specification in the sentence, there is nothing in it to point to 'Touching' previously mentioned in the context;—as shown in the foregoing *Adhikarāṇa*.

And inasmuch as the conclusion arrived at in the foregoing *Adhikarāṇa* points to the fact of the sentence under consideration here also being

the Injunction of a sacrifice, the *Bhāṣya* proceeds to explain the present *Adhikaraṇa* as an exception to the foregoing one.

Though, as a matter of fact, on account of the sentence dwelt with here being a counter-instance of the foregoing *Siddhānta* arguments based upon the connection of the *Enjoyer*, the *Pūrvapakṣa* of the present *Adhikaraṇa* has almost wholly been represented (in the shape of the *Siddhānta* of the foregoing *Adhikaraṇa*); yet the *Bhāṣya* proceeds to present it afresh, because of the peculiar character of the intellect of certain persons; as there are some people, so imbued with the idea of the Logician, that they think of interpreting Veda also by means of Inferences from similarity; and these persons would never grasp the fact of the *Pūrvapakṣa* having been refuted, unless it has been duly set forth previously.

Some people accept the word 'Ālabhetā' as synonymous with 'Sacrifice' on the strength of the foregoing *Adhikaraṇa* while others take it as merely implying the 'Sacrifice'; and it is both these views that they bring forward in connection with the sentence in question also. And we have in connection with this a twofold—

Pūrvapakṣa.—Namely: "(1) The sentence in question lays down a distinct sacrifice, (2) it lays down the calf in connection with the sacrifice that has been laid down previously."

The *Siddhānta* view is that in the case of the sentence dwelt with in the foregoing *Adhikaraṇa* we accepted the injunction of the 'sacrifice,' on the sole ground of relationship between the substance and the Deity therein mentioned by the word 'Vayāvyam,'—and not, either on the strength of a newly discovered expressive potency of the word 'Ālabhetā' or on that of fallacious Inference (of the implication of 'Sacrifice,' by the word 'Ālabhetā'). In the case in question, however, as we have no word expressive of the said relationship (of Deity and the substance), we must take the word 'Ālabhetā' in its simple direct signification. Thus would the similarity of the present 'touching' with the purificatory secondary Actions of cow-milking and the like to be explained; as the 'Touching' also would be a mere secondary rite; and this 'touching of the calf' at the particular time of milking the cow, would serve a visible purpose of making the cow yield more milk.

अर्थवादोपपत्तेश्च ॥ १७ ॥

अर्थवाद Arthavāda उपपत्तेः Upapatte च Cha and.

17. Also because of the possibility of the connection with the particular Arthavāda.—17.

COMMENTARY.

Close upon the sentence in question we have the sentence *Vatsānikāntā hi pasavāḥ* ('Animals love their young ones dearly'); and this could be taken as an *Arthvāda* showing a reason for the previous Injunction, only when the preceding sentence '*Vatsamālabhetā*' is taken as enjoining the 'touching' by way of fondling it for the purpose of making the cow yield more milk [the two sentences together meaning that one should touch (fondle) the calf with a view to the yielding more milk *because animals love their young dearly.*]

If, on the other hand, the word, '*Ālabhetā*' meant touching for the purpose of killing' (by way of offering to a Deity) the mention of the fact of the young being dearly loved by animals would be wholly irrelevant; for in that case the purport of the two sentences would be this. Because the calf is loved by its mother, therefore it should be touched for being killed—certainly not a very relevant proposition? In the other case (*i.e.* when *Ālabhetā* means touching by way of fondling) it would be quite natural to expect that inasmuch as the cow is fond of the calf, if we fondle the calf or the calf fondles us, the cow would be moved to yield more milk, the flow of which would be accelerated by the sight of her calf being fondled.

Thus also, it must be admitted that the sentence in question lays down mere '*touching*' as a secondary action calculated to serve a useful purpose.

*Adhikarana VII.—The Naivārcharu is
for the purposes of Ādhāna.*

SŪTRA II. iii. 18.

संयुक्तस्त्वर्थशब्देन तदर्थः श्रुति संयोगात् ॥ १८ ॥

संयुक्तः Samyuktaḥ, connected. तु 'Tu, verily. अर्थशब्देन Arthaśabdena, with the word mentioning an action. तदर्थः 'Tadārthaḥ, for the sake of that. श्रुतिसंयोगात् Śrutisamyogāt, because such is the direct signification of the words.

18. As connected with the word mentioning an Action, it must be taken as being for the sake of that Action; specially as such is the direct signification of the words of the text.—18.

COMMENTARY.

The *Adhikarana* before last having dealt with the significations of the words '*Ālabhetā*' and '*Nirvāpet*' as contained in the sentences

‘*Śvetamālabhetā*’ and ‘*Sauryān carunnirvapet*’ the last *Adhikarāṇa* has dealt with the counter instance of the first part of that *Adhikarāṇa* and the present *Adhikarāṇa* proceeds to deal with the counter instance of the second portion dealing with the ‘*Preparing*’ in connection with the *boiled rice* nor is the case of this exactly similar to that dealt with in the foregoing *Adhikarāṇa* as in this we have a further ground of doubt, in the shape of the mention of a Deity (*Bṛihaspati*.)

[In connection with ‘*Āgni*’ we meet with the sentence ‘*Naivāraś-charubhavati*’ and then ‘*Yadenam charumupadadhāti*’ and here arises the question as to whether the *boiled rice* is laid down for the purpose of the sacrifice (the sense of the text being that having sacrificed out of the rice, the remnant is to be *kept aside*), or that it is laid down for the sole purpose of being *kept aside*]. And on this question we have the following :—

PŪRVAPAKṢA.

Pūrvapakṣa.—‘The character of a subsidiary to sacrifices is inherent in all such substances as *boiled rice* cake and the like ; and hence in all cases it is necessary to give up one’s ownership of these substances (in favour of some one else). Consequently, what the word ‘*Upadadhāti*’ in the sentence ‘*charum upadadhāti*’ is that there is to be a ‘*Prapatti*’ (keeping aside, throwing away) of the *corn* and as no such *pratipatti* of a thing would be possible until it had been already utilised, we are led to look out for that at which the *boiled rice* could have been utilised ; and the foremost of all, that which presents itself as being most capable of affording an occasion for the said utilisation of the *Rice*, is the *sacrifice* ; and hence we are led to accept the fact of the *corn* being of use at the *sacrifice*. Subsequently too, we meet with the sentence ‘*Bṛihaspatiretadannam yannivāra*,’ etc., which distinctly mentions *Bṛihaspati* as the Deity of the *Rice* ; and under the circumstances, if the connection between the *Rice* and that Deity were not duly established by means of a sacrifice, the mention of the Deity would be absolutely meaningless. Therefore, we must take the sentences in question to mean that “after having performed the sacrifice of the *Bṛihaspatyacharu* which forms part of the *Āgneya* sacrifice, we should desist, for a time, from proceeding with other sacrifices connected with the ‘*Āgneya*’ and *keep aside* the *Rice* (that has been offered to *Bṛihaspati*).”

Siddhānta.—To the above we make the following reply : There is nothing inherent in the *Rice* that would always make it employed at sacrifices ; in fact, the use to which such things are to be put is ascertained by means of the authoritative directions that may be found with regard to them. As soon as the appearance of the *Rice* has been mentioned, we

naturally seek for the use to which it could be put ; and we are met by the sentence '*Yadenam charu upadadhâti*' which directly lays down the fact of the *Rice* helping towards the preparation of the altar for the reception of the fire to be used at the sacrifice. And the *Rice* thus having its use clearly defined, it could not have any connection with another Action, even if such an action were directly mentioned, and hence it is all the more impossible for it to have anything to do with an Action that is not even mentioned (but only indirectly implied). Nor can the *keeping* spoken of be said to have the character of the *Pratipatti* ; because we do not know of any use to which it could be put prior to the *keeping*.

Adhikarana VIII.—(The twaṣtrapatnîvatâ is subservient to the Paryagnikarana).

SŪTRA II. iii. 19.

पालीवते तु पूर्वत्वादवच्छेदः ॥ १६ ॥

पालीवते Pâtnîvate, in the Patnîvatâ. तु Tu, really. पूर्वत्वात् Pûrvatwât, because it is recognised as the previous one. अवच्छेदः Avachchhedah, preclusion.

19. Inasmuch as the Patnîvatâ is recognised as the previous one, the sentence in question must be taken as serving the purpose of precluding (the subsequent subsidiaries.)—19.

COMMENTARY.

In connection with what has gone before we proceed to consider whether the word '*Utsrjati*' signifies the sacrifice or not.

The sacrifice having been laid down in the sentence '*Tvaṣṭrâm pâtnîvatam alabhate*' we find another sentence '*Paryagnikṛitam pâtnîvatâ mutsrijanti.*' And in connection with this latter sentence, there is a doubt as to whether it lays down an Accessory to the sacrifice (laid down in the former sentence), or a distinct Action, the doubt being due to the two-fold construction of which the sentence is capable. And on this we have the following :—

Pûrvapakṣa.—"The sentence lays down a distinct Action ; because the Injunctive potency of the sentence pertains, as in the case of the sentence '*Vâdyavyam śvetam alabhetâ*' to the relationship between the substance and the Deity.

And further inasmuch as the sentence in question does not contain any mention of *Tvaṣṭâ*, the action mentioned therein cannot

be recognised as the same as that mentioned in the previous sentence (in which the word *Tvāṣṭrā* forms an important factor); and (if the action mentioned in the two sentences be taken as the same on the ground of both sentences laying down the '*Patnivatā*' then on account of the sentence in question containing the mention of '*Paryagnikarāṇa*' also, there would be a syntactical split (if it laid down the *Patnivatā* also)."

Siddhānta.—To the above we make the following reply: Inasmuch as the sacrifice mentioned in the sentence in question is actually recognised as the same as the one mentioned in the previous sentence, we cannot perceive any other sacrifice in it; and what the sentence in question does is to lay down, with regard to the same sacrifice, all the subsidiary procedure ending with the '*Paryagnikarāṇa*.'

The word '*Patnivatā*' in the sentence in question can very well denote the previous sacrifice, even though it is accompanied by two qualifications, just like the word *agni* in connection with the *Manotā* sacrifice. And the words '*paryagnikṛtamutsṛjati*' also are cognised, on account of the context, as laying down an accessory for that same sacrifice.

Adhikarāṇa IX.—*Adâbhya, etc., are the names of the vessels.*

SŪTRA II. iii. 20.

अद्रव्यत्वात् केवले कर्मशेषः स्यात् ॥ २० ॥

अद्रव्यत्वात् Adravyatvât, on account of there being no mention of the sacrificial material. *केवले* Kevale, there being the mention of mere holding. *कर्मशेषः* Karmaśeṣaḥ, subservient to the action. *स्यात्* Syât, would be.

20. When the name appears by itself without any mention of the sacrificial material and there is merely the mention of 'holding' it would be subservient to the action.—20.

COMMENTARY.

[In no particular connection we find the sentences, *esha vai haviṣâ haviryajetâ yo dâbhyaṃ grihîtvâ somâya yajate* and *parâ vâ etesyâyuh prâṇa eti yonśum grihnâti*.]

And with regard to the holding of the *Adâbhya* and the *Aṃśu* there is a threefold doubt, just as in the case of the *âlambha* (touching). And just as in that case, so here also, after having set aside the two other alternative theories, we have the following—

Purvapaksha.—The sentence in question enjoins *two sacrifices*. The arguments in support of this view are as follows: It has been shown above

(under *Nâmadheya*) that the name of a sacrifice serves to distinguish it even from that sacrifice which may have been originally mentioned in the context; and hence it will distinguish actions all the more easily from those that are not mentioned in the same context, with regard to which there can be no idea of identity.

In the case in question we find that the names '*Adâbhya*' and '*Aṃśu*' are not known to belong to any sacrifice mentioned in the context; and hence the sentence cannot be taken as laying down a mere repetition of the same. Consequently we conclude that the sentence lays down the *Ekâha* sacrifice which forms part of the *Jyotiṣtoma*—this conclusion being pointed out by the similarity of the injunction of '*holding*.' Nor is the case in question similar to that of the '*touching of the calf*'; (1) because in the first of these two sentences in question, we find the direct mention of the '*sacrifice*' and in the second we have a specific name which serves to distinguish the Action so named from all other actions; and (2) because the presence of the injunction of holding in the sentences transfers, to the actions herein mentioned, all the details of the *Jyotiṣtoma*; and as such these actions become fully equipped with all the necessary factors of the material and the Deity, etc., (which is not found in the case of the sentence '*vatsamâlabheta*.'

And for these reasons, we conclude that the sentences lay down distinct sacrifices.

Siddhânta.—To the above we make the following reply :—

In the case of sentences where we have only the *name* and the *holding* mentioned (as in the case in question), the chances of the mention of a *sacrifice* are very much less than in the case of the sentence '*vatsamâlabheta*,' because the former is devoid even of the mention of a material.

That is to say, we find that, in the sentences in question, the mention of the Deity is a long way off; and even the object that would form the objective of the mentioned '*holding*' is not mentioned. Because the substance cannot be pointed out except by a *class* or by a *property*. And so long as it has not been ascertained that the actions mentioned in the sentence are sacrifices, there can be no idea as to the sacrifices being similar to the *Jyotiṣtoma* and as such '*soma*' (the material offered at the *Jyotiṣtoma*) could not be recognised as the material to be *held*. And as for the verb '*grihṇâti*' also, there is no reason to believe that it is always concomitant with the *Jyotiṣtoma*; because all that it expresses is mere *holding* (and this action is present in all sacrifices).

Nor are the names in question '*Adâbhya*' and '*Aṃśu*,' the names of any sacrifices, whereby they could serve to distinguish these sacrifices.

Because these words have been accepted as names, simply on the ground of their co-extensiveness with 'holding' and as for the difference of 'holding' from the previous sacrifices, we also admit it; but it does not follow from this that the sentence lays down a distinct *Sacrifice*.

As a matter of fact, we have proved under *Sutra* II. ii. 18, that even when such sentences are accompanied by the mention of Deities and materials, they cannot be taken as laying down *Sacrifices* while in the case in question, we do not find even this 'mention of the Deity and the material). As for the *Sacrifice* that is mentioned by the word 'yajeta' in the sentence speaking of the *Adābhya*, it cannot in the present instance, be taken as enjoined by the Injunctive affix (in *yajeta*) which has its injunctive potency transferred elsewhere (to the Accessory) as shown under the *Purvapakṣa* of the *Sutra* II. ii. 27. Therefore the sentence (speaking of *Adābhya*) must be taken as laying down the 'holding' with reference to a certain sacrifice (laid down before).

Adhikaraṇa X.—*The Agnichayana is a secondary preparatory rite.*

SŪTRA II. iii. 21—23.

“अग्निस्तु लिङ्गदर्शनात् क्रतुशब्दः प्रतीयते” ॥ २१ ॥

अग्निः Agniḥ, the word Agni. तु Tu, really. लिङ्गदर्शनात् Liṅgadarśanāt, because of the presence of indicative marks. क्रतुशब्दः Kratusabdah, denoting a sacrifice. प्रतीयते Pratiyāte, should be recognised.

21. “The word Agni should be recognised as denoting a sacrifice because of the presence of indicative marks.”—21.

COMMENTARY.

In connection with the sentence 'Agninchinute' followed by the sentences—'athâtoḡnimagniṣṭomenânuyajati, tamukthyena tamatirâtrena, tam ṣodaśina,' etc.—we have a threefold doubt: (1) Does it lay down a distinct *Sacrifice*, or (2) Does it lay down mere *chyana* (collecting)? or (3) Does it lay down an accessory for all the Primary and Subsidiary sacrifices? And on this we have the following—

Purvapakṣa.—(1) As we do not find the sentence repeated again in the context, as we do in the case of the sentences dealt with in the foregoing *Adhikaraṇa*, (2) as no useful purpose would be served by the mere purification of Agni, we conclude, from the very fact of the presence of the name, that the sentence lays down a distinct sacrifice; and thus alone could we justify the subsequent mention of the Result, in the sentence

'*Ridhnoti*,' etc. Nor can the result herein mentioned be said to follow from an Accessory ; because no substrate of any such Accessory is mentioned in the context.

And then we perceive that such distinctive marks as the *Upasad*, etc., which are the invariable accompaniments of the *Soma sacrifice*, are connected with the Action mentioned in the sentence in question.

So also in the sentences '*Athâto'gnimâgniṣṭomenânuyajati*,' etc., we find that '*Agni*' is the name of a sacrifice to be performed, because the sentence '*Agnim yajati*' is precisely similar to the sentence '*Samidhoyajati*' wherein it has been shown under Sutra I. iv. 4, that the word '*Samidhaḥ*' is the name of a sacrifice ; and hence we come to take the sentence in question as laying down a sacrifice qualified by the name '*Agni*.' And this *Agni*-sacrifice comes to be qualified by the *Sansthâ's* of the *Agniṣṭoma*, which are found to be present in it. Then as for the words '*dvirâtra*,' etc., they could be taken as pointing out the alternatives of time.

SIDDHANTA.

द्रव्यं वा स्यात् चोदनायाः तदर्थत्वात् ॥ २२ ॥

द्रव्यं Dravyam, the material. वा Vâ, but. स्यात् Syât, should be. चोदनायाः Chodanâyâḥ, of the injunction. तदर्थत्वात् Tadarthatvât, on account of being for that purpose.

22. The material should be mentioned by the word because the Injunction is for that purpose.—22.

COMMENTARY.

Inasmuch as the word '*Agni*' is one that has its signification universally known, unless this signification is found to give rise to certain anomalies, like syntactical split, etc., we cannot reject the sense of *Fire*, and take the word as the name of a sacrifice.

That is to say, the word '*Agni*' is not known to have any literal meaning, like the words '*Udbhid*' and the rest, nor is it accompanied by any of the three conditions of '*Nâmadheya*,' viz., '*Vâkyabheda*,' '*Tadvayapadeśa*,' '*Tatprakhya*' and (explained in *Adhikarana* I, *Pâda* iv) ; and hence it could not be taken as the *Name* of a sacrifice.

It has been urged above that it fulfils the *Nâmadheya* condition laid down in *Sutra* I. iv. 4. But it would have been so if the *Agni* were actually enjoined in the sentence, as something to be purified by *chayana* (collection). And it has never been spoken of as to be so purified (in any other sentence save the one in question) ; and hence the condition laid down in *Sutra*, I. iv. 4, does not apply to the present case.

Therefore 'Agni,' spoken of in the sentence, is a substance (and not a sacrifice).

तत्संयोगात् क्रतुस्तदाख्यः स्यात् तेन धर्मविधानानि ॥ २३ ॥

तत्संयोगात् Tatsamyogāt, by connection with that. क्रतुः Kratuḥ, the sacrifice. तदाख्यः Tadākhyah, of that name. स्यात् Syāt, might be. तेन Tena, by that. धर्मविधानानि Dharmavidhānāni, laying down of details.

23. On account of the fact of the connection of Agni with all sacrifices a sacrifice might be named 'Agni,' but that name would only serve to lay down the details of the sacrifice.—23.

COMMENTARY.

In the case of such sentences as '*agnihśastram*' (that have been cited by the *Pūrvapakṣa* as showing that 'Agni' is the name of a sacrifice), we have to take recourse to indirect indication, as there is no other way in which the sentence could be explained. In this sentence the word 'Agni' indicates *the place or altar connected with Fire*, and this *place* indicates *the sacrifice performed at that altar* (and thus it is by a very indirect process that the word 'Agni' can indicate the sacrifice). But the fact of such indirect indication being accepted in one place does not make it necessarily acceptable in all other cases. Hence in the case in question, where the indirect indication can be very well avoided it is only right that we should accept the word 'Agni' as signifying the substance (*Fire*).

In connection with the present *Adhikaraṇa*, the author of another *Bhāṣya* has also treated of the questions of Agni—(1) having a result or being fruitless, (2) being an independent action or subsidiary to another sacrifice, (3) being eternal or transient, (4) being a modification or not of *Uttaravedikā*. But all these questions have already been dealt with in other *Adhikaraṇas*, in connection with other similar sentences, and hence we have not taken them up for consideration here. And the Author referred to also has introduced them here by way of showing off the excellence of his memory.

Adhikaraṇa XI.—The Māsāgnihotra is a distinct sacrifice.

SŪTRA II. iii. 24.

प्रकरणान्तरे प्रयोजनान्यत्वम् ॥ २४ ॥

प्रकरणान्तरे Prakaraṇāntare, when there is a difference of context. प्रयोजनान्यत्वम् Prayojanānytvam, there is a difference in the Bhāvanā.

24. When there is a difference of context, there is difference in the Bhâvanâ.—24.

COMMENTARY.

We have finished the consideration of the question of the Differentiation of actions by means of Accessories, and we have also dealt with all side issues of such questions, as to what sort of Accessory is that mentioned in the subsequent sentence, which, not being applicable to the action mentioned in the previous sentence, makes that mentioned in the subsequent action different from it; and which sort is that which is applicable to the previous action, and as such does not make any difference in the Action. And the five means of differentiation having been dealt with, we now proceed to consider the differentiation of actions by context.

[In connection with the *Kundapâyinâmaya*, we find the sentence 'Mâsamagnihotram juhōti, mâsam darśapûrṇamâsâbhyâm yajate,' and on this there arises a doubt as to whether these sentences lay down the month as the time for the previously mentioned Agnihotra and the Darśa-Pûrṇamâsa or they lay down actions totally different from these].

And on this we have the following—

Pûrvapakṣa.—Such words as 'Agnihotra' and the like, having already on one occasion denoted a certain action, the mere fact of the word occurring after a long interval does not make any difference in the Action itself. That is to say, just as where the word 'Agnihotra' is uttered in *Valabhi* or in *Pâtaliputra*, it does not signify two different things; so no matter whether the word occurs in one context or in another, its denotation cannot be different. For certainly the difference in the context does not bring about a fresh denotative potency in the word. And hence the verbs 'yajate,' 'juhōti,' etc., also as qualified by these words ('Agnihotra,' etc.) do not signify anything different; specially as the absence of another meaning does not make anything meaningless or irrelevant. For in the case in question, the mention of the 'month' is not incompatible with the ordinary 'Agnihotra'; because the *monthly* Agnihotra could very well be taken as an alternative to the *Lifelong Daily* Agnihotra. Or, it may be that the *lifelong daily* performance is laid for that Agnihotra which forms a necessary duty; while there are other occasional performances of the same Agnihotra with a view to the obtaining of certain desirable results; and it is for these that the sentence lays down the 'month' as the time. And it is only desirable that the syntax (of the sentence in question) should set aside that which is pointed out by the context.

Siddhānta.—To the above we make the following reply :—

In the sentence in question, we find that the *monthly Agnihotra* is laid down as to be performed *after the Upasads* whereas we do not find any such *Upasads* preceding the original *Agnihotra*; and as such the two *Agnihotras* must be different.

That is to say, if the sentence in question had simply laid down the *month*, then we could have thought that the time had been laid down with reference to the original *Agnihotra*. As a matter of fact, however, such is not the case; as the sentence distinctly mentions the action as to be performed *after the Upasads*; and as such the *sequence to the Upasads* must be taken as qualifying the time for the performance of this sacrifice. In connection with the original *Agnihotra*, however, we do not find any mention of these *upasads*, either as foreign to it, or as forming an integral part of it. If, again, the sentence were taken as laying down—(1) *Upasads* (2) the *sequence to the Upasads* and (3) the *month*,—then, there being various objects of Injunction, there would be a syntactical split.

This also meets all the other declarations of the *Pūrvapakṣa* that the sentence lays down the performability, in the midst of the *Sūtra*, of the otherwise prohibited *Agnihotra*, either as an independent sacrifice, or as a part of the *Sūtra* itself. Because in all these cases, the mention of the *sequence to the Upasads* and of *month* would be wholly meaningless.

When, however, the sentence is taken as laying down a distinct *Agnihotra*, there would be nothing incongruous in the laying down of many things. Hence the sentence must be taken as laying down a distinct *Agnihotra*.

Such is the *Siddhānta* as represented by the *Bhāṣya*. But there is something to be said against this representation of the *Siddhānta*. It is as follows :—

If the *Agnihotras* were taken as distinct, only because of the fact, there otherwise being a syntactical split,—then the present instance too becomes one of the Differentiation of Actions by means of syntactical split (already dealt with above), and not by that of *context* (what is really meant to be shown here) or, again the Actions would be different on account of the impossibility of the manifold accessories mentioned in the sentence in question belonging to the original *Agnihotra*; and thus the necessary differentiation being done by Accessories, there would be no room for the functioning of the difference of context (towards the differentiation). Because even if the sentence in question had occurred in the same context as that of the original *Agnihotra*, then too it could not but have been taken as mentioning a distinct Action, because of the

fact of the accessory details herein mentioned being inapplicable to the original *Agnihotra*.

And further, even though the reason shown in the *Bhâṣya* might, with difficulty, establish the difference between the two *Agnihotras*, yet it could do nothing with regard to the other sentence in question, wherein the monthly *Darśa Pūrṇamāsa* is not mentioned as preceded by the *Upasads*. That is to say, the sentence ' *Māsam darśapūrṇamāśābhyām* ' lays down only the connection of the sacrifice with the *month*; and as such there being no syntactical split, there would be nothing to show that the *Darśa Pūrṇamāsa* herein mentioned is different from that mentioned before.

Thus then the explanation of the *Siddhânta* as given in the *Bhâṣya* being found to be untenable, the *Vârtika* explains it as follows:—

When the Accessory, though mentioned in a separate context, is laid down as a matter of independent Injunction, *i.e.*, forms the predicate of the sentence, then it can be delegated to the previous action (and would not make any difference in it) when however the Accessory is mentioned only as an *Uddeśya* (not an object of Injunction, but an accomplished thing, forming the subject of the sentence), then the action with reference to which it appears must be taken as different from the previous action.

In the case in question, we perceive a difference between the two *Agnihotras*, not because of their being mentioned in separate contexts, but because of the fact of all connection with the previous context having been cut off. That is to say, when no idea of the original *Agnihotra* is present in the mind, at the time that the sentence in question is met with then the action mentioned in the latter cannot but be recognized as different from the previous *Agnihotra*. And as for the difference of contexts, even though it is present, it does not serve any useful purpose with regard to the differentiation; as we shall show under *Sutra* II-iii-25.

Adhikaraṇa XII.—The Agneya, etc., are Kâmya Sacrifices.

फलं चाकर्मसन्निधौ ।

SUTRA II. iii 25.

फलं Phalam, the result. च Cha, also. अकर्मसन्निधौ Akarmasannidhau, mentioned apart from actions.

25. The Result mentioned apart from Actions (is a means of difference).—25,

COMMENTARY.

All the six causes of differentiation have been dealt with. We now proceed to show another way in which the difference of context operates towards differentiation. There are people who hold the differentiation (in the case cited in the last *Adhikaraṇa*) to be made by a difference of context only (according to the *Bhāṣya*), while others according to the *Vārtika* hold it to be made by the connection of a particular time; and they do not admit of any differentiation brought about merely by such agencies as non-proximity or the relationship of an *anupādeya* substance. It is with a view to explain the real state of things to these persons that the present *Sūtra* has been introduced. And what is dealt with in the present *Adhikaraṇa* is not a seventh cause of differentiation.

Then, the fact of *place* and *occasion* being *anupādeya* is too well-known, as has been shown in the foregoing *Adhikaraṇa*; and hence in the present *Adhikaraṇa* we do not cite any examples of these. And, in fact, the following two passages, too, dealing as they do with *place* and *occasion*—should have been dealt with in the preceding *Adhikaraṇa*, viz: (1) *satrâyāvagurya viśvajitâ yajeta Samyuthâne viśvajit*, etc., (these too speaking of *occasion*); and (2) *Dakṣiṇēna tîrena Sarasvatyâḥ âgneyenashtâkapâlēna śamyâ parâsâmiyât* (speaking of *Place*). Though, as in the case of the *Atirâtrâ*, etc., so in these also, we do not find any mention of the root 'yajî' yet inasmuch as, without the inference of the presence of the root 'yajî' the sentences containing the words with the nominal affix would remain incomplete (the *yajî* is inferred directly as the sentences have been pronounced), and hence the sentences do not stand in need of the 'yajî' occurring in any other sentence; and hence the actions mentioned in them must be taken as distinct from any others previously mentioned.

Then as for the other two *Anupādeyas* the *Result* and *Object to be purified* (or prepared)—we proceed to consider them now, amenable, as they are, to the same line of reasoning.

Of these two, the mention of the *Result* has been cited in the *Bhāṣya*: *Agneyamaṣṭâkapâlannirvapet rukkâmaḥ*, '*Agniṣṭomîyâmekâdaśa-kapâlannivrapet brahmavarchasakâmaḥ Aindramekâdśakapâlannirvapet prajākâmaḥ*.' And as for the mention of the *Object to be purified*, we have the sentence '*Traidhâtavîyâ dîkṣanîya*, etc., which lays down a purificatory rite for the sacrificer.

The *Bhāṣya* speaks of the sentences as being found *without reference to any particular Action*; and this is done with a view to show that the case in question is not capable of being dealt with under *Difference of Context*.

[This question being as to whether the sentences in question only serve to lay down certain results with reference to the original *Āgneya*, etc., or they lay down distinct sacrifices], we have the following—

Pārvaṇakṣa.—*Prākṛiteṣu phalâvidhiriti*—That is to say, the sentence in question lays down the Result with reference to the sacrifice mentioned before,—first in the same manner as *Ahavanîya* and the rest are laid down ; because the Results herein laid down are capable of being desired, even by one who is engaged in the *Darśa Pūrṇamâsa*.

Siddhânta.—The reply to this is this—the Result can never be enjoined. The sentence of this is that, on account of the reasons shown under *Sûtra*, VI.i.3. of the *Svâṅgakâmâdhikarana*, the Result has always the character of the *Uddeśya* (that subject with regard to which something else is enjoined). Because if the Result were enjoined, it could be so only with regard to the Action ; and as such being a part of the Action itself, it would lose its character of Result to be brought about by that Action). And, on the other hand, if the action were not enjoined with reference to the Result then it would not have the character of the means to that Result ; and as such it would become fruitless. If again, both (Action and Result) were *Uddeśya* or both were *Vidheya* then they would have no connection with each other. And so the only alternative left to us is to admit that the sentence lays down an Action with regard to a particular Result. And then just as in the preceding case (of an Action being laid down with reference to a particular time, so in the present case also), the Action thus laid down in the sentence in question would be one that is wholly distinct from all previous actions.

The same line of reasoning would apply also to the case of the sentence that speaks of a purificatory rite for the sacrificer.

Nor is it possible for the transient Desire (for certain results) to be the means of accomplishing such eternal Actions as the *Āgnêya*, etc. (and this is what it would come to if the sentences were taken as laying down the Result with reference to sacrifices.)

For these reasons, we conclude that the sentences in question lay down Actions that are distinct from all previous Actions.

Adhikaraṇa XIII.—[*The Avesti leads to the acquisition of food.*]

SUTRA II. iii. 26.

सन्निधौ त्वविभागात् फलार्थेन पुनःश्रुतिः ॥ २६ ॥

सन्निधौ Sannidhau, when there is proximity. तु Tu, really. अविभागात् Avibhâgât, there is no separation. फलार्थेन Phalârthena, for the purpose of pointing out result. पुनःश्रुतिः Punahśrutih, repetition.

26. When there is proximity, there is no separation ; and hence the second mention is for the purpose of pointing out another Result.—26.

COMMENTARY.

The present *Adhikaraṇa* is introduced by way of a counter instance to all the preceding *Adhikaraṇas* based upon *non-proximity*.

The mention of 'the Result' (in the *Sūtra*) indicates all other *Anupadeyas*. And hence the sentences forming the subject-matter of the present *Adhikaraṇa* are all the following:—(1) *Āgneyo'stakapālo bhavatietayā annādyakāmam yājayet*, or *Darśapūrṇamâśābhyām svargakāmo yajeta śeṣāt sviṣṭākṛitam yajet*, etc. (mentioning the Result); (2) *Sarve darśapūrṇamâśābhyām yajeta* (mentioning the Place); (3. *Pārṇamâśyām Paurṇomaśyā yajeta* (mentioning the Time); and (4) *Yāvajjīvam Darśapaurṇamâśābhyām yajet* (mentioning the occasion).

[The question with regard to these being as to whether the actions mentioned are the same as those of the same name mentioned before, or they are distinct Actions altogether], we have the following—

Pūrvapakṣa.—"Inasmuch as all these sentences lay down certain Actions, with reference to a particular Result, Place, etc., we conclude, in accordance with the foregoing *Adhikaraṇa*, that these Actions are other than those previously mentioned.

And in favour of this view, we have the following arguments : Inasmuch as there can be no Injunction of that which has already been enjoined we would have to take the names of Actions in the sentences in question as mere references to the original Actions (of those names) if we do not take the Actions as distinct); and that which is *referred to* is that which is the *Uddeśya* (that with regard to which something else is laid down) but as a matter of fact, we do not find the Actions (mentioned in the sentences) to have the character of the *Uddeśya*.

Siddhânta.—To the above we make the following reply :

The potency of the Injunction varies according as it happens to be an *originative* or an *applicatory* one. And hence when it is practicable,

we take it as having the potency of only one ; but when that is not found possible, we accept it as having both.

That is to say, in the case in question, we are forced to accept the same sentence to be an originative as well as an applicatory Injunction. It is only when the applicatory Injunction is such that there is no inconsistency in its pointing to the presence in itself of originative potencies, that we take it as having only the applicative potency, with regard to Actions whose idea is present in the mind as having been brought about by another originative Injunction. But the case of the sentence in question not being like this, we have to admit to have the double potency.)

The use of the present *Adhikaraṇa* has been expressed by the *Bhāṣya* as lying in the fact that, *if the sentence in question refers to the original Aveṣṭi, then, the substance to be offered at the sacrifice performed for the acquiring of Food, would be the Âgneya cake ; while if the Action were other than the Aveṣṭi, then we would have some other substance.*

To this, however, some people make the following objection : “ Even if the Action spoken of in the sentence ‘ *Etayâ annâdyakâmam yâjayet,*’ were other than the original *Aveṣṭi* then, too, inasmuch as the word ‘ *etayâ*’ would point to the fact of this other Action being similar to the *Aveṣṭi*, the substance employed at it would be the same as that used in the *Aveṣṭi*, and no other substance would have to be used.”

But this question is not quite pertinent. Because so long as it is possible for the word ‘ *etayâ*’ to be taken, as in the case of the sentence ‘ *eṣa jyotiḥ,*’ etc., in its direct sense, as referring to the Action to be spoken of immediately after it,—it can be rightly taken as indirectly indicating *similarity*. Hence there is nothing incorrect in the assertion ‘ *another substance will have to be used at the sacrifice.*’

We have found that the *Bhāṣya* and the *Vârtika* lay down six means for the differentiating of Actions :—

In another commentary (by *Bhavadâsa*, perhaps) only four such causes are mentioned, *viz.*, (1) difference of words, (2) Difference of Names, (3) Difference of Accessory Details, and (4) Difference of Result. He has included Repetition and Number in Difference of words, and the ‘ Difference of context,’ etc., in the ‘ Difference of Result,’ because all that the context does is to help the Result.

But this appears to be highly objectionable. Because, in the first place (Repetition) cannot be included in ‘ Difference of Words’ ; as if the word ‘ *yajate*’ is repeated five times, or any number of times for the matter of that, it does not become a *different word*. And when the word *prâjâpatyân* is used by way of *Ekāśeṣa* as pointing to seventeen *Prajâpatyas*,

we do not have so *many different* words, as the word is actually found to be one and the same only, in all cases. This is what has been explained under *Sūtra* I.i.15, and also in *Sūtra* I.i.20. And the singleness of such objects will be explained later on under *Sūtra* VI.iii.12. Consequently we conclude that in such cases, not being able to find other ground for differentiating the actions, the author of this commentary has gratuitously assumed the words to be different, even though, as a matter of fact, the word is one and the same. *Secondly*, this author of the commentary has failed to grasp the fact of the Result, etc., not being able to differentiate actions when the *Context* does not happen to be different—a fact that has been shown over and over again in the *Sūtra* just explained (II. iii. 26) and also in *Sūtra* II. ii. 16, *et seq.* And thus we find that though it is the *Difference of Context*, as helped by the mention of the *Result* that being the cause of non-recognition (of an Action as the other), is the real means of differentiating actions,—yet the said commentator has wholly neglected this fact (including the ‘Difference of Context’ in the ‘Difference of Result’). *Thirdly*, he failed to perceive that it was the ‘Difference of Result’ that was included in the ‘Difference of Context’ and not *vice versa*.

It has been argued by the adherents of this commentator that the fact of only four opposites of ground of identity being mentioned in the *Sūtra* II. iv. 9, distinctly points to the fact of the ground of difference also being only four.

But we do not attach any such significance to the *Sūtra*, in the present connection; because in the *Adhikaraṇa* under consideration, we find no other means of Differentiation applicable save the *Difference of Context* (which therefore could not be denied as a means of Differentiation).

Hence we conclude that there are six means of Differentiation as explained above.

— — —

Adhikaraṇa XIV.—[*The Repetition of the Āgneya serves the purpose of Glorification.*]

SUTRAS II, iii, 27—29.

आग्नेयस्तूक्तहेतुत्वादभ्यासेन प्रतीयेत ॥ २७ ॥

आग्नेयः Āgneyah, the Āgneya sacrifice. तु Tu, really. उक्तहेतुत्वात् Uktahetutvāt, for reasons already explained. अभ्यासेन Abhyāseṇa, as repeated. प्रतीयेत Pratiyeta, would appear.

27. The *Āgneya* would appear as if it were to be repeated, because of reasons already explained—27.

COMMENTARY.

We find the sentence ‘*Āgneyoṣṭakapalo amāvāsyâyām bhavati*, and then again ‘*Āgneyoṣṭakapalo amāvāsyâyām paurṇamāsyâñchachyuto bhavati*’ (this latter occurring in the text before the former.) And then arises the question as to whether the same *Āgneya* that is mentioned in the latter sentence is also mentioned over again in the former sentence, or the two *Āgneyas* are distinct actions.

This conclusion pointed out by the previous *Adhikarāṇa* would be that the two are the same, even though the action is laid down in reference to the particular time of the *Amāvasyâ* which by itself, is *anupadeya*.

And against this conclusion we have the following—

Pûrvapakṣa.—It has been shown above that it is only when the Repetition is formed to serve no other purpose that it can be taken as serving the purpose of differentiating actions. And in this case in question, we actually find the repetition serving no other purpose hence we take it to mean that the *Āgneya* is to be performed twice over, that is to say, the two performances would constitute two distinct actions.

In contradiction to this we have another alternative theory, which we bring forward as—

Siddhânta (A.)

अविभागात् कर्मणो द्विरुक्तेर्न विधीयते ॥ २८ ॥

अविभागात् Avibhâgât, on account of non-differentiation. तु 'Tu, really. कर्मणो Karmaṇo, of the action. द्विरुक्तेः Dvirûkteḥ, by reason of mere repetition. न विधीयते Navidhîyate, would not be enjoined.

28. The action not being found to be differentiated, the mere repetition of the same action would not make any difference in the action itself.—28.

COMMENTARY.

In the case of the sentences ‘*Sâmido yajati Bido yajati*,’ etc., it is only right that we should take the repetition of ‘*yajati*’ as serving the purpose of differentiating the actions; because in this case we find the distinct repetition of the ‘Sacrifice’ In this case in question, on the other hand, the sacrifice has got to be inferred from the relationship of the substance (cake) with the Deity Agni (expressed by the word ‘*Āgneya*’). And inasmuch as the Deity, as mentioned in the sentence, are found precisely

the same as those mentioned in the other, we are led, by the idea of those that we had obtained from the previous sentence to conclude that it is the same action that is mentioned in the latter sentence also.

It might be argued that "the Deity and the substance also are distinct in the two cases. But that is not possible ; because as a matter of fact, they are actually recognized as non-different. If the difference be based on the difference of the individuality of substance and the Deity, then such difference of individuality would be present also in the different performances of the same action.

Therefore we conclude that both sentences are optional Injunctions of the same *Āgneya* to be performed in the *Amāvasyā* day.

Or according to the law — *Yugaputpravrteriyathā syāt sattvadarśanam* (i.e., two sentences operating simultaneously we must take them according as we find the object mentioned in them), it is the same action that is mentioned by both sentences. And it cannot be definitely ascertained which sentence really lays down the action and which is a mere repetition and such meaningless.

Siddhānta (B) :—

अन्यार्था वा पुनः श्रुतिः ॥ २६ ॥

अन्यार्था Anyārthā, serving another purpose. वा Va, entirely. पुनःश्रुतिः Punaḥśrutih, repetition.

29. The repetition serves quite another purpose.—29.

COMMENTARY.

When we proceed to look into the various purposes that are served by repetitions, we find that inasmuch as the sentence in question does not mention any qualifying accessory, and as *Preclusion of the Rest* is accompanied by a three-fold anomaly, we conclude that it serves the purpose of an *Arthavâda*. And as it is not quite clear in the sentence itself of what it is an *Arthavâda*, it must be taken as that of the *Āgneya* itself.

SECOND ADHYÂYA.

FOURTH PADA.

Adhikaraṇa I.—[Treating of the lifelong Agnihotra].

“यावज्जीविकोऽभ्यासः कर्मधर्मः प्रकरणात्” ॥ १ ॥

यावज्जीविकः Yāvajjīvikah, lifelong. अभ्यासः Abhyāsaḥ, repetition. कर्मधर्मः Karma-dharmah, a property of the action. प्रकरणात् Prakaraṇāt, because of the context.

1. “The lifelong repetition is a property of the action because of the context.”—1.

COMMENTARY.

[We find the sentences ‘Yāvajjīvamagnihotram juhoti,’ ‘Yāvajjīvam Darśapūrṇamāsābhyām yajeta?’ And with regard to these sentences, there arises a question as to whether the mention of ‘lifelong’ qualifies the action, the sentence laying down the lifelong repetition of the action; or it serves to lay down a restriction for the performer of the action. That is to say, does the sentence lay down the *Repetition of the action* or only a *restriction for the agent*?].

The relevancy of this *Adhikaraṇa* in the present context is thus explained by the *Vārtika* :—

Just as the causes of difference operate towards the differentiation of the forms of action, so also do they operate towards that of their performances. Hence with regard to the Agnihotra, etc., qualified as they are by the mention of ‘lifelong’ there arises the question as to whether each of its (daily) performances is a distinct action by itself, or all the daily performances go to form a single action, meant to bring about a particular desirable end, and the time for whose performance is the whole of one’s life. If then, the time—whole of one’s life—were laid down as a property of the action, then the mere offering of the morning and evening libations in accordance with the injunctions “he should offer the morning libation with the mantra ‘Suryo joytiḥ, etc.,’ and he should offer the evening libation with the mantra ‘Agnirjoytiḥ, etc.,—would not be enough to complete the Agnihotra, till the specified time—‘life long’—expires; and hence a performance of the Agnihotra would come to be made of many daily repetitions; just as the performance of the

Jyotiṣṭoma is made up of the repetition of the same process with regard to each of the many *Grahas*. If, on the other hand, 'living' be taken as the occasion (or cause), with reference to which the sentence lays down the action,—then, inasmuch as the occasion would last till the Performer lasts, the action comes to be enjoined without any reference to any desirable result; and as such a neglect of the performance being sinful, it would be necessary for the man to perform it as long as he lives, either for the fulfilment of his own duty, or for the avoiding of the sin incurred by non-performance; and hence in this case the sentence would lay down a Restriction (or Duty) for the man. And in this case the occasion of the *Agnihotra* performance would be morning and evening together with the life of the agent; and hence as this occasion would present itself every day, the action would be complete every day also; and hence the complete performance of the *Agnihotra* would be repeated each day;—the performance of each day forming a distinct action by itself (independently of the other day's performance).

On the question, then we have the following—

Pūrvapakṣa.—(1) All the daily repetitions of the *Agnihotra* form a single performance of it; (2) *lifelong* is a qualification of the action; and (3) the sentence serves to lay down the time.

Siddhānta.—

कर्तुर्वा श्रुतिसंयोगात् ॥ २ ॥

कर्तुः Kartuh, of the agent. वा Vā, really. श्रुतिसंयोगात् Śrutisamyogāt, because of the direct signification of the words.

2. It must be taken as a property of the Agent, because of the direct signification of the words.—2.

COMMENTARY.

The word '*Dharmoh*' is to be supplied from the preceding *Sūtra*; and hence the proposition laid down by the *Siddhānta* is that—'It is the property of the Agent that is enjoined. This property of the Agent too is binding, and does not depend upon his own sweet will.'

Because in our interpretation of the sentence, both the words—'*Yāvajjîvam*' and the verb '*juhoti*'—retain their direct signification; while in your interpretation, they will have to be taken in their indirect indicated meanings.

That is to say, in our theory, it is by direct signification that the word '*Yāvajjîvam*' denotes the *life-time* of the agent as the occasion (for the Action); and in the Verb '*juhoti*' and '*yajati*' also, it is only directly that

the affix signifies the *Bhâvanâ* as qualified by the Root-meaning. And hence our interpretation is quite in keeping with the direct signification of both these words. In your interpretation, on the other hand, *life-time* not being capable of directly qualifying the action) indicates the *time*, and the verbs also would indicate *Repetition*;—then again, that wherein the Injunction ends, is accepted as the object of that Injunction;—hence it will be necessary for you to reject the direct denotations of the words '*Jîva*' and the *verb*, and make *Time* and *Repetition* the objects of the Injunction; and thus your Injunction comes to be based upon indirect Indication.

In both cases, in consideration of what is directly expressed by the words of the Vedic texts, we reject what is implied by the context, and conclude that the sentences in question lay down the *Homa* (of the *Agnihotra*) and the *Yoga* (of the *Darśa-Pûrṇamâsa*) with reference to the *life-time*,—and that they lay down a property of the performer.

**लिङ्गदर्शनाच्च कर्मधर्मे हि प्रक्रमेण नियम्येत, तत्रानर्थ-
कमन्यत् स्यात् ॥ ३ ॥**

लिङ्गदर्शनात् Liṅgadarśanât, because we find indicative words. च Cha, also. कर्मधर्मे Karmadharme, if the property pertained to the Action. हि Hi, because. प्रक्रमेण Prakramena, by beginning. नियम्येत Niyamyeta, would be completed. तत्र Tatra, then. अनर्थकम् Anarthakam, meaningless. अन्यत् Anyat, another. स्यात् Syât, would be.

3. Because we find indicative words to the same effect if the time pertained to the action, the action once begun would take up the whole time and the other Injunction would become meaningless—3.

COMMENTARY.

We have the text—'*Api hava eṣa svargâllokaḥchchidyate yat...amâvâsyâm paurṇamâsîm atipâtayet*'; and by *atipatti* here is meant *transgression*.

The time for the *Darśa Pûrṇamâsa* of which the *Agnihotra* forms an integral factor, according to you, is the whole lifetime; and certainly no transgression of that time is possible. Because if the performance of a certain action is begun at the prescribed time, it is admitted that the time has not been transgressed. And certainly one who is a 'performer of the *Darśa Pûrṇamâsa*' could never have allowed its prescribed time (his lifetime) to lapse without having begun its performance; because if he were to die without having begun it, he would not be a performer of the *Darśa Pûrṇamâsa*. If by transgression were meant 'non-completion

during the prescribed time' then too, inasmuch as this 'non-completion' could be ascertained only after the death of the performer, the laying down of the Expiatory Rite (for such transgression) would be wholly superfluous.

In accordance with our theory, on the other hand, inasmuch as the beginning as well as the completion of the *Darśa Pūrṇamāsa* is laid down for every month during the lifetime of the performer, it is possible that there may be transgression of that particular day of the month (omission of performance on that day; and hence too it would be quite possible for the transgressor to perform the expiatory rite after that date has elapsed.

व्यपवर्गश्च दर्शयति कालश्चेत्कर्मभेदः स्यात् ॥ ४ ॥

व्यपवर्गं Vyapavargam, completion. च Cha, also. दर्शयति Darśayati, speaks of कालः Kālah, time. चेत् Chet, if. कर्मभेदः Karmavedaḥ, difference of action. स्यात् Syât, should be

4. We have a text that speaks of the completion of the Action. If there is time, the performances of the Action should be distinct.—4.

We have the sentence '*Darśa Pūrṇamāśābhyāmiṣṭvā somena yajetā*. Now, if all the lifelong repetitions were to constitute a single performance of the *Darśa Pūrṇamāsa*, then, for reason shown above, the *Soma* sacrifice would have to be performed only after all the repetitions had been finished; and (as these would be finished only after the death of the performer) the dead person could not perform the *Soma* Sacrifice. If, on the other hand, there is time for the performance of the *Soma* sacrifice (after the completion of the *Darśa Pūrṇamāsa*.' This non-filling up of the whole lifetime is found to be possible, only if the 'lifetime' is taken as a property of the Performer; because in that case, each monthly performance of the *Darśa Pūrṇamāsa* is a distinct action by itself. Thus then the latter part of the *Sūtra* means that if there is time left by the performance of *Darśa Pūrṇamāsa* for the performance of the *Soma* sacrifice, then each performance of the *Darśa Pūrṇamāsa* should be a distinct action, as held by us.

The latter part of the *Sūtra* is also capable of another interpretation. If the whole lifetime be laid down as the time for the performance of the *Darśa Pūrṇamāsa*, then the *Soma* sacrifice as well as all other actions that may be laid down for the man, would be performed in the midst of the *Darśa Pūrṇamāsa*; and in that case inasmuch as all these other

actions would break up the continuity of the lifelong extensive *Darśa—Pūrṇamāsa* the assertion '*Darśa—Pūrṇamāsa* *abhyāmiśtvā*' ('having performed the *Darśa Pūrṇamāsa*) would be wholly incompatible and further, this interpretation of the *Darśa Pūrṇamāsa* would constitute the improper procedure deprecated in such sentences as 'he falls off from heaven, who *perverts the sacrifice*' and the like.

For these reasons also we cannot take the sentence in question as laying down the *time*.

अनित्यत्वात् नैवं स्यात् ॥ ५ ॥

अनित्यत्वात् Anityatvāt, on account of non-binding character. तु Tu, really. न Na not. एवं Evam, so. स्यात् Syāt, could be.

5. Because of the non-binding character of the action (according to you) it could not be so.—5.

COMMENTARY.

We have already shown that in order to take the word '*Yāvajjivam*' as laying down *time*, it would be necessary to have recourse to indirect Indication. And now we proceed to show that even if we allow the indication, *the action not having a binding character, it could not be so*. That is to say, that alone can be spoken of as pointing to a definite point of time which is sure to appear, and always in connection with that point of time; As for instance, the *Amāvasyā* is pointed out as *the day in which the moon is not visible* but there is no such single thing that invariably marks the end of the life-time of all living beings; and hence this life-time is not capable of being definitely pointed out by means of anything, thus then the time (life-time) being wholly indefinite being ascertainable only if it actually happens, it must be taken as mentioned by way of an occasion for the performance of the *Agnihotra*, etc.

विरोधश्चापि पूर्ववत् ॥ ६ ॥

विरोधः Virodhah, incongruity. चापि Châpi, also. पूर्ववत् Pūrvavat, as before.

6. There is also incongruity as before.—6.

COMMENTARY.

If 'lifelong' is a restriction, qualifying the agent, it could not be applied to the subsidiary sacrifices, as it is only that, which pertains to the principal *sacrifice* that is implied in the subsidiary—as we shall show later on; and if the word were taken as laying down *the time for the sacrifice*, it would be relegated to the subsidiaries also (and then the

subsidiary sacrifices, the *Saurya*, etc., also would come to be performed throughout one's life, which is not desirable even for the *Pûrvapakṣī*).

कर्तुस्तु धर्मनियमात् कालशास्त्रं निमित्तं स्यात् ॥ ७ ॥

कर्तुः Kartuh, to the agent. तु Tu, if. धर्मनियमात् Dharmaniyamât, restriction of character. कालशास्त्रं Kâlasâstram, time injunction. निमित्तं Nimittam, occasion. स्यात् Syât, would be.

7. If the restriction pertained to the performer the time injunction would be taken as mentioning the occasion.—7.

COMMENTARY.

What is said in this *Sûtra* being analogous to what has been said in *Sûtra* 4, the *Vârtika* has given three explanations :—

(1) This *Sûtra* being the last of the *Adhikaraṇa* rightly recapitulates what has been said before.

(2) It may be that though the author of the *Sûtra* has already said that the Restriction in question is a property of the Performer,—yet he has not yet shown what, in that case, would be done with the word '*Yâvajjîvam*,' and hence he now declares that the word can be taken *as mentioning the occasion*.

Or it may be that the *Sûtra* replies to the question—"In regard to the *Agnihotra* and the *Darśa Pûrṇamâsa* inasmuch as we have the mention of the word '*Yâvajjîvam*' we could take lifelong as the occasion, but how can that be the occasion for the Animal sacrifice, the Soma sacrifice and the *Chaturmâsya* sacrifice?" The sense of the *Sûtra* thus is that even in the case of these latter, the prescription of time, mentioned repeatedly, would serve to point out the life-time as the occasion ;—'the said prescription being in the form of the sentence '*Vasante vasante jyotiṣa*, etc.' This sentence does not lay down the time for the performance of any optional sacrifice because an optional sacrifice, depending for its performance upon one's whim, and as such being only subsidiary, it could not be spoken of as to be performed in *every spring*. . Then as for the Necessary Binding Sacrifice, if that were to be performed but once, in any one Spring, the repetition of '*Vasante*' would be wholly useless. Nor is there any ground for limiting its performance to only a certain number of *Springs*, consequently we must conclude that the Injunction means that the sacrifice is to be performed in *every Spring that might occur during the lifetime of the Performer*. And as for the Locative in '*Vasante*' that too points to *Vasanta* being the occasion, just as it does in the case of the word '*bhinne*' in '*bhinne juhoti*.' It is for these reasons

that the Sūtra lays down that in all these cases, inasmuch as the mention of time lays down restriction for the performer, it must be taken as laying down the *Occasion*. Thus it is too that the necessary and binding character of the Animal sacrifice, the Soma sacrifice and the *Chaturmāsya* sacrifice becomes established.

Adhikarāṇa II.—[The action mentioned in different Rescension texts is the same].

SŪTTRAS II. iv. 8-32.

“नामरूप धर्मकविशेष-पुनरुक्ति-निन्दाशक्ति समाप्ति
वचन प्रायश्चित्तान्यार्थदर्शनात् शाखान्तरेषु कर्मभेदः स्यात् ”८॥

नाम Nāma, name. रूप Rūpa, form. धर्मविशेष Dharmaviśeṣa, particular details. पुनरुक्ति Punarūkti, repetition. निन्दा Nindā, deprecation. अशक्ति Asakti, incapability. समाप्तिवचन Samāptivachanam, mention of completion. प्रायश्चित्त Prāyśchitta, expiatory rites. अन्यार्थ Anyārtha, distinct purposes. दर्शनात् Darśanāt, because we find. शाखान्तरेषु Śākhāntareṣu, when the texts belong to distinct rescensions. कर्मभेदः Karmabhedaḥ, difference of action. स्यात् Syāt, should be.

8. “When the texts belong to distinct Rescensions, the actions must be distinct; because we find (differences in) (1) the name, (2) the form, (3) the particular details;—and because of (4) Repetition, (5) Deprecation, (6) Incapability, (7) Mention of completion, (8) Expiatory Rites, and (9) Distinct purposes.”—8.

COMMENTARY.

[There are various Rescensions of the Veda; and it is found that the same action is very often mentioned in all these texts; then there arises the question as to whether all these actions are one and the same, or is every one of them distinct from the rest].

The present *Adhikarāṇa* is taken up with a view to show that there are no grounds for the Differentiation of Actions except those already dealt with. And hence we proceed to bring forward certain other grounds of difference, and then demolish them; and then we shall show also, in course of the discussion, that every one of the grounds herein mentioned is included in one of those that have been already dealt with in the previous *Adhikarāṇas*.

On this question we have the following

Pārvaṇapakṣa.—The action mentioned in each Rescensional text is that it is distinct; to say, the *Agnihotra* mentioned in the *Katha Rescension*

is distinct from the *Agnihotra* mentioned in the *Taittirīya Rescension* ; for the following reasons :—

1. On account of the *Difference of Name* : for instance we find people declaring that such and such a thing is found mentioned in connection with the *Kāthaka Agnihotra* and that in connection with the *Taittirīya Agnihotra* (which showed that the two *Agnihotras* are distinct, one being called the *Kāthaka* and another the *Taittirīya*). [Here too the differentiating agency is that of *Name*, which is equivalent to 'Sabdāntara' dealt with in Sūtra II.ii.1.]

2. On account of the *Difference of Form*, for instance, in one text the cake dedicated to *Agni Soma* is said to be 'ekādaśakapāla' while in another it is said to be 'dvādaśakapāla.' In this case also, inasmuch as the 'eleven' and 'twelve' are not capable of being exchanged, in the way that we find in the case of the numbers 'eight' and 'twelve' with regard to the *Vaiśvānara* or in that of the *Amikṣā* and the *Vājina*—the differentiating agency is that of the accessory (and this has been fully dealt with in II.ii).

3. On account of the difference of *sacrificial details*, for instance, the *Taittirīyas*, in connection with the *Kārīrī* sacrifice, lay down eating on the ground, while those belonging to other Rescensions do not do so ; so also while in connection with *Agni sacrifice* some lay down the carrying of the water-pot of the tutor, while others do not ; and in connection with the *Aśvamedha*, some lay down that the sacrifices should present grass to the Horse, while others do not lay this down. And in all these cases, the differentiating agencies are those of the eating on the ground, carrying of the water-pot, and the presenting of the grass—all of which are mere sacrificial accessories, but taking the place of the *method* of the sacrifice, these have been mentioned apart from the former accessories, which are wholly outside the performance.

4. On account of *Repetition*, i.e., if the same action were mentioned in all the Rescensional texts, there would be many useless repetitions. In this case differentiating agency is that of 'Repetition' (and has been dealt with under Sūtra II.ii.2).

5. On account of *Deprecation*, for instance : some people deprecate the offering of the morning libations before sunrise, while others deprecate the offerings of the same after sunrise. In this case also, the differentiating agency is that of the *time*, which is only an Accessory.

6. On account of *Incapability*. In this case also the differentiating agency is that of the Accessory, because all that is meant is that all the various details mentioned in connection with the action, in the several texts, could not possibly be performed at the single performance of the

action; and consequently, the action must be taken as distinct in each text.

7. On account of the difference in *Completion*: In that case also, that the differentiation is done by the Accessory; because what is meant by that the upholders of one text declare 'our *Agni* sacrifice is completed here, and not there, as in the *Agni* sacrifice of the other people' and this would not be possible if there were a single *Agni* sacrifice.

8. On account of the laying down of distinct Expiatory Rites: Though this is included in 'Deprecation' yet it is brought forward separately; because the mere deprecation of the time (before or after sunrise) might be explained as pointing to both times being optional alternatives for the same action; hence what is meant by the bringing forward of the mention of Expiatory Rites is that if the two times were mere optional alternatives, none of them would be faulty; as a matter of fact, inasmuch as expiatory rites are laid down in connection with both, both would be faulty, which could not be if the action were the same. Hence the action must be regarded as distinct.

9. On account of the perception of distinct purposes being served in the direction that if the sacrificer happens to be previously initiated, he should employ the *Atirâtra* of the *Bṛihatsâma*; because the *Rathantara Soma* will have been already employed at the previous initiation; while if he does not happen to have been previously initiated, he should employ the *Rathantara Soma*. In the *Tândaka*, however, we have it distinctly laid down that the *Jyotiṣṭoma* is the very first of the sacrifices to be performed. And the uncertainty of precedence spoken of in the previous direction would be possible only if the *Jyotiṣṭoma* mentioned in the latter sentence were other than *Jyotiṣṭoma* occurring in the same text with the former sentence. For, if all the *Jyotiṣṭoma* were one and the same, then inasmuch as in accordance with the *Tândaka* direction in the case of all texts, it would always be the *Jyotiṣṭoma* that would be performed first, the sacrificer would always have been initiated for the *Jyotiṣṭoma*, the said mention of uncertainty—'if he be not initiated'—would be wholly incompatible; as no sacrificer would ever be found to be uninitiated.

Siddhânta.—

एकं वा संयोगरूपचोदनाख्याविशेषात् ॥ ६ ॥

एकं Ekam, one. वा Vâ, only. संयोगरूप चोदनाख्याविशेषात् Samyogarûp Chodanâkhyâviśeṣât, because of the non-difference of Connection, form, Injunction and Name.

9. The action is one only ; because of the non-difference of (1) Connection, (2) Form, (3) Injunction and (4) Name,—9.

COMMENTARY.

That is to say, the identity of actions, recognized by means of their Names, Forms and Accessories, does not disappear even when they happen to be mentioned in various Rescensional texts.

The *Bluṣya* says : The action spoken of in all texts, or in all *Brâhmaṇas*, is one and the same. The sense of the phrase in all *Brâhmaṇas* is that the same is the case even when the action appears in the various *Brâhmaṇas* of the same Veda. As for instance, when the *Jyotiṣṭoma* and the *Dvâṭasâha* sacrifices are mentioned in the *Pañchavinśa* and the *Ṣaḍvinśa Brâhmaṇas* of the *Sâma-veda*.

(1) 'By 'Connection' is meant the connection of the Result, as that is the chief factor in the relationship, (2) By 'Forms' are meant the *Deity* and the (*material*), as being the most nearly related, (3) By 'Injunction' is meant that which partakes of the *Root-meaning* as well as the *Bhâvanâ*, (4) And lastly, by *Name* are meant *Jyotiṣṭoma* and the like which are found to be exactly the same in all texts. Thus then, there being so many reasons for recognizing the action to be the same, we cannot but admit its identity in all texts specially as we do not find any reason for taking it as different.

न नाम्ना स्यादचोदनाविधानत्वात् ॥ १० ॥

न Na, not. नाम्ना Nâmnâ, by name. स्यात् Syât, would be. अचोदनाविधानत्वात् Achodanâ-vidhânatvât, because the names do not speak of actions.

10. Difference could not be established by the names in question because the names do not speak of actions.—10.

COMMENTARY.

Even if '*Kâṭhaka*' and '*Kalâpaka*' were the names of actions, then too, inasmuch as these do not occur in the originative Injunction of the actions, they could not serve to distinguish one action from another. As a matter of fact, however, they are not the names of actions at all ; because by the law that 'it is not right to accept a multiplicity of meanings,' the names belong to the books, and it is indirectly through these that they are applied to the actions (treated of in these books).

सर्वेषाञ्चैककर्म्यं स्यात् ॥ ११ ॥

सर्वेषां Sarveṣâm, of all. च Cha, also. ऐककर्म्यं Ayekakarmyam, one action. स्यात् Syât, would be.

11. (If the name belong to actions) all actions would become one.—11.

COMMENTARY.

The differentiation of the cause is generally found to bring about the differentiation of the effect. Hence inasmuch as the name '*Kathâka*' is one only, all actions—*Agnihotra* and the rest—mentioned in that text, would come to be taken as one (if the name belonged to the actions).

Though the reasoning herein advanced partakes of the nature of the Faulty Apparent Inconsistency (*vide Nyâya Sûtras*, V.i.21), because there is no actual invariable concomitance between the conclusion (oneness of actions) and the Reason (oneness of Name)—yet the *Siddhânti* has purposely brought forward a faulty argument, as a proper reply to the *Pûrvapakṣa*, which is based upon fallacious arguments through and through because a faulty rejoinder is always allowable against faulty arguments (*vide Nyâya Sûtras*, V.i.39, *et seq*).

कृतकं चाभिधानम् ॥ १२ ॥

कृतकं *Kṛitakam*, coined. च *Cha* also. अभिधानम् *Avidhânam*, name.

12. The name is one that has been coined.—12.

COMMENTARY.

It has been shown under *Sûtra* I.i.30, that the names *Kathaka* and the like are coined ones; and certainly such recently coined names could not very well differentiate the eternal actions.

That is to say, though on account of the eternality of the class *Kâthaka*, the word '*Kâthaka*' is an eternal one,—yet it is a universally recognised fact that the word was applied as a *name* to the Vedic text, solely on account of the fact of that particular text having been taught, pre-eminently, by the teacher named '*Katha*.' And there is no doubt that it is not the *action* that is taught but the *Verbal text*; and hence the name not applying to actions, it could not differentiate them.

एकत्वेऽपि परम् ॥ १३ ॥

एकत्वे *Ekatve*, even when it is one. अपि *Api*, also. परम् *Param*, diversity.

13. Even a single action has diverse forms.—13.

COMMENTARY.

Mere difference in such details as the number of *Kapâlas*, cannot establish a difference between actions; because so long as there is absolutely no difference in the *Kapâla* itself, that in its number is an

insignificant detail. Hence we conclude that the two numbers—Eleven and Twelve—are optional alternative accessories with regard to the same action.

विद्यायां धर्मशास्त्रम् ॥ १४ ॥

विद्यायां Vidyâyâm, pertaining to the science. धर्मशास्त्रम् Dharmaśāstram, injunction of the detail.

COMMENTARY.

As for the difference in the sacrificial details, several of these are mentioned in the various texts, simply by way of showing all that has to be learnt about the sacrifices, and not as laying down something to be actually carried into practice at the performance.

आग्नेयवत्पुनर्वचनम् ॥ १५ ॥

आग्नेयवत् Āgneyavat, as in the case of Āgneya. पुनर्वचनम् Punarvachanam, there would be repetition.

15. “There will be a repetition as in the case of the Āgneya.—15.”

COMMENTARY.

This *Sūtra* may be taken either as reiteration of the *Pūrvapakṣa* argument—that many repetitions of the same action would be useless,—or as explaining the repetitions of the same action, as resembling that of the *Āgneya*; the sense of the latter explanation being that the Repetition serves the distinct purpose of glorifying the action (and as such there is incongruity in it) (*vide* *Sūtra* II.iii.29).

अद्युर्वचनं वा श्रुतिसंयोगाविशेषात् ॥ १६ ॥

अद्युर्वचनं Adyurvachanam, there is no repetition. वा Vâ, however. श्रुतिसंयोगाविशेषात् Śrutisamyogâviśeṣât, there being no difference in the method of declaration.

16. As a matter of fact, however, there is no repetition as there is no difference in the method of declaration.—16.

COMMENTARY.

The word ‘Vâ’ in the *Sūtra* serves to reject the explanation just given in the second interpretation of the foregoing *Sūtra*. And the reason for this rejection is that a *Repetition* is taken as serving other minor purposes, only under two conditions: *viz.*, (1) when the Repetition consists in another mention of the action only; and (2) when there are two objects of Injunction, in a single sentence. In the case in question, however, none of these two conditions are present; because

we find that the Repetition is one of the Primary Action itself together with all its details of procedure, etc. This is what the *Bhâṣya* understands by the word 'Śrutisaṃyogâviśeṣa, in the *Sûtra*.

But the *Sûtra* is capable of also another interpretation, as follows: As a matter of fact, there is no Repetition in the case in question; one sentence is known as a 'Repetition' of the other, only when both occur in the text of the same Rescension; while in the case in question, we find that the mention of the action is found in distinct texts of the *Kāthaka*, etc., and that too only once in each text.

In accordance with the law spoken of before: that one man can read the text of only one Rescension, one who has read of the *Agnihotra* mentioned in the text of the *Kātha* Rescension, does not know of that which is mentioned in that of the *Taittirîya* Rescension; or even if he happens to know it, inasmuch as he has all necessary knowledge of the *Agnihotra* from the text of his own (*Kātha*) Rescension, he takes its mention in the other Rescension to be meant for those professing that Rescension; and hence he does not look upon it as a mere fruitless repetition. Similarly, does the professor of each particular Rescension treat of the text of other Rescensions. And every one of these professors equally recognizes the *Agnihotra* as mentioned in a single text (this is what is meant by the non-difference in the method of declaration). Nor is there any order of sequence among the various Rescensions; by which it could be ascertained that it is by the text of any one of them that the *Agnihotra* is originally spoken of and those found in the rest are mere repetitions. To this effect it has been declared elsewhere: 'Inasmuch as all Rescensions have a simultaneous existence, no one of them can be looked upon as a repetition of the other; specially as there is no order of sequence in which the various Rescensions are to be studied, as there is in the study of the various portions of a single Rescension.'

Consequently, even in the case of the mention of an action in a single text, if that very mention (of the same text) happens to be repeated at another time, for the sake of another person, such mention is not taken to be a mere useless repetition,—and the reason for this is that the persons addressed are different in the two cases; so would it also be in the case of the mention of the Action in various texts.

वाक्यासंवायात् ॥ १६ क ॥

वाक्यासंवायात् Vâkyasamvâyât.

16A. Because of the non-inherence of texts.—16A.

As a matter of fact the texts of two Rescensions can never be retained in the mind of the same person.

This *Sūtra* has dropped out of the *Bhāṣya*; but is explained in the *Vartikā*.

अर्थासंनिधेश्च ॥ १७ ॥

अर्थे Artha, Purpose. असंनिधेश्च Asannidheścha, on account of non-proximity.

17. Also because of the non-proximity of the purpose.
—17.

COMMENTARY.

The various texts are known as the 'Branches' of the *Veda tree*, simply on account of their containing certain points of the same kind—in the shape of actions, just like the many branches of the same tree.

That is to say, if the action mentioned in the various Rescensional texts differed from one another, there inasmuch as the very roots (actions) would be distinct, on account of the facts of flowers and fruits—in the shape of the results of actions—being different from the very beginning, we would speak of the texts as '*distinct Vedas*' and not as '*distinct Rescensions*, (or branches). On the other hand, when the roots in the shape of actions and the stems in the shape of *Injunctions* are the same, the only difference would be in the details of procedure, etc., which would be difference in the number of fruits and flowers on the various branches of the tree; and as such from the similarity of the *tree* it is right that the different texts should be spoken of as so many different 'Branches' or (Rescensions.)

The *Sūtra* may also be taken as meeting the aforesaid objection with regard to Repetition. The sense would then be that, we take that to be a case of Repetition, where what has been spoken of once is approximate to the same man to whom it had been previously addressed. In the case in question, however, we find that, that which is mentioned in one text is not approximate to the person professing a different text.

न चैकं प्रति शिष्यते ॥ १८ ॥

न च Na Cha, nor. एकं Ekam, one. प्रति Prati, for. शिष्यते Śiṣyate, is enjoined.

18. Nor is the action in one text enjoined for one class of Brāhman only.—18.

COMMENTARY.

This *Sūtra* takes it for granted that the actions are different. The sense of the *Sūtra* is that even when the actions differ in their accessory details, those subsidiary accessories that are mentioned along with the

original Injunctive sentence, being laid down only as with reference to the *Agnihotra*, etc., come to be recognised as meant for all persons (professing all texts), and as such to be necessarily procured; and hence it follows that in matters of subsidiary accessories, we should not rest contented with our own particular text. Nor do we find a single author of the *Kalpasūtras* confining himself within his own particular Rescension; and for this reason also, we cannot ascertain all the details of any sacrifice from out of one particular text only.

This as regards subsidiaries; as regards the primaries also, inasmuch as the names of actions (*Kāthaka* and the like) are not capable of specifying the *sacrifices* as one professing any particular Rescension, the Injunctions of these primaries (in whatever text) must be taken as laying down these actions for all who may be desirous (of obtaining the result following from these actions); and hence the actions mentioned in all the texts appear before each one of the performers. Then inasmuch as all these (*Agnihotras*, for instance) lead to the same result, they could not all be performed conjointly and the result having been accomplished by means of anyone of these all the rest would become useless. If they be explained as serving the purpose of optional alternatives, then it would be far more reasonable to accept the texts themselves as optional alternatives.

समाप्तिवच्च संप्रेक्षा ॥ १६ ॥

समाप्तिवत् Samāptivat, accompanied by the mention of completion. च Cha, also. संप्रेक्षा Samprekṣa, assertion.

19. Also because there is the assertion speaking of "completion."—19.

COMMENTARY.

If the sacrifices (*Agnihotra* for instance) mentioned in various texts, were distinct actions, then each of them would be completed, first it would happen to be mentioned in its own text, then we could not have such assertions as 'Our *Agnihotra* sacrifices does not end here' (this could be possible only when the speaker recognised the *Agnihotra* that is being performed to be the same as that mentioned in his own text). "The *Anvārohas* are the mantras in connection with the *Sthalārohana*, and it is with these that the sacrifice is finished by the professors of the *Maitrayāṇī* Rescension; but our sacrifice does not end there,"—such assertions of the learners of Veda distinctly show that even students, apart from the sacrificers, recognise the actions to be the same.

एकत्वेऽपि पराणि निन्दाशक्तिसमाप्तिवचनानि ॥ २० ॥

एकत्वे Ekatve, when the action is one. अपि Api, even. पराणि Parâṇi, others. निन्दाशक्तिसमाप्तिवचनानि Nindâśaktisamâptivachanâni, the mention of deprecation, incapability and completion.

20. Even when the action is one and the same, the mention of (1) Deprecation, (2) Incapability and (3) Completion is quite explicable.—20.

COMMENTARY.

(1) All that the mutual deprecation of the offering being made before and after sunrise would show would be that the two theories are optional alternatives. Even according to your theory, you admit the Result of such offerings to be alternatives.

(2) Similarly as for the Incapability or capability of persons, it varies with each individual ; and it is equally uncertain with regard to the details laid down in all texts, as well as with regard to those mentioned in one text only (i.e., there are men who are quite capable of duly carrying out all the minute details mentioned in all the various texts, while there are others that are not capable of performing even those mentioned in one text only), and after all there is not much difference between the details mentioned in the various texts.

(3) As for the declaration of completion, or otherwise that depends upon what the speaker may have learnt, and hence that does not establish a difference between actions.

प्रायश्चित्तं निमित्तेन ॥ २१ ॥

प्रायश्चित्तं Prâyaśchittam, expiatory rite. निमित्तेन Nimittena, occasion.

21. Then as for the mention of the occasion for expiatory rites.—21.

COMMENTARY.

This Sûtra recalls for the purpose of refuting it what has been urged by the *Pûrvapakṣi* under (8) of Sûtra 8, in connection with the laying down of distinct expiatory rites for the actions concerned. This *Pûrvapakṣa* argument is met in the next sûtra.

प्रक्रमद् वा नियोगेन ॥ २२ ॥

प्रक्रमद् Prakramât, in accordance with the method started with. वा Vâ, really. नियोगेन Niyogena, would be controlled.

22. The application of the expiatory rites would be controlled in accordance with the method started with.--22.

COMMENTARY.

In all cases of alternative procedure, one can start with his performance distinctly in accordance with one method of procedure only; and hence, if subsequently he happens to leave off the details of that method, and takes up those of another, he commits a distinctly wrongful infringement; and thereby renders himself liable to expiatory rites; and thus the mere mention of expiatory rites does not necessarily show that any, or both, methods is objectionable or unacceptable by any performer.

समाप्तिः पूर्ववत्वात् यथाज्ञाते प्रतीयेत ॥ २३ ॥

समाप्तिः Samâptih, completion. पूर्ववत्वात् Pûrvavatvât, because depending upon what has gone before. यथाज्ञाते Yathâjñyâte, according to what we know. प्रतीयेत Pratiyeta, should be accepted.

23. Inasmuch as the completion depends upon what has gone before, we accept it in accordance with our own knowledge.—23.

COMMENTARY.

We have shown under *sûtra* (19) that the mention of completion is compatible with both the unity and diversity of actions. But, inasmuch as the assertion of completion is always in accordance with what the speaker might know, it serves to establish the unity of action; and the reason for that assertion is that it is regulated by what has been done before in the beginning.

Or the *sûtra* might mean that, inasmuch as all verbal usage depends upon its previous acceptance by people, we could conclude that the 'completion' spoken of is what we actually find to be. And for this, we often find that even when the action has not been completed, as soon as the details mentioned in one text have all been performed, the professors of that text declare 'Our this sacrifice ends here'; and hence there is no incompatibility in this assertion (with our theory).

**लिङ्गमविशिष्टं सर्वशेषत्वान्नहि तत्र कर्मचोदना तस्मात्
द्वादशाहस्याहाराख्यपदेशस्यात् ॥ २४ ॥**

लिङ्ग Lingam, indicative word. अविशिष्टं Avisaṣṭam, equally applicable. सर्वशेषत्वात् Sarvasaṣatvât, because pertaining to all. नहि Nahi, nor. तत्र Tatra, in the text. कर्मचोदना Karmachodanâ, injunction of another action. तस्मात् Tasmât, therefore. द्वादशाहस्य Dvâdaśâhasya, of the Dvâdaśa sacrifice. आहाराख्यपदेशः Âhârâkhyapdeśah, incongruity in the performance. स्यात् Syât, would be.

24. The indicative words are equally applicable to both views—because the mention (of the *Jyotiṣṭoma* as the

very first to be performed) pertains to all (Rescensions) nor does the text enjoin another *Jyotiṣṭoma*; therefore there would (in both cases) be an incongruity in the performance of the *Dvâdaśâha*.

COMMENTARY.

This meets an objection urged by the *Pûrvapakṣî* (Va. Text p. 198, line 26).

The presence of uninitiated sacrifices at the *Dvâdaśâha* is equally incongruous, for both of us. Because what the *Tândakâ* lays down is the fact of the *Jyotiṣṭoma* mentioned in all texts being always the first to be performed. Nor does the *Tândakâ* enjoin a distinct *Jyotiṣṭoma* of its own with regard to which alone it would lay down that restriction. Thus then the restriction applying to the *Yâjurvedis* also, and hence the said incongruity being found to be present in both theories, both of us should explain the clause in question as meaning that 'if the sacrificers happen to be initiated or not initiated for the *Dvâdaśâha*.' And hence on this point there is no difference between our theories.

द्रव्ये चाचोदितत्वात् विधीनामव्यवस्था स्यात् निर्देशात् व्य-
वतिष्ठेत तस्मात् नित्यानुवादः स्यात् ॥ २५ ॥

द्रव्ये Dravye, with regard to substance. च Cha, and. अचोदितत्वात् Achoditvât, not being enjoined. विधीनां Vidhînâm, of injunctions. अव्यवस्था Avyavasthâ, indefiniteness. स्यात् Syât, would be. निर्देशात् Nirdeśât, by being pointed out. व्यवतिष्ठेत Vyavatiṣṭheta, would become well defined. तस्मात् Tasmât, therefore. नित्यानुवादः Nityânuvâdah, everlasting description, स्यात् Syât, would be.

25. (The measuring of the *Vedî*) not being enjoined with regard to any substance, the injunctions would be indefinite; while when it is pointed out, they become defined, and hence it would be taken as an everlasting description.
—25.

COMMENTARY.

This meets an objection urged by the *Pûrvapakṣî* (Va. Text p. 199, line 8).

It has been argued above (*Sâbara Bhâṣya*, p. 199, line 8, et seq.) that there could be no mention of the measuring of the *Pakṣa* and the *Vedî* (if the action were the same). And to this we make the following reply:—

That is to say, the sentence '*yat pakṣasammitam*,' etc., appears in the wake of the Injunction (there is but one post, and eleven animals),

and it means that as at the *Ekâdaśini*, there would be a deal of trouble, if any of the two measures mentioned were accepted, it is far better to have only one post. And as for the measuring of the *pakṣa*, as it is one that has never been enjoined, it must be taken as always appearing as a mere description; and the Injunction of the measuring by the *Vedî* also only serves as a praise, showing the superior excellences of a single Sacrificial post. And as for the measuring by the 'eyes' of the chariot, it would be done at that sacrifice, in connection with which the *Ekâdaśini* is laid down; and as such there would be no incompatibility. In the case in question, however, the measuring by the *Vedî* appears as the object of Injunction, by means of praise; and as such we cannot very well take it as eulogising anything else. Consequently it must be concluded that the 'measuring by the *pakṣa* which is not enjoined is a mere description for the sake of praising the 'measuring by the *Vedî*.' And as, in regard to the Agni sacrifice, this 'measuring by the *Vedî*, would be the most authoritative, on account of its being mentioned in the same context,—the Injunction of the 'measuring by the eyes of the chariot,' being thus freed from the primary Agni sacrifice, would betake itself to its subsidiaries.

The *sûtra* may be taken as follows: If the measuring with the *Vedî* were not laid down with regard to a substance, then there would be no restriction with regard to the measuring of the *Pakṣa*, etc., all of which would be (equally) implied and that would be set aside by the direct mention of the 'measuring by the eyes of the chariot.' In the case in question, however, it is not so; and hence there is no contradiction.

विहितप्रतिषेधात्पक्षेऽतिरेकः स्यात् ॥ २६ ॥

विहितप्रतिषेधात् Vihitpratishedhât, on account of the prohibition of what is enjoined. पक्षे Pakṣe, optional. अतिरेकः Atirekaḥ, excess. स्यात् Syât, would be.

26. On account of the injunction and prohibition of the same thing the excess would be optional.—26.

This *sûtra* meets one of the objections urged in the *Bhâṣya*, p. 19 line 17.

COMMENTARY.

One text lays down the holding of the *Ṣoḍaśî* at the *Atirâtrâ*; while another prohibits it; and hence its holding or not holding being both optional, when it is not held there would be an excess of two hymns only; when however it is held, the excess comes to be three, because in this latter case, there are two *Rik* verses added to the group of twenty-one, and in this way we do not find any contradiction between the texts concerned,

सारस्वते विप्रतिषेधात् यदेति स्यात् ॥ २७ ॥

सारस्वते Sârasvate, in the Sarasvata sacrifice. विप्रतिषेधात् Vipratishedhât, on account of prohibition. यदा इति Yadâiti, the conditional 'if'. स्यात् Syât, should be added.

27. In the Sârasvata sacrifice on account of the prohibition the sentence should be taken with a conditional 'if.'—27.

COMMENTARY.

This meets the objection urged by the *Pûrvapakṣi* in the *Bhāṣya*, p. 199, line 22. As in regard to the *Sârasvatâ* sacrifice just as in the case of the *Dvâdâśâha* shown above, the previous performance of the *Jyotiṣṭoma* would be found necessary for both of us (disputants), both of us should explain the sentence concerned as follows:—

'If in the case of the performance falling in the bright fortnight of the month ending with *Paûrṇamâsî* the sacrificers happen to be *Purodâśins* then they should fast; whereas if in the case of the performance falling within the dark fortnight ending with *Amâvasyâ*, the sacrificers happen to be *Sânnâyyins*, they should remove the 'calves.' And in this way, we find that the mention of different sacrificers (*Purodâśins* and *Sânnâyyins*) indicates the different times of the performance, and as such there is no incompatibility.

उपहव्ये प्रतिप्रसवः ॥ २८ ॥

उपहव्ये Upahavye, in regard to the Upahavya. प्रतिप्रसवः Pratiprasavaḥ, incongruity.

28. "In regard to the Upahavya there would be certainly incongruity.—28.

COMMENTARY.

This Sûtra recalls an objection urged by the *Pûrvapakṣi* *Bhāṣya* p. 200, line 1) the purport of which is as follows:—

In one Recension we find the sentence '*upahavyo niruktoḥ, agniṣṭomo yajno rathântarasâma, aśvahśyâvo dakṣhinâ*'; while in another we find, '*upahavyaḥ aniruktoḥ, uktho yajno brihatsâmâ, acvâh cveto rukma-lalâto dakṣinâ*'; and in this case, in view of these two Injunctions the two Hymns could be taken as optional alternatives; yet, inasmuch as this alternative is already obtained from the Primary sacrifice, any mention of it would be absolutely useless, if the action (*upahavya*) were one only; while if the two *upahavyas* are distinct, the repetition (of what has been mentioned in connection with the Primary) would serve the

purposes of restrictions. Hence too the two actions must be taken as distinct.

गुणार्था वा पुनःश्रुतिः ॥ २९ ॥

गुणार्था Gunārthâ, for the purpose of indicating an accessory. वा Vâ, but. पुनःश्रुतिः Punahśrutih, repetition.

29. The repetition referred to serves the purpose of indicating another accessory.—29.

COMMENTARY.

The answer to the above objection is that the repetition of the Brihata and the Rathantara could be explained as serving the purpose of restricting the number.

प्रत्ययश्चापि दर्शयति ॥ ३० ॥

प्रत्ययः Pratyayaḥ, idea. चापि Châpi, also. दर्शयति Darśayati, supports.

30. The Veda also lends support to the idea (that the action mentioned in the diverse texts is the same).—30.

COMMENTARY.

We find that the Veda, speaking of the *Homa* in reference to the *Prayaja* lays down the mantra '*Kṛiturasi*,' etc., which appears in entirely different rescensional texts, as to be employed in the *Aṣmâdâna*; and this distinctly shows that the action though spoken of in various texts is held to be one and the same.

“अपि वा क्रमसंयोगात् विधिपृथक्त्वमेकस्यां व्यवतिष्ठेत्” ॥ ३१ ॥

अपि वा Api vâ, but. क्रमसंयोगात् Kramasamyogât, on account of distinct orders of procedure. विधिपृथक्त्वम् Vidhiprithakatvam, difference in the injunctions. एकस्यां Ekasyâm, in regard to what is laid down in one text. व्यवतिष्ठेत् Vyavatiṣṭheta, should be.

31. “As there are distinct orders of procedure the Injunction pertaining to what is laid down in one text must be regarded as distinct (from those pertaining to what is laid down in other texts).—31.

COMMENTARY.

The action mentioned in one text must be regarded as different from the same action spoken of in another text for the simple reason that the order of procedure is found to be entirely different in two cases.

विरोधिनात्वसंयोगदैककर्मै तत्संयोगात् विधीनां सर्वकर्म- प्रत्ययः स्यात् ॥ ३२ ॥

विरोधिना Virodhinâ, with the contradictory. तु Tu, but. असंयोगात् Asamyogât, there being no connection. ऐककर्मै Aikakarme, the action being taken. तत्संयोगात् Tatsamyogât, on account of connection with that action. विधीनां Vidhînâm, of the injunctions. सर्वकर्मप्रत्ययः Sarvakarmapratyah, the common idea of all actions. स्यात् Syât, should be.

32. There being no connection with contradictory processes the action is taken as one and the same, hence all Injunctions connected with that action must be taken as affording the idea of that same action.—32.

COMMENTARY.

That all actions are one is shown by *Syntactical Connection*; while the difference in the order of procedure would, at best, be pointed by the *order* in which they happen to be mentioned; and as a rule Syntactical Connection is always more authoritative than mere order. Because, as a matter of fact, we find that such details as are mentioned even in the *Smritis* are not rejected by any considerations of Order, time or Extent; and then, how could it be that that which is pointed by the Syntactical Connection of Vedic texts would be rejected by any such considerations?

Thus, then, we conclude that the action mentioned in each Recensional text being distinctly recognized as the same, we cannot take each of these as a distinct action. And it has also been shown that there is no seventh means of differentiating actions, except those that have been explained above, which afford all the means for the necessary differentiation of actions.

End of Adhyâya II.

